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## THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN POLAND IN THE YEARS 1696-1697

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BY THE end of the seventeenth century many courts of Europe had had, for at least two centuries, a sustained interest in the Polish throne. Prior to the vacancies and subsequent elections and during the not infrequently interregna, diplomacy was notably busy in attempts to secure the election to a favored candidate or, minimally, to prevent the success of an opponent. The traditional Hapsburg-Bourbon rivalry found in Poland one of its busiest battlefields of political influence. The Bourbons desired to have an ally at the backdoor of the Hapsburg empire, and the Hapsburgs desired a friendly if not subservient Poland.

But Poland was internally weak. The forces on whom the one or the other power had to rely were utterly demoralized. They did not represent any steady element in the state. So the political atmosphere worsened until in the eighteenth century, the collapse was complete.

The present essay presents an episode in Polish history that illustrates this state of affairs at a crucial period. Polish glory had gone. The decay crept in long before Poland's gravediggers, the partition powers, initiated and accomplished the destruction of her independence.

Long before King John III Sobieski's death (1696) some of Poland's neighbors showed their keen interest in the election that was to follow the king's death. In the defensive alliance between Louis XIV of France and Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg of January 11, 1681, signed in Köln an der Spree, were included "articles secrets", point 5 of which obliged both partners to devote their particular attention to the events in Poland and to act in mutual agreement in case a new election should follow the death of John III.<sup>1</sup>

Five years later, on March 22, 1686, attention was paid to Polish affairs in the defensive alliance between the same Elector Frederick William and the Hapsburg Emperor, Leopold I. In article 22 of the treaty both

1 See: Moerner: *Kurbrandenburgische Staatsverträge im XVIII Jahrhundert*. (Berlin,

partners agreed to inform each other on any important decision concerning Poland.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, they insisted that the existing constitution, the free election of kings and the liberal rights of the nobility should be preserved.<sup>3</sup>

In Poland, too, the idea of finding a successor to John III cropped up quite early. The main antagonism prevailed between the Austrian and the French parties which had existed for decades. It is known that the election of John III was considered as a French victory. Only later, when Queen Maria Kazimira, who exercised an enormous political influence, abandoned the French party, the Austrian party considered itself victorious. However, now a different problem arose, and matters became more complicated.

John III hoped to secure the succession to his eldest son, James. But James was married to a Princess of Pfalz-Neuburg, a sister-in-law of the Emperor. While the King hoped to get the support of the Emperor for James, Louis XIV was planning to prevent James' election. As it happened, Maria Kazimira, too, was opposed to James. Thus, unintentionally, she sided with the French Party. The Queen wanted rather one of her younger sons, Constantin or Alexander, as candidates.

Louis XIV wished to take no chances. He sent to Poland as an extraordinary envoy, the Marquis de Bethune, who was a brother-in-law of the Queen. His instructions were to assist the Queen in her desire to prevent James from becoming the successor of John III. The Marquis decided above all to undermine the then existing anti-Turkish alliance. By so doing he hoped to weaken the influence of Austria in Poland and to replace it by the French influence. He drew up an agreement to be signed by the Queen and himself without the knowledge of the King, according to which the French Ambassador in Constantinople would mediate a separate peace treaty between Poland and Turkey and Poland would drop out of the great alliance. Besides, Poland would support the French candidate in the case of a coming conclave, and the Queen would promise to have French partisans in all important offices. The only return promise for Poland was that France would help her to reconquer Prussia from Brandenburg. In this way Bethune wanted to get Poland into the orbit of France, hoping that his relationship to the Queen would be helpful.

However, the Emperor had a very skillful agent. It was Father Vota, the King's confessor. He soon learned what was going on behind the King's back, and he set out to counteract it. He was successful and the agreement was a failure.

<sup>2</sup> Moerner: *ibid.* p. 714.

<sup>3</sup> Poland's neighbors appeared too interested in preserving the liberties of her nobility. They wanted Poland to be weak. So the anarchy in Poland grew. The statement: "Polska nieładem stoi," was a fact. During the present interregnum the rebellion of Boguslav Baranowski showed what such a liberty looked like. Hetman Jabłonowski had great difficulties in restoring order again. Cf. W. Konopczyński: *Dzieje Polski Nowożytnej*, (Warszawa, 1930), II, 146.



Louis XIV transferred Marquis de Bethune to Stockholm, and Sieur Vidame d'Esneval succeeded him in Poland. D'Esneval was instructed to promise anything in order to win Poland. When Maria Kazimira wanted the sum of 300,000 francs for bribery and a necklace worth 30,000 francs for herself, Louis was willing to grant it, though he added that he would not give anything before the peace treaty with the Turks should be concluded.

Meanwhile d'Esneval died without achieving anything, and one of the most skillful diplomats Louis XIV could find replaced him. It was the 32 year old Abbé Melchoir de Polignac.<sup>4</sup> The young envoy soon won the favor of the Queen. At once his energetic activities began where his predecessors had left off. Again he met the vigilance of Father Vota who was indeed his most dangerous adversary.<sup>5</sup> However, Father Vota's influence was soon to become ineffective.

When the King fell ill in March Polignac's hopes grew. His influence on the Queen was greater than ever. She would not have undertaken anything without consulting Polignac beforehand. And yet, when the King died on June 17 the moment appeared very inopportune for France.<sup>6</sup> France was exhausted as a consequence of long wars, and Louis XIV anticipated the great struggle that was bound to follow the death of the Spanish king that was generally thought to be imminent.

Immediately after Sobieski's death the preparations for the coming election started. At many County Councils (*seymiki*) resolutions concerning this election were adopted. At others it was resolved that the whole knight-hood should participate in the election, the prospective candidate should accept the obligation to reconquer Kamieniec Podolski from the Turks,<sup>8</sup> that he must not be a "Piast"<sup>7</sup> and that he and his wife should be Catholic.

In spite of the existing opposition to a "Piast" the sons of the late king were seriously considered for some time, but only James, his eldest son, could hope for a short while to be successful, whereas the other two sons remained during the whole election campaign rather shadowy figures.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> About Polignac, S. R. Scheller-Steinwartz: "Polen und die Königswahl im Jahre 1697," in *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte*, II (Berlin, 1912), 481-540.

<sup>5</sup> Polignac tried to influence Rome against Father Vota through the offices of the Cardinal de Jansen Forbin. Cf. Scheller-Steinwartz: *ibid.* p. 494.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. P. Helbig: "Polnische Wirtschaft und französische Diplomatie, 1692-1697" in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, I (München, 1859), 380-423.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. La Bizardiére, M. D. de: *Bezkrólowie po Janie III*, translated by Julian Bartoszewicz. (Wilno, 1853), p. 68. The Mazurian Council proposed that the Queen should stay away from Warsaw during the election campaign and that the whole Szlachta should participate in the elections. Concerning the first proposal it is interesting to note the attitude of the Queen as reported in K. Waliszewski's: *Marysienka*, translated by Lady Mary Loyd, (New York, 1899). p. 268. Cf. also: *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Ausführliche und Wahrhaftige Beschreibung aller und jeder denkwürdigen Geschichten etc.* (Frankfurt am Main, 1637-1738). XV, 71.

<sup>8</sup> By that term was meant any candidate of the Polish nobility.

<sup>9</sup> In the other letter to James' wife, Elizabeth Hedwig, at the end of June in which

James' followers consisted chiefly of pro-Austrian elements. For that reason alone France had to fight him, and if she considered a Sobieski, only the younger sons could be considered. This is expressed in a letter of Louis XIV to Polignac, dated July 3, when France did not yet consider a Bourbon candidate. As Louis could not spend much money he mentioned the sum of 200,000 thaler and no more, the nomination of Sobieski's younger sons was quite acceptable to him.<sup>10</sup>

However, the Polish nobility was on the whole unwilling to elect a Sobieski. The possibility that the widowed Queen would continue to exercise her influence, as she had while John III was alive, was a deterrent factor. Even when the quarrel in the royal family was known and the Queen decided to oppose James and to support one of her younger sons, even this fact did not help to remove the objection of the Poles. And when in October and November the chances for James did not appear too untavable, mainly due to the support of the influential Bishop of Kujavia,<sup>11</sup> he lost gradually the few followers he might have been able to rely on. The situation demanded the support of a foreign power. The candidate would need considerable funds and there was no Pole who had sufficient money to "buy" off the whole electorate. Besides, the Austrian party had no one who could compete with Polignac, Father Vota had lost all his influence after the king's death, and the Viennese Court appeared to be a weak sponsor for James. Judging from the documents to be found in the Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna one may conclude that Vienna was not particularly involved in the support for James. Thus the advantages were on the side of the French party.<sup>12</sup>

Two days after Sobieski's death Polignac wrote to Paris a very hopeful letter. The question of a French candidate arose. On July 8 the Marquis de Crassy, Louis XIV's Foreign Minister and Secretary, replied on behalf of his king saying that Louis XIV was willing to allow either Duke Henri Julien de Condé, or Duke Louis de Bourbon, or François Louis de Bourbon, Duke of Conti, to accept the nomination as a candidate for the Polish

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the Emperor expressed his sympathy on Sobieski's death he promised to support James as candidate to the throne and he authorized the messenger of the letter to discuss details about that with James. Cf. *Biblioteka Ordynaryi Myszkowskiej*, ed. S. Bandtke. (Lwów, 1860).

<sup>10</sup> Polignac's letter of June 19, which crossed this letter, reported that the Poles preferred a foreign candidate. So he suggested the nomination of a Bourbon prince. Cf. *Depesze księdza Polignac Posła francuskiego po śmierci Jana III, króla polskiego*. (Poznań, 1885).

<sup>11</sup> About this ambitious and influential man, cf. *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, tom V/1, zeszyt 21, (Kraków 1939), ed. W. Konopczyński: (Stanisław Kazimierz Dąbski, biskup kujawski. pp. 36-8) by K. Piwarski. See also: Szujski, Józef: *Dzieje Polski podług ostatnich badań*, (Lwów, 1886), v. 4. p. 159 and *Theatrum Europaeum*, *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> The documents and correspondence in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, show very little and vague support for James. See: *Polonica*, 1696-7. 1867).



throne in case the Poles would not wish to accept one of Sobieski's younger sons as candidates.<sup>13</sup>

On July 26 there followed another letter with instructions for Polignac. The envoy was instructed to support the candidate of Maria Kazimira. Should her candidate fail to gain the approval of the Polish nobility in this case, out of gratitude for the French support for her she should then support the French nominee. Anyway, Louis XIV expected that she would prevent the election of any Austrian candidate, and he pointed to the great harm done to the Polish cause in the past by the Hapsburgs. He was opposed to the election of the Elector of Brandenburg, Leopold of Lorraine and Karl of Neuburg, whereas he had no objections to the election of Max Emmanuel and the Markgraf Ludwig of Baden.<sup>14</sup>

The Austrian party in Poland realized that it was hard to compete with the energetic activity of Polignac. So they wanted to get rid of the competitor and they wrote to friends in France that Polignac was very extravagant in his promises and expenditures in spite of the fact that there was no hope for his success, because "the Poles" had decided to elect a Sobieski.<sup>15</sup> This was of course, not true. It may be, that as so often, certion factions expressed their own attitude and wishful thinking as the will of the electorate. At all events, this group's aim to discourage the support of the French party by France failed completely.

Following this letter Polignac reported that the Lubomirski, Radziejowski and other Magnates preferred Conti as a candidate. Only if there were no hope for Conti to be elected they might consider the Markgraf of Baden. He added that this seemed to have been the general attitude of the Polish electorate and he emphasized that the "Patriots" would be unable to prevent the election of a German prince if Louis XIV failed to emphasize his determination to support a candidate he would favor. He suggested that the King should nominate a definite candidate who would get the support of the Polish nobility. He wanted 600,000 francs for the Primate and 100,000 francs for Sapieha and the Lithuanians. This money should be used to get the support of the electorate. Besides, he wanted a guaranty of a pension for the friends of France, and he requested the money to be sent at once and deposited. It should also serve to pay the troops and to relieve the financial burden on the Szlachta.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Depesze* . . . *ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* Louis XIV thought that Vienna would support Karl or Leopold. Indeed, the latter's mother, who was ex-queen of Poland, wrote to Poland a letter of recommendation for her son as "a son of the Republic". See *Theatrum* v. XV. p. 294. Karl was the Emperor's brother-in-law, thus also not acceptable for France.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. La Bizardière: *ibid.* p. 70f. Note that every group in Poland considered itself as "the Poles". Though roughly speaking one can accept Konopczyński's conception that there was a distinct division between the szlachta and the Senators, it is far from an accurate appreciation of the existing situation. See Konopczyński: *ibid.* p. 146.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Depesze*, I. p. 11.

Louis XIV would have accepted Polignac's suggestion, but the conditions in France were then too complicated and the financial burden was too heavy, because the war absorbed big sums of money. However, he promised to consider Polignac's suggestions and he advised him to await further instructions.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile a new nomination appeared as a competitor. It was that of the ex-King James II of England who was living as a refugee in France. The project originated in Lithuania and won some support. In his report of July 27 Polignac wrote that the Grand Treasurer of Lithuania, Benedict Sapieha, had told him that neither he nor his friends would vote for a Sobieski. In order to prevent the success of any German candidate he proposed the nomination of James of England.<sup>18</sup> Also the Court Marshall of Lithuania, Alexander Sapieha, and others, according to the report, accepted the nomination. The supporters of James II thought that he was a pious, pleasant, devoted and respected old gentleman who had been accustomed to govern a free people. The election of James II would remove the "bone of contention" between France and England. It would facilitate peace in the west, and the English as well as the Dutch would most probably support the election.<sup>19</sup>

In his reply Louis XIV expressed his readiness to support this nomination in case no French prince would have any chance of election. Besides, he did not know the attitude of James II and he doubted whether England and Holland would support his candidacy. It was not however necessary to argue about this matter. James II had little support in Poland, if at all. He was soon forgotten, and among the electorate he was not taken at all seriously. As far as James II himself was concerned, he did not give any open consideration to his nomination in order not to make it appear as if he had renounced his pretensions to the English throne.<sup>20</sup>

In his report of August 3 Polignac again stressed the nomination of Conti. The Poles, according to this report, were enthusiastic about Conti. Still he needed 1,000,000 thaler to win the Szlachta.<sup>21</sup> This sum appeared far too large for Louis XIV. Thus he started to moderate the extravagant promises of Polignac. He asked him to accept no financial obligations whatsoever prior to the accomplished election of Conti.<sup>22</sup>

Polignac was disappointed. In each letter to Louis XIV he asked for money. In order to convince his king of the urgency of the matter he pointed out that Austria and James Sobieski had more money to spend on the

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, I. p. 13.

<sup>18</sup> Louis received this letter a day after mailing his instructions to Polignac. Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Scheller-Steinwartz: *ibid.* p. 505.

<sup>21</sup> *Depesze*, I. p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 16. Louis' letter was dated August 20.



election campaign than France, and that they were very generous with money.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, he tried to emphasize the importance of the election for France. In the letter of August 21 he compared the current election with that of 1573. Then France had been weak internally, and externally far less influential than in 1696. And yet in 1573 France not only had prevented a Hapsburg's success, but a French prince had become King of Poland.<sup>24</sup>

Polignac tried to influence other personalities in France, too, as to the urgent need for money for the campaign. From a letter to de Crassy which the latter showed to Louis XIV on September 12 we see how he did it. After pointing to the great achievements of France under Louis XIV in the struggle against the Hapsburgs for the hegemony of France he at the same time pointed out that the power of the Emperor had reached great heights, too. It was to be expected, he continued, that the Emperor would strengthen his position in the coming treaty with the Turks, and if Austria also succeeded in getting Spain under her domination the Emperor's power would far exceed that of Charles V. Such a development had to be prevented at all cost. An alliance with Poland would certainly change the balance of power in favor of France. Therefore a French prince on the Polish throne was of utmost importance.<sup>25</sup>

However, Louis XIV did not accept Polignac's reasoning. He was unwilling and unable to spend too much money on the election campaign. He desired to keep his promises, whereas in 1573 this had not been the case.<sup>26</sup>

The Convocation Parliament started August 29. Some representatives demanded that the widowed Queen should leave Warsaw, but she refused. Even the counsel of her friends did not change her mind. She was determined to influence the elections although she had not yet made up her mind whom she should support. She was in any case opposed to the election of James, but her younger sons refused to accept the nomination. Her influence was consequently bound to shrink. This actually happened, and an important source of potential unrest disappeared.

The Voivode of Lenczyca, Raphael Leszczyński, the Bishop of Kalisz, Jan Małachowski, and the Bishop of Kujavia, Stanisław K. Dąbski, were James' partizans, as well as the Papal Nuncio. Strangely enough, the latter tried to gain Polignac's support for him. This was mainly due to the influence of Vienna, because the Pope had declared to Jansen Forbin that he did not care whether Conti or James were elected.<sup>27</sup> According to the con-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 17.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 26.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 27.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Szujski: *ibidem*, v. 4. p. 154.

ception of the Nuncio the election of James would help to bring peace between France and Austria.<sup>28</sup>

In spite of their great efforts the Austrian party soon realized that Polignac was too skillful a competitor to cope with. Thus Dąbski published an "Open Letter" under the heading: *Rationes pro non eligendo Galliae Principe in Regem Poloniae*<sup>29</sup> in which he denounced the falsehood and trickery of the French party. He pointed to the anti-French feeling in Poland which had existed for ages and said that the reason there was an anti-Piast feeling in Poland was due to the pro-French sentiments of the Piast kings which have been provoking Poland's neighbors. He advised Polignac to withdraw his nomination, as later on it might become too difficult for him to do so.<sup>30</sup>

Polignac took up this challenge. His reply circulated widely throughout the country. He recalled the anti-Hapsburg attitude of the famous Hetman Zamoyski. He dispersed any possible anti-French feelings by emphasizing all the good sides of the French and all the bad sides of the Hapsburgs. He praised the virtues, valor and wealth of Conti, and he now publicly repeated all the promises he had given before to the Magnates.

It is interesting reading how he tried to convince the Poles about the virtues their king needed, which, of course, Conti was supposed to possess. Poland needed "... Regem optimum, Regem maximum, Regem bellicosum, sapientem, magnanimum, liberalem, modestum, stabilem, qui tot eximie talentis ad pristinum oppulgentiae splendor et famae status redimat Republicam bellumque vocalibus triumphis ut propria Eccellas vestrae verbis utar, hostes patriae debellet, aemulos derreat et vicinos in aeterna societatis atque amicitia ne necessitate continent, qui regat populum suum exemplo potius quam autoritate, qui sit in bello primus bellator, in consiliis primus consiliarius, quem nemo Polonus aut oderit, aut condemnat, qui sceptrum sibi neque lege, neque consuetudine, sed amore natione delatum digne ferre studeat..."<sup>31</sup>

The Bishop of Kujavia was not a man that gave in. He continued to fight with energy and zeal against France's influence. He argued that Louis XIV's conception of government would not harmonize with the "Thorn-Crown" of Poland and that it would not be worth the trouble Polignac took to gain it for a French prince unless some concealed motives made the Polish crown appear attractive.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Depesze*, I. p. 18. The arguments of the Nuncio did not convince Polignac. He thought that it would be fair for the ex-king of England to regain his throne instead.

<sup>29</sup> Throughout the whole campaign, as we see, Dąbski was above all anti-French.

<sup>30</sup> See copy of this letter in Polonica, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.

<sup>31</sup> The letter, headed: "*Epistola responsoria legati Galliae ad episcopum Cuiaviensem*" is interesting for its political and diplomatic argument. One copy can be found in the Polonica-collection, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Helbig: *ibid.* pp. 394-5.



Soon another candidate caused a great deal of concern to Polignac: the above mentioned Markgraf Ludwig von Baden. The confidence that Jansen Forbin, who did not consider the Markgraf a good Catholic, would help him against this candidacy was not sufficient for Polignac, particularly as he knew that Louis himself had no particular objection to him.<sup>33</sup> He then succeeded in convincing the king that Ludwig was a candidate of the Elector of Brandenburg,<sup>34</sup> reason enough for Louis to be against the Markgraf. Besides, he proved, as he expressed it in a letter to Jansen Forbin: "Ils n'ont pas le coeur trop français," that Ludwig could not deserve support by France.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, Ludwig had a good chance to be elected. He was a famous general, wealthy, respectable, politically independent even towards the Emperor, whom he served, and a Catholic. Even Polignac had found nothing to diminish his chances as a candidate.<sup>36</sup> In his instructions for Polignac, Louis XIV wrote: "... que le commendement qu'il a presentement des armées de l'Empereur ne l'empêcherait pas s'il étoit roi, de repler sa conduite suivant les intérêts de la couronne de Pologne."<sup>37</sup>

But these characteristics were against those who wanted to preserve and increase their influence on Polish affairs.<sup>38</sup> Eventually only one supporter remained behind the Markgraf: the Elector of Brandenburg, and this was only because he hoped to clear up some outstanding problems concerning the Baltic provinces with the help of Ludwig, once the Markgraf was elected.<sup>39</sup> In his instructions for his envoy, Hoverbeck, Frederick III asked the envoy to work for the Markgraf in case no "Piast" had a chance to be elected and he justified his intervention in Polish affairs by saying that he did it "amore rei publicae at boni publici" only.<sup>40</sup>

Hoverbeck was optimistic and he reported to Frederick III that he had been told by the Commander in Chief that all of Lithuania wanted to elect the Markgraf. Maybe the Magnates having sensed a shortage of money in French quarters he hoped to get more money from the Markgraf. It may have been that it was purely wishful thinking; anyway, the chances for Ludwig were very shortlived.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See above p. 115.

<sup>34</sup> This appears obvious from the subsequent attitude of Louis XIV.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Helbig. *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Louis thought of Ludwig von Baden that "cette candidature est tellement dangereuse, uarce qu'il n'y a absolument rien à redire". See Erdmannsdörfer, B., *Deutsche Geschichte vom westphälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen*, II (Berlin, 1893), 86.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Recueil des Instructions* in Erdmannsdörfer, *op. cit.*, 87f.

<sup>38</sup> See Droysen, J. G.: *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, IV, (Leipzig, 1886), 167f.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Erdmannsdörfer: *op. cit.*, p. 86f. and Droysen: *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Droysen: *ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Compare the agreements of the Magnates with Polignac of October 8, (Szujski: *op. cit.*, p. 165), and of October 24, quoted by Scheller-Steinwartz: *op. cit.*, p. 509.

Polignac continued to be generous in his promises, though he had very little cash to offer. Whatever his attitude was - hope that Louis would be generous later, particularly after the election of Conti, or dishonesty, - anyway the Magnates wanted cash and not promises. Even their condition, that the candidate should reconquer Kamieniec Podolski from the Turks, had to be fulfilled before the election, and this condition was definitely unacceptable to France, because this would have meant assistance to Austria against the Turks, France's natural allies.<sup>42</sup>

Louis XIV ordered Polignac to withdraw his promises. Polignac's position became difficult and the opposition against him in Poland grew. His opponents wrote in this sense to their French friends. Simultaneously they spread rumours that Louis XIV was not at all willing to support Conti, and that Conti was nominated only in order to counteract an Austrian candidate. This caused Polignac to present Conti publicly as the official candidate of France.<sup>43</sup> But this was not much help. The intrigues of his opponents succeeded in influencing Louis XIV to send Polignac strict orders to withdraw his promises. As Polignac appeared reluctant to obey the orders, Louis sent another envoy to Poland, who had to watch Polignac's activities and to withdraw the hazardous promises.

Louis' attitude toward the Polish affair is clear from his letter of January 13, 1697 in which he said that according to Polignac's reports the money he had already sent and promised should have been sufficient to secure success for his candidate. But he thought that Polignac had deceived himself, as he continued to ask for more and more money. Louis doubted whether he too should spend much money as, according to reports which had reached him from Poland, other candidates had as much chance to be elected as Conti. So he was unwilling to spend more money. If the money he had already spent was insufficient, he was willing to withdraw his candidate and support Alexander Sobieski.<sup>44</sup>

The man whom Louis sent to watch Polignac was Abbé de Castaguères de Chateauneuf. He was instructed that the Poles were greedy, corrupt and unreliable, that all the money spent could be easily lost in case a new candidate would appear immediately before the election with new money, at a time when France would have no more money to spare.

The mission of de Chateauneuf could have meant the fall of Polignac, but Polignac succeeded in convincing the new envoy that his optimism was justified, and soon de Chateauneuf was won over to Polignac's ideas and efforts.<sup>45</sup> This did not mean that both envoys could convince Louis XIV. The latter stuck to his wish to go slow with money, therefore the envoys

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Depesze*, p. 43 and the instructions of November 22, *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Polignac's report of November 9, in *Depesze*, p. 48.

<sup>44</sup> See Louis' letter of January 13, 1697 in *Depesze*, p. 64.

<sup>45</sup> See Szujski, *op. cit.*, p. 168.



had to go slow with money. This made the money-hungry Magnates try elsewhere for money. They turned their eyes towards the Markgraf Ludwig von Baden whose envoy, Count Gonzales (Abbé Gonzal), was soon involved in the mesh of intrigues of the Polish Magnates.<sup>46</sup>

As late as April 13, he reported to Ludwig that Hoverbeck had signed an agreement with Lubomirski in which the latter promised the election of Ludwig against a payment of 200,000 thaler. However, this sum was too high for the Markgraf. The Emperor refused to support him. Those who left the French party for lack of money in Polignac's pocket, had nothing left but a moneyless candidate, and those of the Austrian party who supported him were small in number. So the chances of the Markgraf were very poor.<sup>47</sup>

Before we enter the last phase of the election campaign one more candidate should be mentioned here, namely that of Don Livio Odescalchi, a nephew of the Pope Innocent VII, who for some time thought he might be able to get the Polish throne with the help of the Emperor. He sent an envoy to Poland, the Abbé de Monte Cattini, who was to lead the campaign in his favor. However, it was too hard a task,—and this nomination was a small episode in this struggle. He was soon forgotten.<sup>48</sup>

When the Election Parliament convened everything was still in an uncertain state of affairs. Chances and probable results were entirely unclear.<sup>49</sup> Only the French party was hopeful when their partisan, Bielinski, was elected Marshall with 11,848 votes out of 16,880. But suddenly a new candidate entered the struggle: Frederick August, the Elector of Saxony. As he was going to be the successful candidate we should introduce him here.

Frederick August was one of the commanders of the Imperial army in Hungary against the Turks when this election campaign started. There

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<sup>46</sup> From the Diary of Baron Greiffen sent to the Markgraf we can understand the attitude of the Viennese Court. Under the date May 26 we read: "Es seye eine schlechte Conduite und Politique von Ew. Hochfürstl. Durchlaucht, dass Seye Ihrer Majestät dem Kaiser Ihre intention und geführte negotiation nicht eher haben wissen lassen..." - "...indeme schon vor 6 Monaten seye bekannt gewesen, dass Ew. Durchlaucht einen Tractat mit Chur-Brandenburg gemacht, dass zum Fall s. Churfürstl. Durchlaucht Ewrer Hochfürstl. Durchlaucht zur Krohn Polen helfen werden, Sye Ihme Herrn Churfürsten das königliche Preussen in die Hand spielen und zum Königstiel verhelfen wollten." - The diary is quoted by Scheller-Steinwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 511, from the archive in Karlsruhe, Baden.

<sup>47</sup> See *Depesze*, Report of Polignac of April 1697.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. La Bizardière: *op. cit.*, p. 74.

<sup>49</sup> In a letter to Count Sedlnitzky the situation in Poland is described by Kinsky as follows: "Printz Jakob halte ich vor verlohren, Printz von Lothringen in parva, Printz Carl von Neuburg in nulla spe, Printz Conti adhuc metuendum, Curfürsten von Bayern oblitum, Marggrafen von Baden non contemio sed non metuo, den Englland und Holland werden das behörige nit beytragen und durfte nudis promisso nit zur 'rechten Zeit angeritten kommen, bleibe bei meiner Meinung glaubend, dass sors endlich super piastum ausschlagen dürfte". See the letter in Kinsky's *mémoires*, in *Polonica*, 1697.

was a slackening in the successes of the army just then. It was generally accepted that the failure of the High Command was responsible for the condition on the battlefield, particularly as the attack of August 26, 1696 was a failure and Frederick August, who had ordered it, was considered responsible for the attack and the failure. On September 13 the Emperor ordered Frederick August to report to Vienna, and naturally the latter complied with this order in a wrong mood. He succeeded in convincing the Emperor of his innocence and he was again entrusted with the High Command, but a certain misgiving against the Emperor remained. In such a mood the idea cropped up into his mind to enter the competition for the Polish throne the origin of which sounded somewhat romantic.<sup>50</sup>

The Elector happened to stay in Torgau in December 1696. In one of the rooms of the palace there he noticed a strange painting. It showed a man who was attacked by lions and defended by tigers. He was very interested in the painting and he asked his companions about its meaning. His doctor, Dr. Erndteil, told him the painting referred to a dream which he could look up in an old book.<sup>51</sup>

Frederick August secured the book and studied it. In it were many stories and prophecies, "inspired by the Lord". Among them was a prophecy which he considered as referring to himself and having some connection with the election campaign in Poland. According to the prophecy a member of the House of Wettin (i.e. Saxon), August by name, would become king of Poland. Later, the Polish rule would stop and he would become Emperor of the Roman Empire. With the assistance of a Würtemberg prince, who had been formerly in Danish service, he defeated the Turks, conquered Hungary and part of Asia, and eventually became Emperor in Constantinople. "Und gleich wie der erste Kaiser" the prophecy went on, "unter welchem Christus geboren worden, fromm, glücklich, ein Held und Triumphirer gewesen, ja ein Mehrer des Reiches genannt worden, also wird auch der letzte Augustus, den ich Augustum den Grossen nenne, aus einem grossen Geschlechte und Volke, der letzte Monarch im römischen Reiche sein. Dieser Augustus wird bis zur letzten Zukunft Messia leben, unter welchem auch unser Herr und Heiland Jesus Christus Kommen wird zu richten die Lebendigen und die Toten."<sup>52</sup> The Elector imagined himself already as Emperor of Constantinople.

This, according to Haake, was the origin of Frederick's idea to enter

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. Haake, P., *König August der Starke* (Dresden, 1922) and Haake P., "Die Wahl August des Starken zum König von Polen." in *Historische Viertelsjahresschrift* VI, (Leipzig, 1906), 31-84.

<sup>51</sup> Quoted from the State Archives in Dresden by Haake: "Die Wahl August des Starken".

<sup>52</sup> This prophecy is based on another one according to which the Pope would in 1690 be in great distress. All his allies will leave him, and in 1699 his empire would be destroyed completely. Cf. Haake, *ibid.*



the competition for the Polish throne. But Wagner thinks that the example of Frederick III Elector of Brandenburg, who was soon (1701) to become king of Prussia and the existence of the vacancy of the Polish throne, gave the Elector the idea for this enterprise.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps, he continues his supposition, the Prussian crown and the Polish election were discussed at the Dresden Conference that took place in December 1696 between the two Electors.<sup>54</sup> F. Förster, in his book: *Friedrich August II, König von Polen und Kurfürst von Sachsen*, (Potsdam, 1839) expressed the opinion that Frederick August had thought of getting the Polish throne long before Sobieski died, though he failed to prove it. It seems that the idea of La Bizardière that the initiative for his nomination came from Poland might have been accepted by the historians of the period, at least as partially correct. La Bizardière mentions that the Castellan of Kulm, Przebendowski, went to Dresden, put forward this suggestion and tried to gain the consent of the Elector. The Castellan of Kulm played an important part in the election of Frederick August, but as we will shortly see, La Bizardière's conception contains more accuracy in it. Anyway, things are not yet clarified, and we know only that the nomination appeared suddenly.

At the end of January 1697 the Elector sent his envoy, Erich Theodor von Rose, to Rome and Paris in order to win the support of the Pope and Louis XIV.<sup>55</sup> Von Rose first spoke with Jansen Forbin. He promised France an alliance against the Hapsburgs and the Pope the Elector's conversion to Catholicism.<sup>56</sup> The response was apparently not favorable. In his report to Frederick August, von Rose wrote: ". . . que le cardinal de Jansen estimait, que les choses étaient trop avancées en Pologne pour que Louis XIV y put appuyer les prétensions de l'Electeur, a moins que dans la suite, il uy ont bien de la proposer comme tiers parti; alors seulement le roi de France concourrait volontiers a cette election comme a toute affaire, qui pourrait être avantageuse à l'Electeur et à la maison de Saxo."<sup>57</sup>

Von Rose was not discouraged. He went to Copenhagen and conferred with the French envoy Collière who tried to intervene on behalf of Frederick August. He had no success as Louis XIV considered the time too far in the future. He could not and did not want to change his mind. Too many ties connected the Elector with the Emperor to be trusted by the French king.<sup>58</sup>

Frederick August heard that one of his colonels, the Pomeranian

<sup>53</sup> See Wagner, G.: *Die Beziehungen August des Starken zu seinen Ständen*. (Leipzig, 1903).

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>55</sup> See La Bizardière, *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> S. Haake, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>57</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 53

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Scheller-Steinwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

Jacob Heinrich von Flemming, had applied for leave because he wanted to go to Poland to visit his relatives and to watch the election campaign. The King asked Flemming to come to see him before leaving for Poland. When Flemming came he disclosed to him his intentions and asked him to accept the mission to become his agent in Poland. Flemming was astonished. He thought that it was too late. Besides, he pointed out that the candidate must be Catholic. Frederick August dismissed his objections. He thought it was just as good to get on the field late, when all the candidates had spent all their money, and that he had decided to become a Catholic.<sup>59</sup>

Flemming accepted the mission, although he had little money at his disposal. He carried a letter of the Elector for Polignac with the request for support in case the election of Conti would have no chances. He visited his cousin, Przebendowski, the Castellan of Kulm, after his arrival to Poland. He discussed with him the whole problem, and the cousin accepted the idea, though reluctantly.

Przebendowski introduced Flemming to the Primate, Radziejowski, who was a leader of the French party. Radziejowski appeared enthusiastic about Frederick August, and even exclaimed: "The Lord had sent him." He asked for a proof of the Elector's willingness to become a Catholic, — and for money, of course, to disengage himself from the French party. Przebendowski introduced Flemming also to the Lubomirskis and Sapiehas whose attitude was the same as that of the Primate.<sup>60</sup>

Polignac cold-shouldered Flemming. He did not wish to act without instructions from Louis XIV. Chateaufort reported concerning the new candidate to Paris, <sup>61</sup> and the answer from there was the same as that to von Rose as we learned above.<sup>62</sup>

There was some hope to get the support of the Emperor, because there was actually no candidate that could have won the wholehearted support of Vienna.<sup>63</sup> The only candidate so far who could hope to be successful was Conti, and Vienna was not willing to accept him. Fortunately for

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<sup>59</sup> Flemming's cousin was married to the Castellan of Kulm, Przebendowski, mentioned by La Bizardière as the man who first brought up the idea of the nomination of Frederick August. Anyway, Przebendowski played an important part in this election, and Haake's conception based on more recent research is more acceptable. This has been proven by the appreciation of the contemporaries. The bishop of Kujavia, Dąbski, appeared very annoyed about the credit given to the Castellan, though he considered himself as having been the more important figure in the election. See *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Vol. cit., p. 37.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Haake, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *Depesze*, II.

<sup>62</sup> See above, p. 123.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Redlich, O., *Geschichte Oesterreichs*. (Vol. 6. of Huber's: *Geschichte Oesterreichs*.) (Vienna, 1921).



Vienna the young Tsar Peter, too, was against the election of Conti.<sup>64</sup> But they had no candidate of their own with any hope for success.

When the Elector revealed his intentions to Count Kinsky, May 1697, Kinsky was very pleased with it. He hoped to get the Electoral College of the Holy Roman Empire catholicized, to prevent the election of the French candidate and to get a free hand in Hungary. Besides, the Elector promised to add 10,000 troops to the Imperial army to those fighting already in its ranks. Nevertheless, the Emperor supported him only half heartedly, and the Austrian envoy, Lamberg, played a somewhat ambiguous role.<sup>65</sup> This, however, did not deter Frederick August. He was sure of the support of the Emperor eventually, and so he went through the ceremony of conversion in Baden near Vienna. June 2, in the Imperial Palace, in the presence of the Bishop of Raab.

After the conversion all energy was concentrated on winning the election. There was little time left and little money available. The Elector ordered the treasury to force from the Council of Zwittau a loan of 100,000 thaler. He sold his rights on Lauenburg to the Guelfs for 1,100,000 gulden. He pawned the crown jewels with the Jesuits in Vienna for 1,000,000 gulden. He sold his property in Pillnitz to his mother for 15,000 ducats. In this way a substantial sum was at his disposal.<sup>66</sup>

When Flemming arrived at the beginning of June in Warsaw he was already an official envoy of the Elector. He brought his credentials to the Primate and a letter to the "Republic". He presented the promises of the Elector in case he should be elected. He promised to be a mild and fair ruler, to name officials according to merits, to pay the army its dues, altogether 10,000,000 gulden, to reconquer Kamieniec Podolski, Ukraine, Moldavia, Wallachia, to exchange Saxon territory against neighborly Polish provinces, to maintain an army of 6,000 men out of his own funds, etc. etc.

It is interesting to note that the conversion was kept secret. In a letter to the Primate it was pointed out that for "comprehensible reasons" he was bound to consider it a secret and the Primate was requested to consider it, too, as a confidential matter.

The Primate did not comply with this wish. He showed this letter, and by that he proved his unfavorable disposition towards the Elector, whatever might have been the reason for his indiscretion. Anyway, he

<sup>64</sup> Concerning the attitude of the Tsar towards the election, cf. Solovyoff, S. M.: *Ystoria Rossyi*, XIV (St. Petersburg, 1894f). 229. See also: Kazimierz Waliszewski, *Peter the Great*, translated by Lady Mary Loyd, (New York, 1897), p. 80. The Tsar considered any candidate better than Conti, as he thought of France as an ally of Turkey with whom he was at war. He seemed to have been prepared to prevent Conti's election even by force of arms.

<sup>65</sup> S. Instructions to Lamberg, Austria's envoy in Warsaw, in *Polonica*, 1697. Haus- Hof- and Staatsarchiv. in Vienna.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Haake; *op. cit.*, p. 63. See particularly the note on that page.

seemed to have remained a Contist.<sup>67</sup> However, the letter made a favorable impression on those to whom the Primate had shown it, and many had approached Flemming afterwards. But for Flemming, too, it was good to learn in time the attitude of the Primate. He started his work energetically to reach his goal. He put up a poster provided with the Saxon emblem inviting all interested to come and to see for themselves his credentials and the letter to the "Republic". Then he got the certificate of the conversion signed by the Bishop of Raab and verified by the Nuntius, Davia, in Warsaw. He published the Primate's letter to the Elector, of May 24, in order to prove the perfidy of the Primate. He asked 100 Jesuits to copy the letter of the Elector containing his promises to the Poles, in order to distribute the copies among the Poles. In this way he gained more and more followers for his candidate.

June 26 was the election day. The Primate introduced the election with a speech in which he mentioned all candidates, except Frederick August. Only casually he referred to rumors that the Elector of Saxony was supposed to be one of the candidates, but that he was supposed to know nothing about it.

The results of the first voting brought forth three candidates: James Sobieski, Conti and Frederick August with no decisive electoral cast. Attempts to get some agreement between voters failed. On orders of the Primate the electorate remained overnight on the field. Fortunately for the Elector, Flemming received in the afternoon 40,000 thaler which he distributed among the electorate. So the followers of James were bought off<sup>68</sup> and next morning there were only two candidates. Both parties were approximately equally strong. The Primate proposed that both parties should elect representatives among their followers who would try to find a modus for peaceful agreement. Indeed there was some inclination to accept this proposal, but the Saxon party grew stronger when the Sapiehas joined it. Thus this party presented the Contists with an ultimatum to withdraw their candidate, as they were going to acclaim Frederick August as King.

As the Contist party began to shrink the Primate was pressed to do something about it. He got on horseback and rode across the election field asking the electorate whether they consented to elect Conti. Some shouted: "Yes", and others shouted: "No". Ignoring the latter, he acclaimed Conti as King of Poland. The Saxon party protested, and without delay the Bishop of Kujavia proclaimed Frederick August King of Poland.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>67</sup> He ostentatiously ignored the candidacy of Frederick August.

<sup>68</sup> All non-Contists decided to vote for Frederick August. See: Haake, *König August der Starke*, p. 45.

<sup>69</sup> In this historic muddle it might not sound strange, though it was very unlikely, that Damski had offered his support for Conti a short while before against a payment of 20,000 thaler as one can read in the *Depesze*, II, an offer that was quoted from the Archive of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and, it was reported, that offer was not accepted.



Both candidates accepted the election, and so force alone had to decide. On the suggestion of Przebendowski the Elector mobilized troops and made all preparations to march into Poland. He did not lose any time and on July 6, Saxon troops entered Poland at Tarowice. This, in fact, decided the election results in favor of Frederick August.<sup>70</sup>

The outcome of this election campaign can be summed up in the following way: French diplomacy suffered a great defeat, while the Hapsburgs won a very cheap and easy victory,<sup>71</sup> a victory shared by almost all neighbors of Poland, with the exception of Sweden.<sup>72</sup>

Very soon the effect of this election was to be felt on various battlefields, particularly in and about Spain, in Hungary, and in the Northern War. Sweden had to pay a high price. The Turks had to conclude the peace treaty of Karlowitz and France faced a very exhausting struggle for the succession in Spain.

However, the real victims were Saxony and Poland. Saxony paid too high a price for a quite unattractive crown. She lost her leadership in the German Protestant world. Poland began her steady but continuous decline, while Russia and Prussia were on the threshold of becoming the great and important powers of the following generations,—to a great extent at the expense of Poland.

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<sup>70</sup> Conti, too, came to Poland in order to accept the election, but he came ten days too late. He arrived by sea to Danzig. He realized that it was impossible to start a fight and he returned to France. See Konopczyński: *op. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>71</sup> Austria's ambiguity continued to the very end, as is quite clear from documents in the Staatsarchiv in Vienna. See also: Scheller-Steinwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 520.

<sup>72</sup> On the attitude of Sweden, see Haake: *König August der Starke*, p. 45; on that of Brandenburg see Droysen: *op. cit.*, v. IV, 1, Anmerkung 172. From all these documents we gather that the conception of Konopczyński in his: *Brief Outline of Polish History* (Polish Encyclopaedic Publications II, Geneva, 1921), was exaggerated when he sees the results of this election as an outcome of the intrigues of the powers which subsequently were the partition powers. On the contrary it is obvious that the disintegration of Poland started from within. The neighboring powers made only good use for their own purposes of this state of affairs. See Konopczyński's *Outline*, p. 29.

## ON THE NATURE OF PEASANT SERFDOM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

by Roman Rosdolsky

IN HER book *The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant 1740-1798* (New York 1949) Edith Murr Link touches upon the question of the character of peasant bondage in Austria in the eighteenth century. Can this bondage be considered as *serfdom* (*Leibeigenschaft*), or was the status of the Austrian peasants rather that of *hereditary subjection* (*Erbuntertänigkeit*)? The controversy is a very old one, and, according to Dr. Link, of purely terminological nature. "Perhaps they (the Austrian peasants) cannot be regarded as serfs anywhere in the monarchy, although whether they were serfs or not depends on what we accept as a definition of the term." If we follow Knapp and Grünberg for whom the term "serfdom" was synonymous with outright slavery, then, of course, the Austrian peasants were not slaves. But if we adopt the conception of the Josephinian legislation for which restriction of the peasant's freedom of movement in itself represented a feature of serfdom, then these peasants must be regarded as serfs even in the so-called German provinces of the monarchy.<sup>1</sup> Thus the whole question becomes one of definition only, and the historian is free to use whatever term he prefers, provided that he states unequivocally what he means.

It is my opinion that this presentation of the "old controversy" can not be accepted, nor does it offer anything new to the reader. The problem is actually much more complex—and also more interesting—than it appears at first glance. But to prove this, we have to go into some details of the subject and to deal with Joseph II's "abolition of serfdom" as well as with the opinions expressed by Georg Knapp and Karl Grünberg.

As Dr. Link points out, the very context of the Josephinian "*Leibeigenschaftsaufhebungspatente*" of the years 1781-1782 excludes the possibility that the term *Leibeigenschaft* was used in those patents as synonymous with slavery. The Josephinian laws granted the peasants the right to leave their villages and to move to the cities or to other manors, the right to marry without the permission of the landlord, the right to let their children learn arts and crafts, etc. In short, the provisions of the law eliminated a series of very burdensome and oppressive restrictions of the peasant's personal freedom; but all these restrictions resulted only from the *glebae adscriptio* of the peasants, and did not indicate that the peasants were slaves anywhere in the Austrian empire. Why then did the legislators choose the term *Leibeigenschaft* which was not only rare in the earlier Austrian legislation, but had also the disadvantage to be easily mistaken for real slavery?

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<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.



Grünberg and Knapp give a very simple explanation. Grünberg claims that the term *Leibeigenschaft* was introduced or "created" (*geschaffen*) "by the reformatory zeal of the eighteenth century . . . in order to make the hateful system of bondage and its basis, hereditary subjection, even more odious . . ."<sup>2</sup> Knapp goes even farther when he asserts that the choice of this term was a deliberate move of the Emperor and the "reform party", "Joseph, like his mother,"—he writes—"used a small and highly justifiable artifice which proved very successful elsewhere too: the princes gave to the legal institution which was so repugnant to them a name which made it appear as something altogether different—a name which made it despicable. What they wanted to abolish, they called in this decisive moment 'serfdom'. But serfdom at that time meant . . . also slavery. Thus the princes, in their sincere ardor for the future of their countries have so to speak slandered to some extent the past of these countries."<sup>3</sup>

The construed character of this explanation is obvious. Of course, I do not want to cast any doubt on the "reformatory zeal" of the Josephinian (and not even of the incomparably more fainthearted and conservative Frederician) bureaucracy. A segment<sup>4</sup> of this bureaucracy was certainly inspired with the ideas of bourgeois enlightenment, and its philosophy was very radical for that time.<sup>5</sup> Yet, the assertion that the bureaucracy deliberately misinterpreted the existing social and legal condition of the Austrian peasants seems to be far-fetched. All the more so, since we can

<sup>2</sup> K. Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien*, I (Leipzig 1893), 94.

<sup>3</sup> G. F. Knapp, "Die Bauernbefreiung in Österreich und in Preussen." in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, Heft II (1894), p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> How stubbornly the majority of the Theresian and Josephinian bureaucracy opposed the peasant reforms, has been described by Grünberg, Mitrofanow and others.

<sup>5</sup> A good example of the views of this segment of the Josephinian bureaucracy is the contemporary book *Briefe über den jetzigen Zustand von Galizien* which the Galician gubernatorial official F. Kratter published anonymously in Leipzig. Here is a characteristic quotation from this pamphlet:

"And why *corvées*, if serfdom has been abolished? How can I be aware of the freedom granted to me by nature and by society, if I myself, my implements, my cattle my strength, my abilities still belong to another person for a certain number of days every week? I am thus free today, in order to be a slave tomorrow. What titles and claims can another man have in regard to me, that he could force me to live one half of my precious life for him? How could he have acquired such a title? Have my ancestors ceded it to him? But how could they have done that? Has he purchased me? Who could have sold me to him? Did he inherit me? Freedom was my inheritance, and how could my slavery be the inheritance of another person? And how does this man compensate me for being his slave? Does he give me protection, security, education, morality? How could he, who gloats over my bloody sweat, who crams himself with the fruit of my labor, who plays with it and flaunts it, who feeds retainers and buys sycophants and keeps whores with my labor? He, who is a burden to the state with his despotic pretensions, his tyrannic mania which keeps all courts of justice busy preventing him from swallowing completely the victim whose lifeblood he slowly sucks and devours." (*op. cit.*, I, 202-203.) All this was written in 1786, three years before the outbreak of the French Revolution.

quote historical documents which directly contradict the assumption that for Joseph II and his staff the term *Leibeigenschaft* was primarily a device of propaganda. Thus, when the estates of Styria tried to prevent the extension of the law of 1781 abolishing peasant serfdom to that province, they pointed out that peasant serfdom did not exist in Styria and that even the term *Leibeigenschaft* was unknown there. The emperor replied in his "resolution" of April 21, 1782: "As the word "serfdom", as the estates claim, is no longer known in the Inner Austrian lands, and as at present we are dealing only with some effects of serfdom that are either residues of former times or have crept in gradually, it seems that the word serfdom must be omitted from the patent. Concerning the content of the patent, it is necessary to establish without exception the personal freedom granted by the Bohemian and Moravian decree. This freedom, as is definitely known to me, does not at all exist in Lower Styria."<sup>6</sup>

As we see, Joseph tenounces in this instance the term *Leibeigenschaft* despite its "propagandistic" value. This appears all the more remarkable, since only some months earlier (in 1781) the estates of Bohemia and Moravia had put forth the same arguments as the nobility of Styria<sup>7</sup>, but the Emperor had not yielded to them. Why this different attitude? It can be easily explained by the fact that in Styria existed really only "residues" of the institution which Joseph II regarded as "serfdom", while in the Bohemian provinces this institution was still predominant. Therefore the Emperor could drop the term *Leibeigenschaft* in the Styrian case, but had to insist on it when referring to the Czech peasants. In both cases, however, this term meant to Joseph nothing else than *glebae adscriptio* with all the restrictions of the peasant's personal freedom which resulted from it. It must be admitted that this term was vague and ambiguous—but this ambiguity had its source in historic reality itself, in the endeavors of the nobility to extend the bondage of the peasants to a point where it resembled real slavery. Such endeavors found their expression frequently in the writings of the learned jurists, especially in nobility republics, who identified peasant

<sup>6</sup> *Resolutionsbuch* ex 1782: "Vortrag, die Ausserung des I. Ö. Gub. über die Adaptirung des Patents, die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft betr." (H.-H.-und Staatsarchiv in Vienna.) I use here the translation given by Link, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> Grünberg, *op. cit.*, v. II, pp. 373 and 379 "dass der böhmische Unterthan bereits von Jahren her nach der gehässigen Leibeigenschafts Gestalt nicht, sondern als ein blosser natürlicher Unterthan behandelt würde"; "dass in Mähren weder *ex lege summi Principis*, noch *ex pacto* eine Leibeigenschaft im genauen Verstande, d.i. eine Servitus Romana oder Sklavische Knechtschaft jemals bestanden habe, minder heut zu Tage bestehe). In contrast to the failure of the Austrian nobility to move Joseph II by this argumentation, the Prussian nobility in Pomerania succeeded in thwarting the abolition of peasant serfdom intended by Frederick II in 1762-1763, and in reducing the whole question to a terminological dispute. (See von Brüneck, "Die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft durch die Gesetzgebung Friedrich des Grossen und das Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht", in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germ. Abt.*, v. X, pp. 32-37.)



bondage with the *servitus Romana*,<sup>8</sup> in order to promote the aims of the landowners. "The conception of the peasant's serfdom," writes Kovalevskij, "furthered, of course, the abolition of his freedom of movement, of his right of marriage and his right to bequeath his mobile property to his heirs." The same tendency prevailed in all countries east of the river Elbe, where the manorial system predominated. And this fact, i.e. the real existence of elements of slavery in the peasant conditions of those times, explains sufficiently the usage of the term "serfdom" in the peasant legislation of enlightened absolutism. The "propagandistic" motives of the reform party were here certainly only of secondary importance.

The obvious fact that neither the Austrian nor any other Central European peasants were actually slaves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was expounded by Knapp as well as by Grünberg, in order to prove not only that the terminology of the Josephinian legislation was entirely incorrect, but also that from a scientific viewpoint the status of those peasants can be defined only as hereditary subjection. "*Leibeigenschaft*"—writes Knapp in his book on the emancipation of the Prussian peasants—"is primarily the German word for slavery. In this sense its characteristic features are: The serf cannot acquire property for himself (he acquires it for his owner), and the serf cannot be sold like a thing. This was certainly not the situation in which the great mass of the peasantry found itself, not even in the worst areas . . . The bondage of the peasants had neither resulted from slavery, nor did it show the characteristic marks of slavery. On the whole, peasant bondage, even in its most severe form, was always of such a nature that the peasant represented an appurtenance of the manor and could be alienated only together with the manor, but not as a being by himself. Furthermore, even if he could not always bequeath his tenancy, he had in every case the right to leave his mobile property to his family."<sup>10</sup> Knapp's pupil, Grünberg, deals with the problem in a similar manner. He too identifies serfdom with slavery<sup>11</sup> and regards as its principal features the serf's lack of legal capacity and of protection by the law on one hand, and his character as a mere subject of property rights on the other. Grünberg

<sup>8</sup> Thus the Polish jurist Thomas Dresdner wrote in his *Institutionum iuris regni Poloniae libri quatuor* (Zamosci, 1613, I, p. 57): *ut breviter dicatur, quae antiquis Romanis in servos fuit, haec nunc nobilibus Polonis in plebeios subditos absoluta est, quod ad ius attinet, potestas.* - Similar views were expressed a century earlier by the Czech jurist Viktorin Kornel (see Kamil Krofta, *Dějiny selského stavu* (History of the peasant class), Prague 1949, p. 103.

<sup>9</sup> Maxim Kovalevskij, *Die ökonomische Entwicklung Europas bis zum Beginn der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsform*, v. VI, p. 386.

<sup>10</sup> G. F. Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter in den älteren Teilen Preussens* 1887, v. I, p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> "To avoid a mere dispute about words" - writes Grünberg - "I want to state in advance that I regard the term *Leibeigenschaft* as synonymous with slavery." (*op. cit.*, v. I, p. 87.)

admits that slavery appears also in milder forms in which the above mentioned features can be "combined in various degrees". But, he adds, "we must not forget that a legal status can be regarded as serfdom only when the master can dispose of his subject in exactly the same way as of all other parts of his property". This was, however, not the case in the Bohemian provinces. Although the Czech peasant was *glebae adscriptus*, his *nexus* with the soil could not be deliberately severed by the landlord. Furthermore, he was capable of family and property rights<sup>12</sup>, and enjoyed, at least in principle, a certain legal protection in his relations with his lord.<sup>13</sup>

Of course, these arguments of Knapp and Grünberg cannot be called in question if we concede that the term "*Leibeigenschaft*" has to be understood as identical to slavery. In this case the whole problem would, indeed, be one of terminology only. But is it true that our only alternative is to choose between the two opposites: "slavery" and "hereditary subjection", and that there were no other *transitional* forms between them? Does the term "hereditary subjection" really comprise all forms of bondage different from outright slavery? For instance: it is known that the bondage of the Czech peasant in the 14th and 15th century differed greatly from what it was three centuries later. In the earlier period, he was free to abandon his holdings and his village, to become a craftsman, to send his children to school, etc.; at the later date, he was in the full sense of the word a personal appurtenance to the manor, a *glebae adscriptus*. But in *both cases*, according to Knapp and Grünberg, his status should be defined as "hereditary subjection" only. If we have thus avoided one terminological ambiguity, we have plunged into another no less disconcerting one.<sup>14</sup> And on the other hand: to what category would Knapp and Grünberg have referred the ancient *colons* whose status was described by the Roman jurists with the words: *quadam servitute dediti patronis videntur*?<sup>15</sup> Here we are obviously confronted with a transitional institution which seems to suit none of the above forms. But the same refers *mutatis mutandis* also to the Central and Eastern European peasant serfs. According to Knapp and Grünberg, we can speak of "hereditary subjection" only in countries, where the peasants were not sold without the soil and where they enjoyed a certain legal protection against their landlords.<sup>16</sup> From this follows that the status of the peasants

<sup>12</sup> But the same was true also for the Polish and Russian peasants whom Grünberg, as we shall see later, nevertheless regarded as actual *slaves*.

<sup>13</sup> Grünberg, *op. cit.*, v. I, pp. 88-89.

<sup>14</sup> From this viewpoint Grünberg's conception was criticized by the Czech scholars J. Kaizl and K. Kadlec. Both maintained that since the Czech peasants of the seventeenth and eighteenth century were not only bondsmen, but also *glebae adscripti*, it is correct to refer to them as serfs, which term does not at all designate the status of slavery. Of the same opinion was the Czech historian J. Kalousek, while J. Pekař shared Grünberg's views. - K. Krofta whose book I have quoted above considered the dispute as a terminological one and was willing to drop the term "peasant serfdom" as misleading. (*op. cit.*, p. 344.)



in all countries, where the above mentioned conditions were not fulfilled, would have to be characterized as outright slavery. This, however, would contrast not only with our legal concepts, but also with our sense of historical reality. Let us take the example of Poland. There can be no doubt that the Polish peasant could be alienated by his lord, even detached from the soil (several cases of this kind have been recorded in Polish historical literature). Also from the beginning of the sixteenth century the Polish peasants, with the exception of those on the royal domains, were explicitly excluded from any legal protection. Not even for the murder of a peasant could a nobleman be brought before a court of law (the ill-famed *Jus vitae et necis* of the Polish nobility with regard to their peasants). Thus single elements of slavery undoubtedly existed in Poland; nevertheless the Polish peasants were capable of family rights, could own movables, conclude contracts with their landlords, and the common law gave them certain titles with regard to the plots they tilled. The existence of one or even several characteristics of a slavery-like condition is therefore obviously not sufficient to define a form of bondage as "slavery". What counts is the relation between the subject and his master in its entirety—the question whether such features were essential to this relation or not. But, if we pose the problem in this form, then it becomes apparent that the bondage of the Polish peasant serfs was far removed from real slavery. Nobody can deny that the manorial system could have existed and developed in Poland without the *jus vitae et necis* of the nobles, and without the selling of the peasants detached from the land. None of these features was a necessary precondition for the proper functioning of this system<sup>17</sup>; they resulted primarily from the lack of a strong centralized state power in Poland which could have resisted the endeavors of the nobility to subjugate completely the working population of their manors.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Roth Clausen, *The Roman Colonate, The Theories of its Origin*, (New York, 1925), p. 21, n. 5.

<sup>16</sup> This latter argument, however, can be discounted; Grünberg himself states repeatedly that prior to the rule of Maria Theresa the legal protection of the Austrian peasants was only nominal and did not give any relief to the peasants.

<sup>17</sup> It is, however, obvious that this system which was based on the forced labor of the peasants could not exist without a certain degree of bondage of the peasant population. Nothing shows this more clearly than the history of the peasant conditions in the so-called Principality of Warsaw (later "Congress Poland"). Napoleon, in 1807, granted personal freedom to the peasants of this territory, but he failed to break up the large estates of the nobility and to give the peasants the ownership of the land which they had cultivated, as it had been done in France. As a result the actual, even though not the legal conditions of peasant bondage were soon *restored* in the Principality, and, according to the unanimous opinion of the Polish scholars (Wł. Grabski, Zron Kirkow-Kiedroniowa, H. Grynwaser) the situation of the nominally *free* peasants of this territory was in the following decades much more oppressive than that of the peasant *bondsmen* in the neighboring Galicia.

<sup>18</sup> Knapp too stated in one of his lectures that the enslavement of the peasants (in his terminology "Leibeigenschaft") was by no means a precondition for the manorial

This leads us to the problem of the economic role of slavery on the one hand, and of peasant bondage on the other. "If we," writes Grünberg, "consider the economic purpose of slavery and of hereditary subjection as well as the way in which both institutions function economically, then the organic differences between them become immediately apparent. Hereditary subjection remained until its abolition the legal basis for rural labor relations. The large scale agricultural enterprise brought it into being. . . and was the only reason for its existence. The bondsman is a forced agricultural laborer and nothing else." The situation is completely different with regard to slavery. "Contrary to hereditary subjection, slavery (*Leibeigenschaft*) as such is neither the result nor in its turn the cause of a certain mode of production, whether agricultural or industrial, whether on a large or on a small scale. Slavery adapts itself to all of them as well as it can serve mere luxury purposes. While under the legal conception of hereditary subjection the economic purpose remains distinctly visible, it becomes completely extinguished in the milder or more severe forms of slavery". . . "While, therefore,"—Grünberg concludes quite unexpectedly—"it is permissible to speak of serfdom (i.e., of slavery) on the European continent in recent times in Russia, and even in a part of Germany and especially in a part of Prussia, it must be maintained that this institution was actually completely unknown in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia in the seventeenth and eighteenth century."<sup>19</sup>

This argumentation of Grünberg is certainly very interesting, but only partially correct. The Czech scholar Kaizl raised against it the objection that peasant bondage could serve not only the purposes of the agricultural, but also of the industrial large scale enterprise, as for example in the well known Russian serf factories.<sup>20</sup> This is not a very serious objection, since the serf factories were only a short lived product of the *decaying* manorial system and in no way characteristic of it. To me another point in Grünberg's reasoning appears as most vulnerable: Notwithstanding his assertion of a specific economic function of peasant bondage, Grünberg speaks of the peasants being slaves not only in Russia, but even in a part of Germany! Was

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system, but rather a shortlived "parasitic growth on the tree of peasant bondage". (See his book *Die Landarbeiter in Knechtschaft und Freiheit*, 4 Vorträge (Leipzig, 1891), p. 26f.)

<sup>19</sup> Grünberg, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 89f. - A memorandum of the Austrian "Hofkammer" official Schierendorf of the year 1713 shows that the last assertion of Grünberg is exaggerated. The memorandum investigated the question "whether in the Bohemian provinces existed at any time as a legal institution a 'slaverylike bondage' such as the landlords 'almost generally practice now by denying the peasants' property rights to their holdings, forbidding them to bring their grievances before the emperor, and in forcing upon the entire peasant population the yoke of an absolutistic tyranny, as if there were no difference between their subjects and their horses, dogs and other beasts.'" (K. Krofta, *op. cit.*, p. 342.)

<sup>20</sup> See his article: "Lid selský, jeho poroba a vymanění v zemích českých". (The peasantry, its subjugation and liberation in the Czech provinces) in "*Naše Doba*" II, (1895), pp. 107-9.



then in these countries the "economic purpose" of bondage, its necessary connection with the manorial system, less apparent than elsewhere? Did in this respect the situation of the Russian, Polish or the Eastern Prussian peasants differ essentially from that of the Czech peasants? Of course not. Here too the bondsman was in reality nothing but an "agricultural forced laborer", even though his landlord occasionally gambled him away in a card game, as in Russia. Grünberg's argumentation proves evidently more than he intended. It proves that even in countries where the peasants were predominantly labor serfs peasant bondage cannot be identified with slavery proper, because both institutions belonged to completely different modes of production. The decisive difference is this: the slave was nothing but a tool in the enterprise of his owner, while the labor serf possessed a plot of land where he produced the means of his livelihood ("selfsustaining serf"). In other words, the entire working time of the slave was at the disposal of his master<sup>21</sup>, while the working time of the labor serf was divided into two distinctly separate parts: one part of his time he spent on his own allotment, and the other on the manor; one part of his labor belonged to him, the other was appropriated without compensation by the landlord. In his relation to his master the slave could therefore be regarded only as an object of property rights, while the bondsman's dependence on his lord was indirect (*servus terrae ipsius cui natus est*)<sup>22</sup>. Otherwise the latter's legal capacity (*Rechtsfähigkeit*) was not extinguished, and only his capacity to act (*Handlungsfähigkeit*) was restricted. And this is also the reason why a legal definition of slavery can confine itself to the assertion of the slave's lack of legal personality—while, on the contrary, peasant bondage cannot be defined without a closer specification of the kind and degree of the dependence resulting from the peasant's relation to the soil. The "dematerialized" character of slavery, its seeming independence from any economic determination is therefore only an illusion to which Grünberg succumbed because of his one-sided juristic method. In reality, both institutions—slavery as well as peasant bondage—were economically conditioned and corresponded to specific and very different types of social relations based on unfree labor.

Thus, the only conclusion which can be drawn from Grünberg's reasoning is that in analysing the various forms of personal dependence of forced agricultural laborers we cannot restrict ourselves to purely juristic considerations, but have to put the stress on economic criteria. From this aspect the difficulties encountered frequently by the juristically oriented school of

<sup>21</sup> Naturally, the slaveholder had to feed his slaves, just as he had to feed his cattle, if he wanted to keep them in working condition.

<sup>22</sup> From the definition of the colonate in the Theodosian Codex (see: Sohm, *Institutionen, Geschichte und System des römischen Privatrechts*, 1928, p. 176f).

histories disappear<sup>23</sup>, and even the "border cases" of the Polish and Russian peasant serfdom can be explained much more plausibly. In both countries, but especially in Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, peasant bondage degenerated to such a degree that from a legal and social viewpoint the situation of the peasants in these countries may be very well compared to that of the ancient or modern slaves.<sup>24</sup> In some cases the conditions of the ancient slaves would even prove better than those of the Polish and Russian peasants. Yet, it would be absurd to characterize the form of rural economy prevailing in Poland or in Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as one based on slavery. It is true, in both countries peasant serfs could be bought and sold without land, and in Russia there existed special markets where the serfs were traded just like hunting dogs and horses. But a closer examination of such transactions shows that their objects were almost always artisans, cooks and other domestic servants—in brief, persons who were not directly connected with the agricultural operations of the manor. Where the peasant serf was nothing but a forced agricultural laborer, his dependence as a rule did not exceed the *glebae adscriptio*; while in cases, when his labor served only personal or luxury demands of the lord his bondage degenerated easily into slavery proper. Another example of the breaking up of the original connection between the peasant serf and the soil, and the resulting degradation of the former to a slavlike condition were the notorious Russian serf factories, whose victims often were not any more fortunate than the slaves in the ancient gold mines described by Diodorus Siculus. Finally, in Russia, and especially in the Ukraine, it happened in the first half of the nineteenth century that the landlords deprived their peasant serfs completely of their allotments, in order to use their entire working time for the manor. This system was called *misjachyna* (*misjaci*-month) because the peasants received their provisions once every month from the landlord. Here too, the loss of the land allotment put the peasant practi-

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<sup>23</sup> As we have seen, Knapp denied categorically the existence of peasant serfdom even in the "worst areas" of Germany; his pupil Grünberg, however, considered it justified by the same juristic criteria to speak of peasant serfdom in Germany, and especially in Prussia! The same discrepancy can be found with regard to Poland. While most German historians refuse to admit the existence of peasant serfdom in Germany and Austria, they adopt this term unhesitatingly for Poland and other Eastern European countries. Most Polish historians, on the other hand, deny just as categorically that peasant serfdom existed in Poland, and point to Russia (or even Eastern Prussia) as to the countries where this odious form of peasant bondage was to be found. This shows that the problem cannot be solved by applying only juristic criteria.

<sup>24</sup> "From the economic viewpoint" - writes Warszawski about the condition of the Polish peasants in the seventeenth and eighteenth century - "it was not slavery, for there was no economic need for slavery. There was no lack of labor power, but rather an abundance of it. What was missing, was the possibility to use the existing labor force efficiently. But from the social viewpoint, it was serfdom which degenerated into slavery." (*Die Entwicklung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Polen und die Bauernfrage im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zürich, 1914), p. 87.)



cally in the economic condition of a slave. Such cases, however, occurred only infrequently<sup>25</sup>, and were not at all characteristic of the manorial system. The overwhelming majority of the peasants in the Ukraine (as well as in Poland and in Bohemia) consisted of self-sustaining producers who supplied the manorial estates with unpaid labor services, and for this reason had to be held in a condition of serfdom. (Had the landlords not had unrestricted power of command over their subjects, they would not have been able to extort from them the inhuman amount of work they demanded.) Thus, the form of rent the peasant owed to his lord was decisive for the degree of personal oppression to which he was exposed. The rent in labor was not only economically most burdensome, but it also resulted in a greater restriction of the peasant's freedom of movement than the obligation to pay rent in produce or in money.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, in territories where the bareness of the soil or poor transportation facilities made forced labor services unprofitable for the landlords and where they resigned themselves to tributes in kind or money from their subjects, the bondage of the peasants was as a rule much less severe than elsewhere. The best example for this is the very large layer of *obrok* peasants<sup>27</sup> in Russia. Not only was the economic situation of these peasants better than that of the average labor serf, but they very often enjoyed a certain amount of freedom of movement which contrasted strongly with the degraded condition of the latter. "Peasants of this *obrok* category"—writes Gitermann—"were, of course, according to the law, still subject to serfdom." But they could "dispose freely, or almost freely, of their time and their labor, frequently their landlords permitted them to leave their villages, to conclude contracts by themselves and even, if they acquired property, to consider it their own and to administer it according to their own dispositions"<sup>28</sup>. Curiously enough, it even happened that enriched *obrok* peasants purchased serfs or whole estates with serfs, so that sporadically Russian peasants became bondsmen of bondsmen,<sup>29</sup> like the an-

<sup>25</sup> "As a matter of fact" - writes G. T. Robinson, on this subject, "comparatively few of the villagers were reduced to such complete dependence; much the greater part of them devoted at least a portion of their time to the self-directed and self-supporting cultivation of a share of the master's estate allotted to their use." *Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, (New York, 1932, ), p. 227.

<sup>26</sup> I use the terms "labor rent", "rent in produce" and "rent in money" in the same meaning in which they were applied by Rev. Richard Jones in his book *An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, and on the Sources of Taxation, Part I - Rent* (London, 1844).

<sup>27</sup> *Obrok* - money rent.

<sup>28</sup> It is tempting to refer here to the analogy with the *peculium* of the ancient slaves. This analogy, however, would be forced, because of the essentially different character of both economic systems. Thus, the only use it offers is that neither slavery nor peasant serfdom were rigid and inflexible phenomena and that they changed gradually into other forms of labor relations.

<sup>29</sup> See: M. Tugan-Baranowsky, "Geschichte der russischen Fabrik" in "Ergänzungshefte zur Zeitschrift für Sozial — und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Heft V and VI, p. 113 (the *obrok* peasants of the industrial village Ivanovo).

cient Roman *vicarii*. "Thus"—concludes Gitermann—"the *obrok* peasants were, so to speak, social amphibia which to some degree still belonged to the sphere of serfdom while at the same time they already advanced into the sphere of personal freedom. . ."<sup>30</sup> All these changes, however, were strictly connected with the form of rent which the *obrok* peasant paid; significantly, this system predominated in the less fertile regions of Northern and Central Russia, where the landlords were not so much interested in the direct exploitation of the peasants' labor power, as in the surplus produce which they exacted as tribute from the peasants' allotments. Therefore, the peasants here could be given a greater extent of freedom of movement, while in the black soil regions of Southern Russia, and especially of the Ukraine, the most oppressive form of serfdom prevailed. But even in these territories, the rural economy, contrary to the system of slavery, was based essentially on the cultivation of the soil by self-sustaining serfs; even here the enslavement of the peasants was nothing but a "parasitic growth on the tree of peasant bondage", and not the tree itself.<sup>31</sup>

We have strayed far from the starting point of our investigation which was not the problem whether the Russian and the Polish peasants were slaves, but whether the Czech and the Eastern German peasants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be regarded as serfs. But this digression has not been in vain. It has led us to two important conclusions: (1) Wherever the forced agricultural laborer was a self-sustaining producer, his personal status cannot be identified with that of a slave in the strict meaning of the word; and (2) the extent of the peasant's personal freedom and the character of his bondage were determined *primarily* by the form of the rent he gave to the landlord. In this respect, however, there existed no essential difference between the peasant conditions in Poland and Russia and, on the other hand, in Bohemia and Eastern Germany; in all these countries it was the predominance of the manorial system and of the labor rent which led to the complete tying of the peasants to the soil and the most extensive restriction of their personal freedom. Of course, this condition had nothing to do with outright slavery; but, on the other hand, it differed also considerably from the milder forms of peasant bondage. It was therefore not at all a purely terminological whim when the legislation of enlightened absolutism and contemporary authors called this specific form of bondage "peasant serfdom"<sup>32</sup>. This term is certainly of greater accuracy than the

<sup>30</sup> Valentin Gitermann, *Geschichte Russlands*, v. III pp. 80 and 89 (Zürich 1949).

<sup>31</sup> "When one reads of their (*i.e.* the Russian peasant serfs) being sold off the land, sometimes, like so many cattle, one is tempted to call them slaves, but it is still to be remembered that normally (and by custom only, not by the law), they enjoyed the partial economic autonomy of serfdom." (G. T. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 277.)

<sup>32</sup> It is certainly no coincidence that several languages have coined a special term for this form of bondage. Compare the German *Leibeigenschaft*, the Czech *řlověčenství*, the Polish *przypisanstwo*, the Ukrainian *kripectvo*, etc.



term "hereditary subjection" which does not distinguish between various forms of peasant bondage, and cannot, therefore, define the special conditions which prevailed with regard to the forced agricultural laborer of the manorial system.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

# TRANSFORMATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLISH SOCIETY

by Zygmunt Zaremba

**F**IVE years of Sovietization in Poland have effected profound changes in all areas of Polish life. The purpose of this study is to sketch the changes as they affect social conditions, specifically the mutual relations between various social groups, normally bound together under similar conditions of life and in a comparable position with regard to the occupational structure. We refer in particular, in order to be precise in our nomenclature, to the following groups: capitalists, estate-owners, petty bourgeoisie, peasants, industrial and agricultural workers. Obviously each of these groups mingles with the others, and on its periphery, shades into the one "above" or "below" it in the indicated hierarchy, yet without losing its basic characteristics.

In indicating the changes in the mutual relationships between these groups we will begin with the pre-war situation and describe the modifications brought about by the occupation, both German and Russian, and the present Communist régime.

## *Pre-War Social Conditions*

The Poland that was reborn in 1918 took shape in a period when capitalism was already beginning to decay and the working class was growing in influence. Thus social conditions were not typically capitalistic. Finance was nationalized. The National Bank (*Bank Państwa*), The Bank of National Economy, The Agricultural Bank, the most important organs of finance and credit were completely in the control of the Government. Likewise railways, the salt industry, matches, tobacco, the great chemical concerns, mines, and similar basic industries were under government control. That does not at all mean that capitalism or its profits in various areas were suppressed, but, as today in many Western countries, a significantly developed "nationalized sector" means the narrowing of the field of private capitalistic initiative, and consequently the decline of classical capitalism. It likewise meant that the capitalists, as a class, as well as the whole concept of the "Leviathan", had ceased to be an autonomous element in the economic life of the country.

A second important characteristic of pre-war social relations was the decline, similar to that in the rest of the world, of the generation of the architects of capitalism, who while creating their vast enterprises at the same time made vast personal fortunes and great personal power. In all fields they were represented by individuals in control of the capital within the framework of an anonymous stock corporation: business and technical directors of enterprises, organizers of industrial corporations, bureaucrats, fre-



quently with fabulous salaries, but still only office-holders, interested in their high salaries, not born and raised in a particular enterprise.

Thus these groups, which, before World War I represented the capitalist class, had, already by the early 'twenties, experienced the narrowing of their field of activity and had steadily lost ground to the state, which became the leading capitalist.

The second pre-war upper class group, the great landowners, in spite of temporarily favorable conditions obtained through the Agrarian Union (*Związek Ziemian*), was not really in a stronger position. The land reform, though carried out only gradually, put into the hands of the peasants, from 1919 to 1938, 2,655,000 hectares (=ca. 6,520,000 acres) of land taken from the great estates, indicating a reduction of more than a third of the area of the greater estates, which, as early as 1931, constituted only 18 per cent of the arable land in the country. The further inevitable development of the land reform hung over this group like a threat of total extermination. On the other hand the paternalistic relations with the farm workers became a thing of the past, because of the growth of the Union of Farm Workers *Związek Robotników Rolnych*, which wrought in this area a genuine revolution, bringing into effect collective bargaining, by means of which, e.g., a teamster gained complete independence, and his living standards so improved as, after a time, to be better than those of industrial workers. Economically and socially the great landowners, as a class, were on the road to liquidation.

As for the lesser bourgeoisie, it was, in its make-up, rather heterogeneous. We must include within this group those in the free professions, the bureaucracy, craftsmen and the lesser merchants. It has one trait in common. Their living standard was roughly in the middle range. The sources of their income are in no wise capitalistic in so far as they stem rather from their own physical or intellectual labor. It was a numerous group and that very fact was an index of the high general level of social development.

But precisely what was the economic situation of this social group, so diverse in its composition? In actuality its most noticeable mark was the fact that its standard of living was in many respects so close to that of the proletariat. The wages of the intellectual workers were the equivalent, and often even lower, of a skilled laborer. The fact that they were not organized made their position less stabilized than that of the workers, who were protected by powerful trade unions and political organizations. In the crafts the situation worked out similarly and the effects of the depression on this group were cruel, creating a gulf between them and the capitalist, where formerly their position had been that of vassalage toward capitalism. The free professions began to "proletarize" themselves in the sense that competition within the professions made the pursuit of a career more difficult, and the gradual socialization of the professions tended to reduce its mem-

bers to the position of wage-laborers, as for example, the insurance company doctors or the legal advisors at various kinds of institutions. Private practice was a means of maintaining oneself at a level slightly above the average but only for a few fortunate or exceptionally talented individuals.

For the whole century before independence the lesser bourgeoisie had been a faithful servant of the ruling classes, and had benefited from the crumbs of social and economic privileges. But after the revolution of 1917-18 that relationship was dissolved and on the eve of the second world war it was quite easy to see that with their changed living conditions this group had turned toward the working class, if we include in this term those occupied in industry or trade.

The peasants were the most numerous group in Poland though within the whole peasant class there were great variations in status. The following table gives a picture of the land holdings according to the 1931 general census:

	Holdings and Establishments Connected					
	to 2 <i>ha.</i>	2-5 <i>ha.</i>	5-10 <i>ha.</i>	10-15 <i>ha.</i>	15-20 <i>ha.</i>	50 <i>ha.</i> +
Holdings in %	25.5	38.7	24.8	6.5	4.0	0.5
*Number of holdings	747	1,136	729	191	118	15
*Number of persons	2998	5531	3493	1105	694	57
*in (1000's)						

The small-holding peasants or those without land were, in the social life of the countryside, fully as much proletarians as the workers in the city. The peasant who owned and worked a farm of a score of hectares (50 acres) or over, lived under conditions of relative luxury. But in between there was the overwhelming mass of the peasantry, earning their modest bread with hard labor. It was this group that determined the general tone of rural life. The poorest among them leaned toward the proletariat. But even among those of the middle group of the peasantry there were many who desired a radical change in conditions, painfully aware of the frequent famines that struck the land. Thus it was this combination of conditions that called for changes and became just one more factor in the transformations that were coming to pass in Polish life. The numerous demands of the peasants, coinciding with the socialist movement, as also the growing radicalism of the programmatic slogans of the populist movement, were the most obvious manifestation of this deeply rooted trend.

What of the working class? For them this was a time of rapid improvement, witness the social legislation being enacted in the '20's and '30's. There was the establishment of the eight-hour day, and finally social insurance and guaranteed holidays—all clear gains achieved by the workers. Social insurance covered all workers, those in the larger establishments and a large part of those in domestic service. The official statistics showed, for 1937, 1,851,000 insured for sickness benefits, 1,060,000 insured against unem-



ployment and 1,624,000 workers under pension plans (1935). For the white-collar class, 249,000 were under general insurance and 315,000 insured against unemployment.

The workers owed this favorable situation to their improved organization. In 1935 there were in Poland 7383 units of trade unions, counting 941,000 members. The majority of industrial workers and a considerable part of agricultural rural workers were under the protection of voluntary group bargains. In agriculture, compulsory arbitration was in effect in disputes on work, with the full participation of the trade unions. In industry collective agreements covered, in 1936, 50 per cent of the workers, whereas in establishments employing 200 or more, the figure was 65 per cent. There grew up quite naturally a common bond, even a kind of organic alliance between this strong worker's group and the infinitely weaker peasant class. The working class, organized by trades, and forming an independent political party, personified not only an elemental drive toward the coming changes, but a conscious program for their effectuation. The more concrete and popular these changes were, the more it became clear that they envisaged the dissolution of capitalism.

#### *Changes during the War and Occupation*

The war and occupation gave the *coup de grâce* to the capitalist class. The Germans took over all factory enterprises, either incorporating them into their own economic corporations or turning them over to new owners—Germans of course. In both cases, and this was true of the largest concerns, the previous owners were simply thrown out and the establishment taken over as war booty. All responsible and policy-making employees were discharged and replaced by Germans. One did not even raise the question of compensation. Thus the capitalists and managers either became overnight "proletarians" or, at the best had to live off their savings; in any event they were no longer a factor in the national economy. A certain proportion of the smaller enterprises without special military importance—but at that time what was there that had no military importance?—were intrusted to German *Treuhändler*. But this had the effect of facilitating expropriation, generally when the concern was profitable and looked attractive to some German. Industrial and commercial concerns belonging to Jews or Poles of Jewish origin were, naturally, without exception disposed of in this fashion. Characteristically the Germans liquidated Polish industry so ruthlessly and without any regard for property rights, that very often they would arbitrarily transform, combine or move to another area whole establishments, with their office records, preventing the owners from any access to their machinery or records. In addition, all the capital would be "blocked" in the banks, or, if, by any chance, it were in the hands of the owner, it soon melted away in the wake of the depreciation engineered by the Germans.

And this is the story of the disappearance of the class of industrial capitalists. But the fate of the agricultural classes was somewhat less grim—but only in the *General Gouvernement*. Yet even here many of the better equipped properties, industrialized or specialized stock farms, were taken over by Germans or occupied by German managers. In the western region of the country absolutely all the larger farm property and a great part of the peasant holdings were converted into German property. An amusing aspect of this expropriation from a legal and political point of view was the signs put up by the Germans on the gateways of farmhouses: *Kriegsbeute Deutsches Eigentum*. In the eastern provinces the Soviet land reform had about the same effect, parcelling out the farms among the peasants, then throwing them out or forcing them into collective farms. Once powerful, the landed classes had by degrees lost their earlier position of importance until war and occupation had left them only vestiges of their former greatness.

The petty bourgeoisie, though greatly impoverished, had maintained and even here and there improved their social position. In urban life it was the only class able to satisfy the technical needs of an industrial society. Its internal structure was exceedingly flexible. When office work or the free professions could not supply the needs of life, or if one wanted to get ahead, he had to produce something or do some outside "business". When there was nothing available on the open market, the production of glue for shoes or of electric batteries, or straw-mats, of slippers out of cast-off material, pastry or vodka, became the avocation of lawyers, doctors, office-workers or technicians. "Business" in those times was primarily smuggling, taking goods from one place to another, often on one's own back. For economy's sake, this took the place of formal transport, as this was supposed to be for Germans only anyway. Every third Pole was in this kind of "business". Needless to say there developed out of the dangers involved in this illegal existence, a new sense of private and individual initiative.

Some active capitalists joined forces with the lesser bourgeoisie, organizing small enterprises or business concerns. And a good portion of the workers also went along with them, profiting from their craftsmanship or their quick adaptation to this specialized form of war industry—the black market. In sum the lesser bourgeoisie, during war and occupation but in the *General Gouvernement* only—for in the eastern as well as in the western provinces they were eliminated by the occupying powers—grew in numbers and strengthened their economic and moral position in Polish society.

The peasantry had a similar history. If the conflagration of war, the repression of the occupying enemy or his experiments in transferring population, as in the western provinces and in certain areas of the *General Gouvernement* (e. g. Zamojszczyzna) did not force the peasant to quit his garden, or else as in the eastern regions, the Soviet occupier did not simply drive



the peasant farther East or did not put him in a prison camp, the peasant, in actuality, enjoyed a kind of privileged position. The production of the foodstuffs which in traditional fashion (i. e. by not giving up everything) the peasant hid at least partially from occupation control, made of the peasant the benefactor of all society. In the German view the Poles were to become a nation of peasants, producing food for the *Herrenvolk*. The exigencies of wartime showed the Germans the need for some tolerance for this producer of their food. Thus the peasant became primarily the provider for his long since proletarianized cousins and preeminently an excellent source of help to them in their struggle against hunger. If we will but consider the many bonds that in Poland connect city and country we can understand what profound social significance this manifestation of mutual help must have had. Furthermore the produce of the peasants was the only factor softening the edge of the hunger that ravaged the cities during the war, and allowing some profit to the hundreds of thousands of black marketeers of both sexes and all ages, who handled these goods smuggled from the countryside. A steady market and good prices were favorable to the peasant and raised his opinion of himself. He now could regard himself as more influential and significant than before. To a man, the peasants participated in the underground battle with the occupying enemies, and came to regard their class as the most important bastion of the free Poland that was to be. And even when he was thrown out of his precious garden, he never doubted that he would return to his land, and return stronger than before. At that time there was no thought in anybody's mind of any class that land reform would encounter any difficulties of any sort.

The most tragic of all was the situation of the industrial workers. Most of the establishments were closed. In the enterprises and mines run by the Germans the wages fixed were fixed usually at a below subsistence level. It was only the threat of being sent to forced work in Germany for the unemployed that kept people at work. And at that most of the workers did in fact lose their jobs. There was no unemployment pay of any sort. And of course there was a standing invitation for anyone to work in Germany.

The factory workers had several possible recourses: black-market "business," to the crafts, to smuggling, or as a farm-hand, with his family or relatives. The Germans were unrelenting in their search for labor, but every Pole wanted, if at all possible, to stay in Poland. Under these conditions at least half the working class spread out over the country, the Germans exported a considerable part of them for forced work in Germany, and those who did remain in the workshops or factories run by the Germans (or the Russians), lived rather from what their wives or children could make than from the small wages they received from their own work.

Only the deep traditions of the workers' movement and their conviction of the social significance of their class kept them at their posts. They

were convinced that their present sad plight was only transitory, and they felt the close ties that bound them to another, through the length and breadth of the land, and were sure their strength would powerfully influence their fellow Poles. But the pauperization, the uprooting from their accustomed places of work and their scattering all over the country was found to have a deleterious effect upon post-war labor morale. To that must be added the frightful loss of life at the upper levels. Fully half the leaders of all labor organizations were wiped out during the five years' occupation, either by the Gestapo or the NKVD, either from exposure in camps or in the gas chambers of the *Vernichtungslager*.

### *Natural consequences of the Social Changes*

The pre-war structure of social forces had brought on, even before the catastrophic outbreak of the war, considerable tension between the capitalist groups, defending the vestiges of their privileges, and the working classes, who already envisioned the relaxation of their heavy burdens and the disappearance of the devastating effects of the organic crisis due to the impending transformation in the social-political structure. A manifestation of these tendencies toward a reconstruction was the issuance virtually simultaneously of the so-called Radom Program of the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) in 1937, and shortly thereafter the so-called Workers' Program, worked out at a joint conference of the representatives of the trades-union movement *Centralna Komisja Związków Zawodowych* and the socialist parties, PPS, *Ukraińska Partia Socjalistów Radykałów*, *Powszechny Związek Robotników Żydowskich*=*Bund*. The dominant thought of these documents is that the capital structure, in the battle against fascism and authoritarian regimes, must give way to a transitional economic-social structure, in which capitalistic influences will disappear, the great industrial enterprises will pass into government control, and agriculture, on the way to a transformation of the whole agricultural structure, will tend to enlarge the internal market for excess production.

It is not without significance that it was in Poland that the labor movement put forward such a program as a minimum program, when in the West, with its strong and active capitalist class, no such ideas had gotten beyond the stage of theoretical suggestions. Only after the war did they become the concrete principles of the workers' movement.

It is difficult to evaluate objectively just how far such a perspective of the changes in the social and economic structure in Poland had matured in our social thinking before the outbreak of the war. In any event it did not evoke antagonistic reactions. The peasants seemed favorable to this point of view, and the organizations of the intelligentsia favored a *rapprochement* with the workers' movement. It is probably correct to say that the



older basis of relations between the various social groups had now been so modified that the workers' plan dominated the thinking for the future.

We were without doubt at a turning point in regard to the relations between the several social groups. The war sharpened that turning point to the last degree. Along with the war-time developments, which destroyed the system of social forces hitherto in effect, the ground was cleared for the changes advocated in the program of the labor movement, and logically derivative from an analysis of the pre-war relationships. After the collapse of September 1939 it was generally felt that the bonds with the ancient past were finally broken and that out of the war and its effects there would arise not only new forms of political life, but also a whole new system of economic and social relationships. As a natural and concrete expression of these expected changes arising out of the war and of course evidently hastened by it, there was the formal "Program of People's Poland". This document was worked out in 1941 during the occupation by the cooperative efforts of representatives of the socialist and peasant movements and of the industrial workers, reflecting the purpose and needs of the whole of the laboring class.

It had a definite approach. It demands, as a test of the first government of independent Poland, the issuance "of decrees, setting up the basic framework of the political as well as the politico-economic structure of the new state. In general these decrees shall provide (a) land reform through the expropriation of the largest estates and the creation of a reserve of land to be parcelled out, providing also, from these expropriated estates, lands to be administered by committees for land reform on the village (*gmin*) and district (*powiat*) level; (b) expropriation and transfer to the state, for autonomous administration or to an experienced cooperative for socialization, of industrial enterprises, with a simultaneous provision for their socialized control and operation.

It would be subjective to assert that such structural objectives in the area of social relations were completely realistic at the time the laboring-class movement published them. Yet, in their support it would be possible to find that the whole underground press was in general agreement with these ideas, and that, deeply anti-capitalistic, this whole group rejected any return to the pre-war situation and was looking for new bases for future social relationships.

The most convincing proof of this general reaction on the part of a conscious and determined public opinion calling for a fundamental reconstruction of the social-economic framework of the country is the fact that the basic concepts of the "Program of Peoples' Poland" were incorporated into the official program of the organs of the underground régime. The "Manifesto of the Council of National Unity," issued by the underground Parlia-

ment when the representatives of the principal parties met on August 15, 1944 states:

"The bases of the Polish Constitution, as a democratic Commonwealth, shall be: . . . (c) a transformation of the land structure by parcellation of German-owned lands in estates of more than 50 hectares and the reorientation of surplus agricultural population into industry and the crafts; (d) the socialization of key branches of industry, (e) the participation of workers in the management and control of industrial production; (f) the assurance to all citizens of work and adequate living conditions; (g) the just sharing of social gains."

We find a similar formulation in the last Manifesto of the Council of National Unity of July 1, 1945.

By the time the Polish parties of this general orientation found a common ground and were able to speak a common language, and the groups that were anxious to maintain the earlier status had been liquidated by the course of the war and its consequences, it may be accepted as obvious that the delays and obstacles, however they may have arisen, could not change the basic trend nor obstruct the realization of the new organization as it was developing out of the new social-economic system. Unfortunately, this natural line of development in social relationships was brutally shattered by the invasion of a foreign power, which disregarded the wishes and the natural tendencies of the Polish nation. Furthermore, the new occupation, under the cloak of a puppet government brought upon our land by Soviet Russia, aimed primarily to stop all the native developmental tendencies in our society and to force Poland into the framework of the Soviet system, which had grown up under entirely different social and economic conditions. Under these new conditions, imposed upon the country by force from outside, social development assumed an entirely new aspect.

#### *Post-War Changes*

The régime brought from Soviet Russia to Poland a policy that all industry should be taken over by the state; even laundries were nationalized during the first period, and small factories producing candy or soda water were incorporated into state trusts. We must stipulate that there was no opposition to this action, as the Germans left behind, when they left Poland, a whole mass of small businesses without any owners, managed thereafter by the private initiative of the Polish employees, who quite willingly accommodated themselves to state ownership, as the state then necessarily assumed responsibility for providing the business with its raw materials and the general organization of their market.

But even government economists, like Oscar Lange, were opposed to complete nationalization. They emphasized the positive role of the small and



moderate sized industrial enterprises in economic life, organized by the state, and disposing of all the elements of an economy (raw materials, electricity, transport credit, taxes, labor legislation). They also pointed out that this private sector in the economy is a guarantee of correctives for bureaucratic crystallization which always threatens a state economy, and at the same time it can fulfill a function of producing consumer goods where style and artistic execution might be decisive factors. But an element of more significance than these criticisms with propaganda overtones was the fact of the elemental revival of the small business, even at a time when there was hardly any market moving. There sprang up everywhere new shops, stores and even crude sheds where articles could be made. In the face of this movement the government hastened to disclaim any plan to nationalize undertakings employing less than 50 workers. That of course did not mean any lessening of the determination to liquidate along with the capitalist class the petty bourgeoisie. A frontal attack and the mechanical means of liquidation were replaced by a war to exhaustion through administrative chicanery and ruinous taxation.

Yet in spite of this procedure, the vitality of the lesser bourgeoisie is so great that four years of this effort to ruin the smaller enterprises, even government sources revealed that early in 1949 small industry counted 12,000 establishments with 130,000 employees producing 96 billion zlotys worth of goods. At the same time there were in Poland 140,000 trade establishments, employing 300,000 persons and producing over 125 billion zlotys in goods. In addition to this there were 170,000 cottagers. It may be assumed that these figures represent the situation of the petty bourgeoisie reduced to a point at which its productivity is absolutely indispensable and at which the limited number of its establishments may not safely be liquidated. It may be added that the figures given are considerably lower than the real situation, as they cannot include the thousands of cases of small domestic work-shops that avoided registration and thus taxation and carried on their trade illegally.

The destruction of the petty bourgeoisie is economic nonsense, and it is only contemplated because the present régime is told to carry it out by their mentors in Russia, where there never was any such strong class in any event. In dictating this policy the Russians are but practicing their aim of Soviet universalism.

The removal of the class of small owners, and their transformation into wage earners is, however, a result of the concept of dictatorship held by the Communist Party which cannot tolerate any social force in any way independent of the régime. This holds also for the whole group of free professions. The doctor who loses the right of free practice, the lawyer converted into a government official, even the chauffeur, deprived of the

right to make a profit from his own taxi, all become mere cogs in a machine run by the Communist Party.

In the course of subordinating all minor production to the communist régime, perverting the word "cooperative", the government has already created over 1500 companies, labelled "cooperatives of work" which employ over 70,000 persons. In January 1949 there were created obligatory associations in the following categories of private industry and crafts: milling, distilling, consumption goods, textiles, minerals, metals, electrotechnical and chemical products. There is an express and avowed tendency toward a quick incorporation of the productive element of the petty bourgeoisie perhaps in its entirety, into the framework of organizations now under the control of the régime and extending their absolute control over their members. Up to now, small industry and the crafts, and also the network of private business, even the black market, just as during German occupation, remain one way to satisfy many of the consumers' needs of society and the source of income of masses of the urban population and the supplementary income of many workers' families. It is difficult to believe that this situation can be radically altered in a short period of time.

In a similar situation is a second group of independent producers, the peasants. The agrarian reform, put into effect with demagogic presuppositions, yet without a rational modification of the agrarian structure, by means of an increase in the number of self-sufficient peasant holdings, brought about, economically, a decrease in agrarian production, and socially an increase in the number of dwarf, and consequently inadequate, peasant holdings. According to official figures the agrarian reform covered (January, 1946), 3,111,000 *ha.* Of this total 1,555,000 *ha.* were parcelled out, and in the following fashion:

104,000 agricultural workers received	563,400 <i>ha.</i> , aver. 5.4 <i>ha.</i> each
53,900 landless peasants received	192,200 <i>ha.</i> , aver. 3.6 <i>ha.</i> each
91,000 owners of dwarf holdings rec'd	145,700 <i>ha.</i> , aver. 1.6 <i>ha.</i> each
109,000 owners of small holdings rec'd	201,500 <i>ha.</i> , aver. 1.9 <i>ha.</i> each
22,000 owners of middle-sized holdings rec'd	43,300 <i>ha.</i> , aver. 2.0 <i>ha.</i> each

The agrarian reform envisaged on a basis of factors peculiar to Poland, had obviously to generalize a type of farm holding which would be adequate for living, if worked by the owner and his family. Under conditions obtaining in Poland this meant a farm of 8 to 10 *ha.* From the figures just given it is clear that the reform effected by the Communists made no real effort to realize this simple need. It only increased the inadequacy of the agrarian structure. It is significant that the communist régime considered parcelling out only 37 per cent of the land. One may, with complete objectivity, deduce that the agrarian reform they did carry out only confirmed conditions of rural poverty so as to facilitate the creation of kolkhozes.

The régime was not interested in removing the ills of the country but in creating a situation which would bring about a proletarianization of the independent producers and force them to give up their centuries-old ties to the land. Officially the régime has proclaimed its purpose to incorporate the peasants into the large farms under the guise of productive cooperatives in which a member of the Communist Party takes over the function of the former estate-owner and the former independent small farmer does the work of the unskilled farm-hands and teamsters.

As of the end of 1950, the 2000 producing cooperatives accounted for only 6 per cent of the arable land, and the régime has admitted that they are not economically significant, but they show the direction the government wishes to follow, and the techniques of administration and taxation that are being planned, in particular the aspect of force as applied to this class. This certainly points up the basic situation of the peasantry, uncertain as to its livelihood, unable to work freely, and forced to direct its energy to defense of a social position, a position long since won and transmitted by generations devoted to ideals of freedom and joy in free labor.

And thus the changes effected by the communist régime were superimposed on a processus of gradual deliquescence of the role of capitalism and the large estate owners in the social and economic life of the country, but, departing from a natural process, these changes were carried out by force and terror for the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry who had previously had independent sources for their economic existence and a positive and constructive significance for the whole social structure. It is interesting to analyze precisely what changes the post-war period has brought in the life of this social group, in whose substance such structural changes have taken place.

The standard of living of the working class has deteriorated materially in comparison to the pre-war level. The average real income of the working man has not passed 60 per cent of what it was twelve years ago. In many cases it is no higher than the upper brackets of the dole to the unemployed. But that is not all, nor indeed the most serious part of the picture. The destruction wrought by the war, so terrible in Poland, and the absolute need for sacrifice to rebuild the land would have justified a temporarily low level of income, though after five years one might think it was time to cease demanding such sacrifices from the working classes. But there is something even more serious. In the first place in any estimate of the changes that have supervened, there stands out the complete restriction of the freedom of the working class and the fact that there has been taken from them any possibility of countervailing manipulation of the conditions of their living.

This has all come about through the liquidation of all independent labor organizations. The proletariat had previously had to thank their political and trade organizations for any expansion or progress. The present



régime forced upon Poland by the Soviet Union has completely destroyed these associations of the working class and has changed the proletariat back into a servile class, condemned to obey unquestioningly the beck and nod of the new administration of industry and the state. The maintenance of a system of low wages, competitive work and Stakhanovism is the modern form of the capitalistic piece-work system of sweat-shops. A more rigid discipline of work for the physically exhausted worker, the disregard of his strength, as well as the physical resources of the less robust physiology of women workers, nowadays even forced to work in the mines—all this is only a result of the basic change in the actual situation of the workers, who have now been completely deprived of the protection of any kind of labor or trade organization.

Instead the régime has offered the workers a few favors, apparently attractive but very slender in substance. The workers have been granted a new trade organization—in name—but it has no independent function. It includes compulsorily all workers and therefore has no ideological intent of its own, as would a voluntary organization with a tradition based in long association of its members. Orders from above dictate its decisions, excluding any possible influence of the members upon the organization. A typical and eloquent comment upon this situation, enforced upon all groups by the present political terror, is the fact that at meetings of the professional groups, as at the last congress of the so-called trade unions there is not the slightest mention of the festering sore of unbearable poverty in the life of the whole working class. Such a silence would have been unthinkable at any meeting of any working class group in the pre-war period when conditions were, as outlined above, vastly better than at present.

We are told that this situation is to be improved by the new arrangement of vacations for the workers, the democratization of health resorts, and other appeals of the same sort. The propaganda of the régime puts a great deal of emphasis on this policy to show how much better the present situation of the laboring class is than under the old system. But in this case too we face simply the development of positive gains made by the workers in the pre-war period, now colored paternalistically and perverted by force into yet another link shackling the workers to the state administration of industry. Only by dependence upon that administration can labor benefit fully from whatever charity the former chooses to grant.

Finally, the third "conquest" by which the working man has been compensated for the deprivation of his freedom of organization: 15,000 former working men have been "promoted" to the new bureaucracy, assuming various functions in management. The conversion of these few thousands of yesterday's workers into today's bureaucrats is supposed to be a demonstration of the improvement of the workers' possibilities in life. But the fact that a microscopic portion of the whole working class has had some

kind of social advancement hardly changes the workers' present situation. Furthermore, those who have been advanced, so far as our evidence goes at this time, for the most part lose all contact with the masses from which they came. It is also clear that the workers rewarded by this advance recruited from among the most active of the working class, once advanced to administrative posts, becomes the worst exploiters of the workers. And it is further obvious that if the most active workers are taken into the managing class of bureaucrats, they certainly do not strengthen, but rather weaken the working class, removing from it its most energetic potential leadership. This then may be regarded as the completion of the process of disarmament of the working class through the elimination of their own organizations. Those elements of the working class which might have become the foci of resistance to oppression and the replenishment of the vigor of the proletariat will have been eliminated.

The system of promotion to the bureaucratic class is at one and the same time a means of taking over and of renewing that class, which is intended to replace the former ruling class. And right here we face the final manifestation of the social transformations with which we are concerned, brought on by the war: the creation of a new ruling class, an industrial and administrative bureaucracy.

*(To be concluded)*

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# COMPULSORY TRANSFER OF THE TURKISH MINORITY FROM BULGARIA

by Joseph B. Schechtman

## I

**R**EDUCED to its present demographic boundaries, modern Turkey has numerous Turkish minority splinters in the neighboring Balkan countries. Estimating their number at over two million, Sukru Kaya Bey, then Turkish Minister of the Interior, described them in 1934 as descendants of those Turks, "who directly participated in the Turkish conquests of the last centuries, who installed themselves in the conquered regions and lived there for centuries as masters."<sup>1</sup>

This master status came to an end with the establishment of independent Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania. The Turks had become minorities in these states ruled by the local Christian population, their former subjects. Not unlike other ethnic and religious groups, they had been exposed to varying degrees of persecution in the countries of their residence, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania. With regard to them, Turkey has adopted a policy of wholesale, but gradual repatriation.

At the session of the Turkish National Assembly on November 13, 1935, Minister Sukru Kaya Bey solemnly declared that repatriation of the Turkish minorities scattered through the Balkan countries was "one of the bases of Turkey's demographic policy and it was necessary that all Turks living abroad be installed in this country . . . We must hold our doors wide open for them."<sup>2</sup> A few months earlier, explaining the longing of the Turkish minorities to leave the countries of their residence, Sukru Kaya Bey stressed that "the basic trend of the Turkish character is not to be able to live as slave where the Turk previously was the master."<sup>3</sup>

An early manifestation of the Turkish repatriation policy was the Turko-Bulgarian Agreement signed in Ankara on October 18, 1925.

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria lived in close settlements, mainly in the northeastern part of the country, in the districts of Sumen and Stara Zagora and in Dobrudja. The porportion of Turks in some of these districts was as high as 90 per cent. The 1934 census gave their number as 618,268. When, on September 7, 1940, the Craiova treaty returned Rumanian Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, another 65,437 Turks living there became Bulgarian citizens.<sup>4</sup> Bulgaria's present Turkish minority can be

<sup>1</sup> *Ankara*, June 27 and November 17, 1934.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, November 28, 1934.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, November 17, 1934.

<sup>4</sup> Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. *Les minorités ethniques en Europe Centrale et Balkanique* (Paris, 1946), pp. 22-23.



estimated at between 750,000 and 850,000 or 10 to 12 percent of the total population of the country.

The 1925 Agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria provided for the "voluntary emigration of Turks from Bulgaria and Bulgarians from Turkey" to which the two governments "will place no obstacle," allowing the emigrants to "travel freely" between the two countries. (Art. 1). Art. 2 stipulated that all emigrants shall have the right to take with them all their movable property - including all livestock and agricultural machinery - and savings as well as to dispose of all their irremovable property "in complete freedom." Art. 3 forbade the imposition of any special taxes or any financial restrictions, direct or indirect, on the emigrants, and Art. 6 exempted them from military service or compulsory government labor service. Art. 7 regulated the complex problem of transfer of business firms and industrial enterprises belonging to emigrants.<sup>5</sup>

Only during the first few years following the signature of the Agreement was the number of Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria (there are only 18,245 Bulgarians in Turkey and they were mentioned in the Agreement merely in order to safeguard its bilateral character) considerable. 11,996 Turks left Bulgaria in 1928, and 11,568 in 1929, - apparently people who were particularly intent on emigration.<sup>6</sup> In 1930, the number of emigrants dropped to 1,684; in 1931, it was 2,141, in 1932 - 1,452, and in 1933 - 1,382. Enjoying a democratic parliamentary régime of government, the Turkish minority of Bulgaria was not under any compulsion to emigrate.

Premier Georgiev's *coup d'état* of May, 1934, however, marked the end of the parliamentary régime in Bulgaria. The constitution of 1879 was suspended and all political parties dissolved. Eight months later, in January, 1935, King Boris eliminated the Georgiev régime and since then ruled as virtual dictator till his death in 1943. With each succeeding year the Bulgarian authoritarian régime became more oppressive. The position of the Turkish minority grew increasingly untenable. The emigration trend increased accordingly.

As early as November, 1934, the Minister of Interior Sukru Kaya Bey, stated in the Turkish National Assembly: "During the summer months an emigration movement manifested itself in Bulgaria and grew to the proportions of a mass emigration." In reply to remonstrances from the Turkish Government, Bulgarian authorities confessed that this movement was due to "local pressure."<sup>8</sup> This administrative pressure resulted in a 1934 total of 8,682 Turkish emigrants. In 1935, the number of Turks who were forced to leave grew to a new high mark of 24,968.

<sup>5</sup> M. P., "The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria," *The World Today* (January, 1951), p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>7</sup> *Istatistik Yilligi 1937-1938*, X, (Ankara, 1938), 89.

<sup>8</sup> *Ankara* (November 17, 1934).

In an attempt to somehow regularize this chaotic movement, the Ankara Government concluded in 1936 and 1937 additional agreements with the Bulgarian Government providing for the repatriation of some 10,000 Turks each year. During the first year (1936) this quota was fairly well upheld (11,730 Turks left Bulgaria in this year for Turkey). Impatient to accelerate the emigration, the Bulgarian authorities took occasion to dispatch 1,500 Turks to Turkey as "tourists" but were obliged to deduct an equal number from the quota for the next year. Despite this agreed deduction, 13,490 emigrants arrived in Turkey in 1937, and the 1938 calculations were completely nullified when 20,542 Turks were forced to move from Bulgaria to Turkey.<sup>10</sup> The quota for 1939 was 11,290, but 15,458 Turks left Bulgaria during that year.<sup>11</sup> World War II interrupted further displacements.

Almost 125,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey between 1928 and 1939. They were resettled mainly in Anatolia, in the districts of Izmir, Manisa, Aydin, Diyarbakir, Nigde, and Sivas.<sup>12</sup>

## II

World War II barred further emigration. The postwar Communist régime in Bulgaria discouraged migration of its Turkish subjects to Turkey. Only 688 exit visas were granted in 1945; in 1946 only 384 were permitted to leave, and only 608 in 1947; in 1948 all emigration was virtually banned, and but 96 Turks were allowed to emigrate.<sup>13</sup>

Instead, the Communist-dominated Bulgarian Government made a determined effort to "re-educate" the Turkish minority, to integrate it into the general pattern of the country. The Turks were given representation in Bulgaria's Grand National Assembly and in district and local people's councils. A number of Turkish schools, professional courses, newspapers and radio programs were set up, and emancipation of women fostered.

But all these measures seemed to have had little effect. The strongly religious and nationalistic Turkish minority, headed by hodjas (priests) and muftis (bishops) staunchly resisted attempts at assimilation, both cultural and social. The communist régime began to tighten its grip on the Turkish institutions. In 1948, it took over the Turkish schools. In February, 1949, the Bulgarian National Assembly passed a law placing all Mosques, as well as other Moslem religious institutions under direct government con-

<sup>9</sup> *Istatistik Yilligi*, loc. cit.

<sup>10</sup> Schischkoff, Peter und Wilfsdorf Heinz, "Die zwischenstaatliche Lenkung der Tuerkenwanderung," *Zetischrift fuer Geopolitik* (September, 1938), p. 763. *Statistik Yilligi*, loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup> *Ankara* (July 27, 1935), *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie* (Sofia, 1940), p. 136.

<sup>12</sup> Schischkoff und Wilfsdorf, *op. cit.*, p. 763.

<sup>13</sup> M. P., *op. cit.*, p. 32.

trol. The collectivization campaign was intensified. While at the beginning of 1950 Bulgaria had only 1,600 collectives, with 1,400,000 acres occupied by 156,000 peasant families, in the fall of the same year the number of collective farms was increased to 2,566, with 5,000,000 acres operated by 570,000 peasant families; almost half of the nation's farmers had been forced to join the collective sector.<sup>14</sup>

The Turkish minority, peasants, merchants and workers alike, bitterly resented the Communist collectivization and assimilation policy.

A. T. Steele of the *New York Herald Tribune* visited, early in October 1950, the refuge camp in the Turkish frontier town of Edirne (Adrianople) and talked with some of the 1,100 refugees, mostly peasants with a sprinkling of small merchants and laborers, it held at that time.<sup>15</sup> All told a story of gradual but inexorable pressure by the Bulgarian government to complete the communization of the country. All spoke of terror tactics and discrimination to spur compliance with state policies.

Nure, a farmer, had tried to resist Bulgarian pressure to incorporate his lands into a co-operative (collective) farm, but he ran into so much official discrimination because of his desire to be left alone that he decided it was not worth the struggle.

Koraloglu, a merchant and part-time farmer, abandoned two shops and a farm because, as he put it, "life in Bulgaria is unbearable unless you come into the Communist apparatus, and I'd rather have my freedom than a cheaper loaf of bread without it." Recopopglu, an iron worker, got tired of being "shifted from place to place at the whim of the state."

Faced with this opposition, the Sofia Government apparently gave up hope of rallying the Turks. Following the familiar Communist pattern, it attempted to make the Turkish Government responsible for the failure of its policies with regard to the Turkish minority. In a note delivered to the Turkish chargé d' affaires in Sofia on August 10, 1950, the Bulgarian Communist régime accused Turkey of trying to "stir up" the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. It protested against "the hostile attitude of the Turkish government toward Bulgaria and the attempts of the Turkish government to create sentiments hostile to the People's Republic of Bulgaria among the Turkish minority in the country and among the Turkish people," and claimed that Turkey was using the minority issue "for intervention on a political plane in the internal affairs of Bulgaria."<sup>16</sup>

### III

Unable to "absorb" the Turks both socially and culturally, the Bulgarian Communist régime apparently made up its mind to get rid of them as

<sup>14</sup> *New York Times* (January 3, 1951).

<sup>15</sup> *New York Herald Tribune* (October 12, 1950).

<sup>16</sup> *New York Herald Tribune* (August 17, 1950).



quickly as possible, using both their land and houses for its own colonization schemes. In 1949, the number of Turks who left Bulgaria for Turkey had already reached 24,332.

At the beginning of 1950 the Bulgarian Government officially announced that Turkish emigration would be resumed. Throughout the first seven months of the year it proceeded at a relatively modest rate. The number of Turks who crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border at Svilengrad was as follows:<sup>17</sup>

January	-	1,013
February	-	1,539
March	-	2,907
April	-	3,059
May	-	2,927
June	-	2,897
July	-	2,832

Then, suddenly, the numbers rose to 5,782 in August and 10,272 in September.

This abrupt increase was preceded by the above mentioned Bulgarian note of August 10, which asserted that "malicious rumors" had been spread within the Bulgarian borders that Bulgaria was impeding Turks seeking to emigrate to Turkey. In fact, the note contended, Turkey was not seriously interested in assuring the entry of Bulgarian Turks: while applications for exit passports had been received from 250,000 members of the Turkish minority and the Sofia government issued up to August over 54,000 such passports, only 15,835 passport holders had been able to obtain entrance visas for Turkey. The Bulgarian government demanded that Turkey arrange within three months to admit all 250,000 Turks who applied for repatriation.<sup>18</sup> The official Bulgarian information agency ironically stressed that the reception of the repatriates in Turkey will be a test of the Turkish government's desire to keep to the terms of the Bulgarian-Turkish emigration treaty and to actually help the Turkish minority in Bulgaria for whom it "is shedding crocodile tears."<sup>19</sup>

In reply to the Bulgarian note, the Turkish government stressed on August 28 that, while the 1925 Agreements stipulates that no obstacle shall be placed in the way of such nationals of the contracting parties as may voluntarily wish to emigrate, it has set "no time-limit by which emigration must be completed, nor did it intend that such emigration should assume the form of mass deportations." Turkey therefore cannot be forced to accept 250,000 immigrants within 90 days. On the other hand, the Turkish note insisted, the agreement never implied that the receiving

<sup>17</sup> *Central European Observer* (London, November 11, 1950).

<sup>18</sup> *New York Times* (August 11, 1950).

<sup>19</sup> *New York Times* (August 13, 1950).

country "is bound unconditionally to admit every person who may wish to enter its territories."

The necessity for any country to refuse an entry visa to those would-be emigrants whose social and political allegiances would render their presence harmful to the country in question is too obvious to require debate . . . Naturally, the Republic of Turkey, too, possesses the right to prevent the infiltration through its frontiers of such tendencies as constitute a threat to the principles which Turkey upholds along with the other democracies of the world.

The Ankara Government pointed out that it was "conditions of life imposed on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria" and the Bulgarian Government's "failure to respect the [Bulgarian Turks'] economic, cultural, and human rights" that have created the emigration crisis. "The fact that 250,000 persons are alleged to desire to emigrate to Turkey can only be taken to indicate that they can no longer tolerate their present mode of life in Bulgaria . . . The measures adopted by the Bulgarian Government to increase the number of emigrants to such unprecedented levels are reminiscent of forced deportations."<sup>20</sup>

In a second note dated September 22, the Bulgarian Government categorically denied Ankara's accusation that desire of the Bulgarian Turks to emigrate to Turkey had been provoked by Bulgarian authorities' own action. A second note by the Turkish Government dated October 16 rejected Sofia's denial and reiterated the charge.<sup>21</sup>

#### IV

While this exchange of diplomatic notes was going on, mass emigration continued. Among the emigrants were many who possessed Bulgarian exit visas only and no Turkish entry visas. At the beginning, Turkish border authorities admitted such visaless emigrants without too much questioning. Encouraged by this attitude, the Bulgarian authorities started sending untold thousands of Turkish emigrants to Svilingrad. A correspondent of the outspokenly pro-Soviet *New Central European Observer* (London) reported that "there were days when more than 1,000 people left and 80% of them without Turkish visas."<sup>22</sup>

Then, on September 5, the Turks closed the border. Moved by the desperate situation of the emigrants on the frontier, they opened it again on the 8th, and, reports the same correspondent, "between that day and the 17th there was a mass entry." The border was closed again for four days, to be reopened on September 21. On October 6, flooded by visaless emi-

<sup>20</sup> *News from Turkey*. Published by the Turkish Information Office (September 7, 1950).

<sup>21</sup> *New York Times* (October 12, 1951).

<sup>22</sup> *Central European Observer* (November 11, 1950).

grants, the Turkish Government again closed the border, so that by the end of the month some 6,000 Turkish emigrants had accumulated in the Svilingrad camp.<sup>23</sup> Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Koprula stated that the frontier "will remain closed until the Bulgarian authorities realize that they will not succeed in their plan to smuggle into Turkey persons who are not of Turkish origin."<sup>24</sup>

This latter remark referred to Bulgarian attempts to despatch to Turkey, along with ethnic Turks, also elements of Bulgaria's 80,000 strong gypsy minority, over four-fifths of whom are of Moslem faith. Despite repeated warnings on the part of the Turkish authorities, the train which arrived from Bulgaria on October 6 brought a group of 97 gypsies to the Turkish border. They had neither Turkish entry visas, nor could they claim Turkish ethnic origin, and were returned to Bulgaria. Bulgarian authorities, however, sent the train and its passengers back again. To prevent a repetition of such incidents, the Turkish Government closed the border to all traffic until the Bulgars would see fit to permit the gypsies to return to Bulgaria.<sup>25</sup>

Another ground for apprehension on the part of the Turkish Government was the strong suspicion that the Communist Sofia régime would use the refugee stream to plant a number of Communist agents on Turkish territory. It demanded to be given the opportunity of careful screening of the immigrants against infiltration of Communist agents.

## V

One of the most distressing aspects of the migration process was, undoubtedly, its property aspect. The 1925 Agreement to which Bulgaria had so insistently been referring, stipulates that prospective emigrants shall have the right to dispose of all their immovable property "in complete freedom" and to take with them all their savings and movable property (Art. 2).

The Turkish Government's note of August 28 sternly reminded the Bulgarian Government that the Agreement "is an international instrument which takes precedence over national regulations." "Nevertheless," continued the note, "based on subsequent legislation, Bulgarian authorities refuse emigrants to take with them anything other than their bedding and a few kitchen utensils . . . Thus, instead of becoming productively self-supporting in a short time, these emigrants find themselves in a tragic plight on arrival in their new homeland: they urgently require aid out of state funds: and it becomes enormously more difficult to settle and house them . . . The Turkish government demands that discussion be initiated immediately to determine the manner in which emigrants may take with them their

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *News from Turkey* (October 12, 1950).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*



monies and properties: though this is required by the existing emigration agreement, it has been impossible to actualize to date."<sup>26</sup>

This demand remained unheeded, and the Bulgarian authorities continued to disregard the economic clauses of the Agreement. Refugees in the Edirne camp told A. T. Steele that they were given only ten days to two weeks to liquidate their properties, which meant they had to sell at a sacrifice.<sup>27</sup> Their "major complaint was against the subtle technique of stripping them of their capital before they left the country." Moreover, they were allowed to take with them only second-hand personal effects equivalent to \$2 in Bulgarian money, and no valuables.<sup>28</sup>

Another essential provision of the 1925 agreement forbids the imposition of any special taxes or any financial restrictions, direct or indirect, on the emigrants (Art. 3). Art. 6 exempts all prospective emigrants from military service. A *Time* correspondent was told by emigrants who have reached Turkey, how these provisions have been violated:<sup>29</sup>

Said a refuge carpenter: "When I applied for a passport I was asked if I had overdue taxes. When I showed all receipts I was informed that my grandfather Ahmet owed 4,000 leva on a house I'd sold. I told them this couldn't be so, and that my grandfather's name was not Ahmet but Osman. They answered: 'Then he must have changed his name.' I paid the overdue debt of grandfather's." Another refugee paid 4,200 leva, plus a 6,000-leva bribe for the "military exemption fee" of his four-year old son.

Bulgarian propaganda, in an attempt to throw the blame for the sorry plight of the Turkish emigrants massed along the frontier on the Turkish government, has in fact provided striking proofs of these spoliation methods. Radio Sofia reported that the emigrants were "without means, furniture and shelter."<sup>30</sup> A pro-Communist letter from the Bulgarian frontier town of Svilengrad describes the Turks as "living in tents and bivouacs of their own construction and in sheds... They have little equipment."<sup>31</sup> There can hardly be any doubt that even the poorest peasant family in Bulgaria, Turks and Bulgarians alike, owns some household equipment and furniture, a horse or oxen-driven cart, and some cattle. If they have avowedly arrived at the Turkish frontier stripped of all their possessions, it can be explained only by a deliberate Bulgarian Govern-

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* (September 7, 1950).

<sup>27</sup> The Turkish press reported that the Bulgarian government has instructed the militia to ensure that no Bulgar shall purchase any property offered for sale by Bulgarian Turks who are planning to emigrate and that prospective emigrants who do put up their property for sale are visited at night, taken to headquarters, tortured, and made to sign a document of renunciation of all rights to such property. *News from Turkey* (September 7, 1950).

<sup>28</sup> *New York Herald-Tribune* (October 12, 1950).

<sup>29</sup> *Time* (December 4, 1950).

<sup>30</sup> *The World Today* (January, 1951), pp. 34-35.

<sup>31</sup> *The Central European Observer* (November 11, 1950).

ment's policy of pauperizing the emigrants before dumping them into Turkey. Witnesses reported that a group of 1,670 persons who arrived at the Turkish border town of Edirne early in October had almost nothing to wear. A second lot of 600 immigrants stated that all their money was confiscated by the Bulgarian officials.<sup>32</sup>

Turkish authorities made it clear that they are quite disposed to admit generally high-quality immigrants of their own ethnic origin and faith if they are sent across in reasonable numbers. But they could not continue to allow this sudden and chaotic influx of people who were entering the country not as a repatriates but as refugees, who had been stripped of all their possessions after having been forced to abandon their farms without any compensation and, in many cases, have left behind even their movable property and their funds. Such immigrants were bound to become a charge on the Turkish Government at a time when winter was beginning, and the government felt unable to cope with the economic and financial problems of sheltering, feeding and later resettling 250,000 persons within a few months.

With the obvious intention to make the situation unbearable, the Bulgarian authorities, in October, rescinded the ration cards of the emigrants without making any arrangements to feed them during the period of their awaiting transportation to Turkey and thus virtually sentencing them to starvation.<sup>33</sup> Another aggravating circumstance was the weather. Refik Koraltan, President of the Turkish National Assembly, stressed that the Bulgarian government had deliberately chosen the winter season for the mass removal of the Turks in order to inflict utmost hardship to all concerned.<sup>34</sup> Among the 55,000 Turks that arrived between August and September, 1950, there were 28,039 children and 9,924 nursing mothers or mothers to be. Their plight during the severe winter months was particularly miserable.<sup>35</sup> In January, 1951, Turkish sources estimated at more than 20,000 the number of emigrants left to face freezing winter in open fields around Svilingrad. Radio Sofia admitted that such a concentration exists, but claimed that only 8,000 were actually living in the open.<sup>36</sup>

## VI

The Turkish government had from the very beginning taken the position that the dispute over the manner in which the 1925 Agreement

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<sup>32</sup> *News from Turkey* (October 5, 1950).

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, (October 19, 1950).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, (January 18, 1951).

<sup>35</sup> *Another Quarter Million Homeless People*. Published by the Turkish Information Office (New York, 1951), p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 11, 1951).

should be implemented had to be settled by direct negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey; only if the Bulgarian government refused to negotiate, would Turkey refer the matter to international bodies. The Sofia government for months had been avoiding a definite answer to this alternative and merely intensified both anti-Turkish propaganda and expulsions. The Sofia radio indignantly protested that "the doors of Turkey . . . open only to spies and murderers, to the hirelings of the imperialists and to the enemies of the people."<sup>37</sup>

Turkey raised the issue between her and Bulgaria at the November, 1950 session of the sixteen-member Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which met in Rome to sign the Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedom. The Council adopted a resolution expressing strong condemnation of Bulgaria's action which was described as a tendency to create unrest in the affected areas. The Council asked the Bulgarian government to refrain from putting its decision into execution. The condemnatory resolution of the Ministers' Committee, said Fuat Koprula, the Turkish Foreign Minister, "has turned what was previously a Turkish cause into a European cause."<sup>38</sup>

Simultaneously, Nuri Birgi, Turkish delegate to the *ad hoc* Political Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly, gave the Assembly's plenary session a complete resumé of violation by Bulgaria of contractual obligations and human rights and of the sufferings of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin. The Turkish delegate pointed out that Turkey has received, and continues to receive, as many immigrants as it is possible for her to resettle properly. But in this case, he said, the flagrant violation of human rights and dignity lies in the fact that Bulgaria is deliberately creating a situation arising out of the impossibility to receive immigrants in such huge numbers within so short a time, especially when the deportees whom the Bulgarians mass on the frontier arrive in a state of utter destitution, despite the fact that an immigration agreement already exists between Turkey and Bulgaria to regulate this traffic, and also despite the fact that it is quite possible for Bulgaria to cooperate with Turkey to arrive at a workable solution and arrangement.<sup>39</sup>

The Turkish delegate did not ask for immediate action by the United Nations. But President Celal Bayar announced in the Turkish National Assembly that his government "is already decided to submit this grave dispute to international jurisdiction."<sup>40</sup>

The acute conflict lasted till the end of November when the Bulgarian authorities unexpectedly yielded and informed the Ankara Government

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<sup>37</sup> *Time* (December 12, 1950).

<sup>38</sup> *News from Turkey* (November 9 and 16, 1950).

<sup>39</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Fifth Session (November 3, 1950), pp. 366-367.

<sup>40</sup> *New York Times* (November 10, 1950).



that they were prepared to negotiate. Even more unexpected was the brevity of the discussion and easy acceptance by the Bulgarian representatives of all the Turkish proposals. The agreement was signed on December 2, and covered four essential points:<sup>41</sup>

1. The Bulgarian government shall issue exit visas only to those prospective Turkish emigrants who have already obtained entry visas from the Turkish consulates in Bulgaria. Applicants for such visas shall neither leave their homes nor start to dispose of their properties before Turkish visas are issued to them.

2. The Turkish frontier authorities shall have the right to refuse acceptance and to return immigrants for security reasons. Bulgarian frontier authorities shall receive them without protest.

3. The Bulgarian authorities will receive in Bulgaria 360 gypsies, which they had sent to Turkey without Turkish entry visas.

4. The Bulgarian authorities shall in future observe Articles 2 and 3 of the 1925 Agreement safeguarding the property rights of the emigrants.

The first and the last paragraphs of the agreement have now probably theoretical significance only. Almost all the Turkish emigrants, those who have already crossed the border as well as those who are still awaiting their turn, have been in the meantime deprived of their property. The Ankara newspaper *Zafer* reported early in January 1951 that "the Bulgars are already violating their month-old agreement to permit emigrants to retain their homes and possessions, and their promise not to deport persons who are not yet in possession of visas. They continue to confiscate everything and to pile up masses of men, women and children on our borders. Visa or no visa, Turkey feels bound to extend a helping hand to these unfortunate victims of Communism."<sup>42</sup>

Paragraphs two and three, if observed, might be, however, of some practical importance. They give the Turkish authorities the possibility of screening the arrivals and thus safeguarding Turkey against the infiltration of gypsies and Communist agents amongst the *bona fide* immigrants. Turkish circles dealing with the influx of these immigrants expressed confidence in the authorities' ability to deal with this problem.

Ziyad Ebuzzia of the propaganda committee of The Society for Aid to Refugees from Bulgaria told the Reuter correspondent that more than three-quarters of the 68,000 Turks admitted between August, 1950, and March 1951, were old folk or children; only 7,230 men and 8,000 women were between 18 and 45, which could be considered as the potentially "dangerous" ages. On the other hand, Mr. Ebuzzia said, Turkish consulates in Bulgaria are extremely careful in issuing visas. And finally, since almost all the immigrants are peasants coming in compact village groups, "every-

<sup>41</sup> *News from Turkey* (December 12, 1950). *World Today*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>42</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 11, 1951).

one knows everybody else" and it is relatively easy to obtain the opinion of the majority of the villagers about the reliability of single members of the group.<sup>43</sup>

The Turkish border was reopened immediately after the agreement was signed on December 2nd. Since then an average of 650 Turks in possession of entry visas have been entering Turkey daily.<sup>44</sup> A total of 55,045 arrived between January 1 and December 31, 1950. Over 25,000 of this number were admitted since December 4, 1950.<sup>45</sup> Till May 7, 1951, the number reached 122,000, and an official Turkish source announced that "another 100,000 are expected to seek and find refuge in Turkey before the end of 1951."<sup>46</sup> The International Refugee Organization Mission reported that Turkey will probably accept the rest of the 250,000 named in the original Bulgarian note.<sup>47</sup> Earlier, the Istanbul correspondent of the *New York Times* even submitted that "a mass emigration of the 850,000 of Turkish heritage . . . is now indicated."<sup>48</sup> In the course of his inspection tour of the receiving centers, President Celal Bayar assured the immigrants that "everything would be done to receive and resettle in Turkey those other persons of Turkish descent who are still suffering persecution in Communist Bulgaria."<sup>49</sup> Above the old military barracks at Edirne through which all the repatriates pass, a sign reads: "Has Geldin Gocinen Cina Yurt Seni Sevgizle Kucaklar" ("welcome, immigrants, to your homeland; we take you back with love, back to our breast").

Between January 1950 and November 1951, a total of 157,711 refugees, about 37,000 families, were admitted to Turkey.<sup>49a</sup>

However, Bulgaria continued sending to Turkey gypsies along with genuine Turkish refugees. At various instances, 126 gypsies provided with forged Turkish visas arrived. They were deported, but Bulgarian authorities protested these violations of the December 2, 1950, agreement (on June 2, July 19, August 6, August 8, September 6, 1951) and finally, on November 8, closed the frontier altogether and announced that "it will remain closed until the circumstances which made this decision necessary cease to exist." In January 1952, Turkish authorities, moved by the tragic plight of a large group of refugees who were freezing at the frontier, offered to make an exception and to admit this particular group; but Bulgarian Border guards have forcibly driven the refugees from the frontier zone.<sup>49b</sup> There are indications that, in retaliation for Turkey's arherence

<sup>43</sup> *Christian Science Monitor* (March 15, 1951).

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 11, 1951).

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* (June 14, 1951).

<sup>47</sup> *New York Times* (April 10, 1951).

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* (December 21, 1950).

<sup>49</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 18, 1951).

<sup>49a</sup> *Ibid.*, May 25, 1952.

<sup>49b</sup> *Ibid.*, November 22, 1951; January 10, 1952.

to the North Atlantic Treaty, Bulgaria has decided to forbid further repatriation of her Turkish minority.

With the number of refugees stabilized, Turkey was able to concentrate on their rehabilitation and resettlement.

Upon arrival in Edirne from the concentration point in Svilinograd, Bulgaria, the refugees are disinfected, given a medical examination, including X-rays, cleared by the immigration and police authorities, and housed in two-tier bunks in the military barracks. The Edirne camp can handle up to 2,000 in so far as beds and meals are concerned. The accommodations are rough but scrupulously clean and warm.

Within several days each family is being interviewed as to its desires and skills and assigned to one or another province. Some are being sent immediately to their new locations, where they report to the governor of the province. Others go from Edirne to temporary transit centers until travel accommodations are available to their eventual destinations. Each province has a small reception center of its own for use until the refugees find work and housing.

## VII

Early in January, 1951, a top-level three-man mission of the International Refugee Organization, headed by Meyer Cohen, I.R.O. assistant general director, arrived in Turkey at the request of the Turkish government to study the question of immigrants from Bulgaria, and to suggest measures for their resettlement in the country.<sup>51</sup> The mission toured the areas where large reception centers have been established and was expected to "prepare a report which will form the basis of probable monetary aid on the I.R.O."<sup>52</sup> This latter expectation was, however, hardly justified. J. Donald Kingsley, director general of I.R.O., made it clear that the mission's task in Turkey will be limited to the provision of technical assistance, since I.R.O. is scheduled to wind up its operation in the fall of 1951, and all of its resources are committed to the task of resettling as many as possible of the displaced persons already on its roll.<sup>53</sup>

The mission completed its investigation by the end of January. It came to the conclusion that the Turkish government "is doing pretty well under the circumstances." It also was the mission's opinion that "Turkey would benefit in the end from this influx of a sturdy peasant population which

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<sup>50</sup> Wilson, Gill Robb, "Turkey's Repatriation Effort," *New York Herald Tribune* (May 18, 1951).

<sup>51</sup> *Times* (London, January 6, 1951).

<sup>52</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 18, 1951).

<sup>53</sup> *Christian Science Monitor* (January 5 and 20, 1951).



could be resettled in the sparsely populated regions of eastern and southern Turkey."<sup>54</sup>

Recent evidence fully supports this judgement. The about 150,000 Turkish repatriates from Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia who arrived between 1934 and 1939 and had been resettled on vacant land have undoubtedly become a considerable asset in Turkey's economy. According to so neutral and well-informed an observer as Donald Everest Webster, those repatriates "have the vigor and ambition generally characteristic of migrants, so they are making a genuine contribution to the country to which they thus show their affection. While the government is being strained to care for them, there is every reason to believe that the investment is sound."<sup>55</sup>

Turkey is still a relatively underpopulated country. There were, in 1945, only 62 persons per square mile in the whole of Anatolia. The Turkish government is now looking for suitable areas in which to resettle the new immigrants and trying to provide suitable employment for them in line with their previous occupation and experience. Most of them are peasants without special skills other than simple, unmechanized farming. Although comfortably dressed, they have no furniture, no tools, no bedding. Therefore, the initiative in resettling the repatriates must originate with the Turkish government. And the government is meeting this challenge gallantly.

Forty-eight of the sixty-two provinces in Turkey have volunteered to accept quotas of the 250,000 repatriates. The provinces not accepting any are those so remote and isolated as to offer nothing to the refugees in the line of opportunity. From the national budget, Turkey allocated in 1951 1,695,000 lira for refuge work.<sup>56</sup> It is hoped that a long-range plan of land development can be worked out where population density in Turkey combined with the best available terrain makes such possible. For the occasional skilled repatriate or for young people who have an educational potential, there is always opportunity.

Addressing the National Assembly in Ankara, Vice-Premier Samed Agaoglu declared that the problem of immigrants from Bulgaria was considered by the government to be of national importance and magnitude; the government, he said, was envisaging the establishment of a special department to coordinate immigration, housing, land distribution, etc., under a single administration. The newspaper *Zafer* reported that the government was enlisting the cooperation of experts from other countries who have had wide experience of immigration problems and referred particularly to the invitation extended to experts of the U.S. Department of the Interior.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> *New York Times* (April 15, 1951).

<sup>55</sup> Webster, Donald Everest, *The Turkey of Ataturk; Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 274.

<sup>56</sup> Wilson, Gill Rob, *loc cit.*

<sup>57</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 11, 1951).

Mr. Faik Fanik, chairman of the Committee for the absorption of the repatriates, made a study trip to Israel inspecting transition camps, workers' villages, housing projects and other institutions and facilities in the various stages of absorption and integration.<sup>58</sup>

In the meantime, as reported by the I.R.O. mission, the Turkish government is supporting the immigrants for about one month in the camps, but from then on it is to relatives or charity that the immigrants have to look until they get jobs.<sup>59</sup> The receiving facilities at Edrine and Istanbul have been enlarged, and new centers have been opened in Tekirdag and Izmir. Additional food kitchens have been organized, and adequate medical facilities provided.<sup>60</sup> The Turkish Red Crescent Society which is operating the four existing reception camps, is currently organizing several others to meet the needs of the increasing inflow of immigrants.<sup>61</sup> A special Committee to Aid the Refugees is working under the chairmanship of Refik Koraltan, the President of the Turkish National Assembly, with branch offices in almost every province. Large contributions to assistance have been subscribed by national credit institutions, with the Central Bank (\$212,000), Agricultural Bank (\$212,000) and Ottoman Bank (\$177,000) heading the list.<sup>62</sup>

Leading Turkish circles, however, insist that the plight of the refugees from Bulgaria is, as Refik Koraltan put it, "a problem that requires the joint efforts of the whole civilized world, and we are confident that aid will not be withheld." Turkey has also received an equivalent of some \$20,000,000 in Marshall Plan counterpart funds for the rehabilitation of her new countrymen. The Economic Cooperation Administration has justified this grant by pointing out that the refugee settlement tied in well with Turkey's problem of agricultural development.

By the end of 1951, the Turkish Government has been able to announce that "nearly 20,000 of the 25,000 houses required for refugees from Bulgaria will be ready for occupancy within the next few weeks." The hope was expressed that the remaining 5,000 dwellings will be built during the first half of 1952, so that all of the 37,000 refugee families will all be permanently housed.

Aside from housing, each settler family received a grant of arable land, a pair of oxen, a wagon, a plough and other farming implements, as well as seed for the coming harvest. The Turkish Government has divided several state-owned domains in order to provide each refugee family with 25 acres of farm land and 5 acres of pasture.

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<sup>58</sup> *Israel Digest* (June 6, 1951).

<sup>59</sup> *New York Times* (April 15, 1951).

<sup>60</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 11, 1951).

<sup>61</sup> *Another Quarter Million Homeless People*, p. 6.

<sup>62</sup> *News from Turkey* (January 25, 1951).

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, (January 18 and 25, 1951).

The cost of this resettlement is estimated at a minimum of \$2,000 per family, or \$74,000,000 for the 37,000 families who have, so far, arrived on Turkish soil.<sup>64</sup> The World Health Organization volunteered to join in this work. The Red Cross Societies in the United States, Britain, Canada, India, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden have promised speedy and effective aid.<sup>63</sup>

NEW YORK CITY

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<sup>64</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*, (January 7, 1952).



## REVIEW NOTE

### THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ZDENĚK NEJEDLÝ

by S. Harrison Thomson

PROFESSOR Zdeněk Nedjedlý is one of the few competent Czech scholars who have actively and consistently supported the Marxist cause over a period of years. He is old enough to have been active under the Hapsburg régime, all through the first Republic, and to have retained enough physical vigor to be the present Minister of Education, under the Gottwald administration.

His earliest major scholarly work was in the field of musicology, in which he was a pioneer. His study of the origins of Hussite hymnody (*Počátky husitského zpěvu*) appeared in 1907, and its sequel, the history of Hussite hymnody during the Hussite wars (*Dějiny husitského zpěvu od Husa po Kompaktáta*) was approved by the Czech Academy in 1911 and published in 1913 under the title *Dějiny husitského zpěvu za válek husitských*. Since that time and under the impact of the first world war and its problems and possibilities Nejedly's interest broadened and deepened in a remarkable degree. Russian culture and politics, the ideas behind Czech historical development, the tendencies in current politics after independence, criticism and esthetics, all received his attention. He entered gladly into any question of the day, and his feuilletons in the various dailies or periodicals to which he contributed were read by a wide circle of the Czech intelligentsia. His reactions were not always readily predictable, but they were always lively.

His highly active mind and urgent desire to take part in all current debates prevented him from completing some of his great projects. Of the history of Hussite hymnody, planned for at least four volumes, only the first two have been published. His study of the life and thought of T. G. Masaryk, though it filled five large volumes, did not reach beyond 1900. An equally ambitious study of Bedřich Smetana reached five volumes, but that covered hardly more than a substantial part of what Nejedly planned to treat.

Nejedlý spent the World War II years in Moscow, and on his return entered the cabinet of Zdeněk Fierlinger, and has been a cabinet minister every since. Two leading Czech publishing houses, Svoboda and Orbis, have undertaken to bring together in one series all of Nejedly's principal works and have projected at least 43 volumes, of which, so far as I know at this moment, at least 24 are in print, and another dozen announced as 'in press'. This is a formidable achievement. The various volumes have not been necessarily published in the order in which they are numbered in the *Sebrané Spisy*.

The first three volumes are concerned with Russia, the first, *Boje o nové Rusko*, the second a brief but apparently popular (8th ed.) history of the Soviet Union, the third, *Moskevské stati*, a collection of essays dating from his years in Moscow during the last war. The next four volumes, *O lidovou republiku* parts I-IV, are a collection of feuilletons published in Prague newspapers and critical reviews mostly in the early years of the first republic. The events of December 1920, when the Czech Communists were handled rather roughly, disturbed Nejedly, who came to regard this bourgeois governmental policy as the end, not the beginning, of real Czech democracy. He complained - in November, 1921 - that all progress had stopped, that culturally there was a great decline, "Our art is as foggy as a lamp in a cemetery . . . In social questions we are playing paper games, . . . and we are living without spirit and bloodlessly . . . walking corpses . . . no sign of life." (*O lidovou republiku*, II, 8). In the remaining two volumes of this series of excerpts and feuilletons one gets a fairly consistent picture of Nejedly's dissatisfaction with the growth of the young state. He finds too much regimentation on the part of the governing groups, too much compliance on the part of the people, too little real confidence in the moral strength of the common man.

Nejedly did not, in spite of his lively interest in current affairs, at any time stray very far from his first love - the relation of music to the intellectual and spiritual life of the Czech people. His study of the political and cultural trends of his own time led him to the nineteenth century roots of the events of the war and post-war periods. He came to feel that the life and time of Bedřich Smetana, the composer of the last half of the century, should be more carefully investigated, and set about bringing this hope to reality. In the early twenties much of this plan was accomplished. The first two volumes of his study of Smetana have been republished in the collected works (volumes XXI, XXII), and volumes III-VII are announced as in the press. But he had a whole literary plan, of which the work on Smetana was only a part. The other side of the coin was the life and work of Masaryk. These two personalities and the aspects of Czech life they represented made, in Nejedly's mind, a whole which the Czechs of the Republic had not understood.

In his introduction to the work on Masaryk, dated January 1930, he wrote:

At the very time I began to write the *Smetana* I counted on writing the *Masaryk*. My *Smetana* gives a picture of Czech national life of the nineteenth century in its first two stages, in its youth, in the time of its first flowering growth and then, in a later period, in its greatest expansion and ripening. Then, after Smetana there comes a third period, the close of the century, and here the only possible central personality in whom it would be possible to comprehend and depict the whole of Czech life is Masaryk.

Both works, the *Smetana* and the *Masaryk*, will, according to this plan of mine constitute a unit, one total and inseparable picture of our whole national life in the nineteenth century, from its beginnings to its close.

In the original edition the work on Masaryk reached five volumes, without reaching the beginning of the century. The re-edition is announced as in five volumes, volumes XXX-XXXIV of the collected works. It is not yet clear whether the later period has been or will be approached.

Chronologically the work on the history of the national theatre (*Dějiny opery Národního Divadla*, volumes XXVIII-XXIX of *Sebrané Spisy*, came next (first edition 1935) after the work on Masaryk. This intimate study of the national opera is symbolic of Nejedlý's conviction that the artistic expression is perpetually one of the two dominant aspects of Czech life without which neither the mission of the Czech people nor their thought and action at any given period can be understood. Much of this study is necessarily devoted to the economic and political struggles through which the Czechs had to battle before their cultural dream could be realized. Nejedlý's familiarity with the technical details of the Národní Divadlo and his profound musicological knowledge make this a most valuable mirror of the artistic life in Prague from the 1880's to 1920.

Volumes X and XI of the *Sebrané Spisy* are reserved for a two volume history of the Czech people (*Dějiny národa českého*) of which only the first volume has thus far appeared. It hardly seems possible, from the period of time covered by the first volume, that a second volume will suffice. A third of the volume (pp.1-129) is a historiographical essay in which the various schools of Czech history, domestic and foreign, are given some kind of treatment. The general burden of his discussion is that no school of historians, except the Marxist, has given sufficient attention to the real "sense" (*smysl*) of Czech history. There has either been too great emphasis on political history or, even as in the case of Palacký, whom he otherwise regards very highly, on religious. He has a most illuminating analysis of the legacy of Goll, and the place of Josef Pekař in recent Czech historiography. Indeed it seems accurate to remark that seldom has the reputation of a scholar been so quickly deflated soon after his death as that of Pekař.

The purely narrative part of this volume begins with prehistoric origins of the Czech lands. Undocumented, and obviously anti-monographic in interest, this treatment must be taken for what it is: the more or less organized rumination of a scholar who has read widely, but now wishes to interpret. In another 300 pages, he arrives at the end of the fourth century A. D. At this rate one might expect the finished work to attain five volume dimensions.

As volume XII of the collected works we are offered the second edition of Nejedlý's *Alois Jirásek*. The first edition appeared in 1921. In this study Nejedlý's interest is primarily in Jirásek's relation to Czech history, his in-



fluence upon its course in his own lifetime and since. Jirásek's novels were almost exclusively on or about themes of Czech history which he was exceptionally well read, and the great popularity of his writing was some index of its impact upon Czech thought at the end of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth. On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Jirásek's birthday in 1951 much was made of Jirásek's interest in social questions. Nejedlý then published a small book containing four separate studies on the general theme of the social significance of his work (*Alois Jirásek a společenský význam jeho díla*, Prague, 1951, Československý Spisovatel).

As volume XV of the collected works a further collection of essays and journalistic pieces on the general subject of Czech culture (*Z české kultury*) was published in 1951. In time these essays stretch from 1908 to 1937. Perhaps the most interesting is the earliest (1908), "Paměť veřejného mínění", in which he explains his entry into political life, a protest against the lackadaisical attitude of the elements in Czech society which Nejedlý felt should accept the responsibility of progressive leadership, and in particular their disregard of the voice and opinion of the common people. Hardly less interesting is one of the latest, a note on the twentieth anniversary of the Manifest of the Writers, May, 1917, calling upon Czech people to repudiate their deputies to the Reichsrat in Vienna who had officially supported the Hapsburg régime. Nejedlý was one of the 150 signers of this Manifest and therefore has a right to speak. He goes on to remark that among those who supported the Manifest was a group of demonstrating blacksmiths, known to him personally, who were then (1937) "almost all of them communists". It is not clear that he regards this as more significant than the open signing by 150 "bourgeois" writers of the Manifest in the face of Hapsburg wrath.

The achievement of such a collection on so grand a scale is something to be recorded with no little admiration. It may be hoped that the remaining works announced as 'in press' may soon be available.

## NOTES

For several years there has been under way a movement to bring together the leading intellectuals, now emigrés, from the countries under Soviet control. This movement has resulted in the formation of an International Academy of Sciences which has recently (February 23-24, 1952) held its first formal session in Paris. Around 120 individuals from professional and learned circles, now living in exile from their native Central European lands, attended the sessions, and a considerable number of French guests brought the total attendance to about 200. The President of the Academy is Dr. G. Antoniadé and the Vice-President Professor Alexander Shulkin. A Board of Directors, representative both of countries and of disciplines, was elected.

Papers informative and stimulating were read before the several meetings of the Academy, and plans for the future tasks of the Academy were discussed. It is hoped the several papers may be brought together and published so that the best thought of these scholars may be preserved and disseminated in the West.

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Friends and former associates of the late Professor R. W. Seton-Watson (Scotus Viator) of the School of Slavonic Studies in London, and, latterly, of Oxford University, have organized a move to perpetuate his memory by (1) an appropriate plaque, designed by Ivan Mestrović, to be placed in the hall of the London School near the memorials to Sir Bernard Pares and T. G. Masaryk. If contributions to the memorial fund are adequate, a Seton-Watson Book Fund in the School Library will be established. Contributions may be sent to the Secretary, University of London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, W. C. 1. *Floreat memoria.*

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From Spain comes evidence of the characteristically increasing interest in the non-Latin part of Europe. The *Obra Misional del Oriente Cristiano*, a Jesuit-guided missionary organ, has succeeded in founding a journal, *Oriente*, primarily interested in the problems of Greek and Eastern Orthodoxy. The first volume of this quarterly and fascicle I of Año II have come to the editor's desk. The editor is Rev. Santiago Morillo, S. J., secretary of the Redacción Constantino Láscaris Comneno, and other members of the editorial board Dmytro Buchynskyj, Josef Cieker, Mihail F. Enescu, Hilario Gómez, Alexis Markof, Cirilo Popovici. George Uscatescu. The address of the *Oriente* is Conde de Cartagena, 17 (Colonia del Retiro), Madrid. A few titles of articles will indicate the interests covered by the journal: "La Herencia de Bizancio en Rumania" by George Uscatescu, I, 11-16; "Escuela

Teológica de Kiev" by Hilario Gómez, I, 17-24; "La entrada de los eslovacos en la comunidad cristiana" by José Cieker, I, 61-74; "Posición de Vladimir Solovief respecto a la Iglesia católica" by Heinrich Fald, S. J., I, 103-116; "Relaciones entre el Gobierno griego y la Santa Sede con ocasión de las fiestas de San Pablo" by Aurelio de Santos Otero, I, 151-160; etc. There are also documents and copious reviews.

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The second volume (1951) of *Istoriské Časopis* (Belgrade) has come to hand. Under the editorship of Professor Viktor Novak, the journal covers a broad field, from early Greek and Slavic archeology in the Balkans to events and personalities of 1848. There are also documents, news and extensive book reviews, and a longish section (pp. 300-375) devoted to reports on recent archival studies in and around Dubrovnik, and an account of the Code of Stephan Dushan. Historical studies seem to be prospering in Yugoslavia.

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Fascicle I of Volume I of *Acta Historia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest, 1951) has been published. The declared intention is the publication in Russian of articles on Magyar history. The range of the four articles here first translated and published in Russian is wide: L. Elekes, "The Army of Hunyadi" (pp. 5-60); E. G. Frazekas, "A comparison of the Hungarian Nationality Laws of 1849 and 1868, with particular attention to progressive historical forces" (pp. 61-93); L. Réti, "The Bethlen-Peyer Pact" (pp. 95-148) and, pp. 149-160, a note on the work of the journal of the Hungarian Historical Association, *Századok*, now in its 84th year.

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#### VACLAV CHALOUPECKY, 1882-1951

In November 1951 Professor Václav Chaloupecký died in Prague at the age of sixty-nine. His academic career was closely connected with the ups and downs of modern Czechoslovak history. Born in 1882 he studied and completed his doctoral studies in the period of constitutional struggles in Austria-Hungary. He was ready to take responsible posts when Czechoslovakia made its successful start. He joined in 1922 the teaching staff of the newly founded Comenius University at Bratislava. In 1937-38 he served there as Rector Magnificus. In the fall of 1938 he moved to Prague to take at Charles University the chair of Czechoslovak History vacated by the death of Josef Pekař. He hardly had time to assume his teaching duties. The Charles University was closed by the Germans and reopened only in May 1945. Chaloupecký was not *persona grata* with the Communists and in February 1948 he escaped purge only by a hair's breadth.



While in Slovakia he worked mostly in Slovak history and put out several major works. His *Staré Slovensko* (1923) was devoted to early Slovak history. Two publications of documents, *Knihá Žilinská* (1934), and *Středověké listy ze Slovenska* (1937) were welcomed both by historians and philologists - the former was a critical edition of the municipal registers of the royal borough of Žilina, the latter a collection of charters and letters in the vernacular, mostly from the fifteenth century. A book *Zápas o Slovensko 1918* (1930) was a venture in modern history and discussed the liberation of Slovakia with a polemical undertone against Dr. Milan Hodža.

But Chaloupecký's main field was the early history of the Czechs and Slovaks. He analyzed thoroughly the legends depicting the life and activities of both the Slavic apostles, SS. Cyril and Methodius, and of the patron saint of Bohemia. His most considerable contribution to the highly controversial problem of authorship of some legends on St. Wenceslas and his grandmother St. Ludmila, *Prameny X. století. Legendy Kristiánovy o sv. Václavu a sv. Ludmile*, was published in 1939 as vol. II, part 2, of the gigantic collection of essays, *Svatováclavský sborník*. A valuable edition of hagiographic sources in modern Czech translations, *Na úsvitě křesťanství*, appeared in 1942 with Chaloupecký's preface.

Chaloupecký's interpretations and conclusions were usually original and provocative. They stimulated discussion and kept alive interest in the rather remote epochs. He was in general opposed to the critical school as represented by Václav Novotný, and endeavored to treat the late ninth and tenth centuries as a period of intensive literary activities in Church Slavonic and in Latin. His critical acumen often was at odds with patriotic sentiment and in many cases Chaloupecký went too far in his reliance on the legends. Only a careful scrutiny of his writings on the opening phase of Czechoslovak history would show which of his views can be retained and where a more dispassionate method would have to be applied to reach safer grounds. By his many friends and pupils Chaloupecký will be remembered for his rugged individualism, personal charm, and his determination to serve Clio gallantly.

## BOOK REVIEWS

BILMANIS, ALFRED, *A History of Latvia*. Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. x, 441. \$6.00.

Despite its colorful past, the segment of Europe lying between Russia and the Baltic has been neglected by British and American historians. The present volume, therefore, is a welcome arrival, with no competitors except the longer, more detailed, and less readable *History of Latvia* by Arnolds Spekke, published in the English language in Stockholm almost simultaneously. The late Alfred Bilmanis possessed unusual qualifications to write the history of his country. Well-read in the field and master of several languages, he had occasion to systematize his knowledge while serving as professor of history at the Riga College of Commerce. Only when his national or political prejudices were involved did he depart at times, in the opinion of this reviewer, from the objectivity required of the scholar.

*A History of Latvia* is a pleasure to read, in more ways than one. Physically it lives up to the high standard of appearance which one has learned to associate with products of the Princeton University Press and stylistically it is characterized by free-flowing, lucid English.

The section of the book which will perhaps be most unfamiliar to the American reader with respect to subject matter is that dealing with the history of Latvia before the thirteenth-century German conquest. Bilmanis makes available to us the results of several decades of archeological research by the scholars of his country. From this research we learn, as we have learned from similar explorations of the Finnish and Estonian past, that the integration of the Eastern Baltic region into European culture was not a sudden phenomenon beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with St. Erik's crusade or the consecration of Meinhard as Livonian bishop. On the contrary, Western conquest was preceded by a long period of cultural contacts: not only material objects of the civilization of the outer world but ideas as well—including Christianity—had been widely distributed in the region before even the first crusader arrived to establish political and economic dominance on the pretext of introducing the true religion.

Some readers will doubtless be of the opinion that this section of Bilmanis' treatment suffers from too narrow a concentration on specifically Latvian developments, in contrast to Spekke's book, which illuminatingly fits Latvian pre-history, as well as history, into the general background of the East European peoples. Certainly the reader of the present volume is not likely to acquire as clear and accurate a picture of the early relationships of the Latvian tribes with the other Baltic peoples, the Finnic peoples, and the Russians as he would obtain from Spekke's very scholarly treatment, which is entirely free of the nationalistic ebullience characteristic of Bilmanis.

On the other hand, Bilmanis has done a far more satisfactory piece of work than Spekke in tracing the rise and development of the medieval Livonian state. He describes the institutions of that political monstrosity clearly and succinctly, without letting himself become entangled in confusing details. His account of the dissolution of the Livonian Confederation, and of the international struggle to seize the inheritance, is excellent. He traces skillfully the principal

developments under Polish, Swedish, and Russian rule. His section on the Latvian *Risorgimento* of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is an interesting case-study in the rise of modern nationalism.

It is to be regretted, nevertheless, that certain subjects have not been covered. There is no integration of Livonian expansion into the great general offensive against schismatic Russia planned by the thirteenth-century Papacy—a subject which has been interestingly developed by Donner and others. Insufficient attention is paid to the economic relations of Livonia with other countries in the Middle Ages and early modern times; and the connection between the growth of large-scale grain export to the West and the consolidation of the manorial system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is not brought out. The rise of the *Ritterschaften* in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the elaboration of the *Landesstaat* under Swedish and Russian rule are not adequately described. Cultural developments among the Baltic Germans are slighted, especially for the very fruitful period of the nineteenth century. Obviously, a general historical survey cannot cover everything; but these are important topics, and space for at least a cursory treatment of some of them could have been found by omitting from the first chapter the six-page discussion of Latvian national characteristics—all of which, it is interesting to note, are good.

A more serious criticism arises from the pronounced right-wing political bias on the part of Bilmanis which, in the opinion of this reviewer, mars and distorts his picture of Latvian history in increasing measure as it approaches the present. Nascent Latvian nationalism in the nineteenth century was, in some of its manifestations, more turbulent and violent than one would gather from these pages. The Revolution of 1905, as described by our author, is considerably milder and less radical than it appeared to some well-informed contemporaries. Whereas Spekke mentions and explains—convincingly or not—the Bolshevik loyalty of the Latvian Rifles at the end of the First World War, Bilmanis does not touch upon the subject. Above all, the reader will probably be startled by the author's apologia for the Ulmanis dictatorship, of which he does not indicate the darker features. Bilmanis was a servant of that régime; and evidently time and events did not lead him to any reappraisal which altered his attitude towards it.

A frankly "selective" bibliography of 165 titles is useful; it would be more so if it included some twenty or so important works unaccountably omitted.

A few minor errors ought to be noted. Hamilkar von Fölkersahm (whose name is misspelled), born in 1811, can hardly have "gained the friendship of George Washington" (p.227), since the latter died in 1799. William of Modena was not the first Bishop of Kurzeme (p.74); he was instrumental in having one appointed. Sweden obtained the *Bishopric* of Bremen-Verden, not the *city*, by the Peace of Westphalia (p.166). Carl Schirren's *Livländische Antwort* was a reply to Samarin's *Okrainy Rossii* (1868), not his *Pisma iz Rigi* (1848) (p. 240). Ferdinand Walter had to resign as General Superintendent because of the pressure of the Slavophiles, not of the Baltic barons (p. 245). It is most unlikely that the Russian government encouraged the settlement of German settlers in the Baltic provinces in the years just before the First World War (p. 274). The town of Wolmar is erroneously identified with Valka instead of Valmiera on pp. 111 and 162 and on the maps on p. 136. All the maps have the Vortsjäv



emptying into the Gauja instead of the Ema. A number of proper names are misspelled, and a couple of minor errors in dates appear.

Whatever criticisms of detail or interpretation may be found—and no work on the subject could possibly escape the latter, from one school of thought or another—*A History of Latvia* is an extremely useful book. Let us hope it will increase American understanding of an area about which we are, in general, greatly confused, and that it will quicken the interest of our scholars in exploring this fascinating field of history.

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C. LEONARD LUNDIN

SERAPHIM, METROPOLIT, *Die Ostkirche*. Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1950. Pp. 339.

Only the first, dogmatic part of this survey of the Eastern Church, which is one of the volumes of the series *Voelker Glaube*, has been written by the editor himself, Metropolitan Seraphim. As Orthodox Archbishop of Berlin and Germany, and Head of the Mid-European Metropolitan Circle, he is indeed well qualified to give the German public a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of his church, explaining its various dogmas as well as their interpretation, which, as he stresses in the introduction, is even more important and significant than their mere formulation. The author avoids, as he promises in the preface, any propaganda or polemics, but time and again he emphasizes the dogmatic differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which in his authoritative interpretation appear deeper than many people would suppose. The main controversial issue regarding the procession of the Holy Ghost receives, of course, special attention on a few pages which will help the non-theologian better to understand the position of the Eastern Church. Similarly, the concluding section on the eschatological approach of the Orthodox will make it clear why at the Council of Florence the problem of purgatory raised such serious difficulties.

Purely religious, too, is the second part, in which a former professor of the Imperial Academy of Divinity in Kiev, Ivan Chetverikov, describes the spiritual life and particularly the development of the monasticism among the Orthodox. He limits himself, however, almost exclusively to the Russian Church, because, as explained in the preface, that Church could develop more normally than those in the Balkans and now includes the great majority of all Orthodox peoples.

The historian will find instructive information in both of these main divisions of the book, but obviously he must be especially interested in a historical chapter which has been inserted between the two and written by the Rev. Vasil Lengenfelder, a graduate of the University of Belgrade. In that case a specialist in the problems of the Balkans has been selected, and he discusses all the national Churches of the Orthodox world. Unfortunately, however, he does it so briefly that the development of all of them has been summarized in twenty pages which had to include even the tragic story of the fate of Orthodoxy under the Bolshevik régime in Russia but could not give any clear picture of that involved problem. These pages are followed by twenty others which deal with those Eastern Churches of Asia and Africa which separated themselves not only from Rome but also from Constantinople when these two centers of Christendom were still united.

That early period of union, the "great separation" and the subsequent at-

tempts toward reunion are studied in greater detail (in thirty-six pages) in the first sections of the historical chapter. The author was well inspired in dedicating most of them to the centuries when Eastern and Western Christendom were in basic community. But even here he emphasizes early symptoms and occasions of misunderstandings, for instance, the so-called Trullian Council of 692. Speaking about its decisions which usually receive little attention, he points out that the Western Church does not recognize it as ecumenical, but admits that even the Eastern Church considers it only a continuation and implementation of the Sixth Ecumenical Council held in Constantinople in 680-681.

Speaking at comparative length about the Photian Schism, the author gives exclusively the official viewpoint of the Greek Orthodox Church, seeing all wrongs on the Latin side. Unfortunately, he does not seem to know the important results of Father F. Dvornik's painstaking research which make a conciliation of the two opposite views so much easier. It is hardly necessary to say that the very brief remarks about the Unions of Lyons and Florence are entirely negative. In the author's opinion the Orthodox Church cannot make any concessions to the West which is considered schismatical and guilty of heretical doctrines.

The volume is illustrated by a dozen beautiful plates with reproductions of religious works of art. The notes are very few, but besides two indexes there is a useful bibliography which includes works representing also the Western point of view, but, with one exception, is limited to publications written in, or translated into, the German language.

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O. HALECKI

HALLGARTEN, GEORGE W. F., *Imperialismus vor 1914*, 2 vols., Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1951. Pp. 561 and 505.

Since it is possible that the title of this excellent study in modern history may convey a wrong impression of its subject matter, it should be said that the book is actually a study of European diplomatic history for the period 1871-1914. Two chapters are devoted to a general account of the fundamental trends of British and French diplomacy from the seventeenth century down to 1914. After 1871 it is Germany that gets the fullest treatment, a fact that makes the book of fundamental significance to the student of German history in the Bismarckian and Wilhelminian periods. The reviewer would like to add that P. E. Schramm *Deutschland und Übersee* (George Westermann Verlag, Braunschweig, 1950) would serve as an excellent introduction to this part of Hallgarten's work. So thorough, so detailed, so well documented is this study that it can be said without fear of contradiction that the student of any phase of European diplomacy for the forty years prior to the outbreak of the First World War will find here new ideas and new materials on whatever question is of interest to him. It is the most important book in print on this period, indispensable to the student of modern European history. This is not to say that we would abandon Fay, Langer, Schmitt, Sontag, Renouvin, and the many others who have done important work in the field. These earlier writers are still needed if one is to have the knowledge that Professor Hallgarten must assume in his readers.

The manuscript for this work was completed in 1933, after seven solid years of labor with archives, documents, newspapers, and monographic studies. Works published since that date have been treated in the footnotes on those pages

that consider the subjects of these later writings. Hallgarten's work has been so thorough, it should be added, that in most instances these later studies have added little to what he has already given. Fearing that his study might never be published because of its great cost, the author had an abridged edition printed in Paris in 1935 under the title *Vorkriegsimperialismus*; and in 1939 he sold copies of the full text in typescript and on film to seven American libraries.

Hallgarten differs from other writers in this field by his intense and praiseworthy dissatisfaction with the kind of history content to work with only standard political and diplomatic documents. He calls his approach a sociological one and devotes a chapter to a discussion of methodology. Actually, the method is not the broad sociological one; rather, the emphasis is on the economic nexus between actual foreign policy and the people who make it—people in industry and commerce, people in the legislative and executive branches of government, whoever the people are that formulate and execute diplomatic policy. Professor Hallgarten succeeds in giving diplomatic history its long-needed third dimension by going far beyond the standard diplomatic documents whose use permits only a surface view of events. He is doing here what Professor V. J. Puryear of the University of California has been doing on his studies of European foreign policy in the Near East in the first half of the 19th century. This trend away from the standard diplomatic history is a most welcome one.

It would be sheer pedantry to attempt a list of the subjects on which new light is thrown by this profound study. Every important question between 1870 and 1914 comes in for careful consideration. Suffice it is to say that here one sees the powerful influence of munition-makers, of bankers, of concession-hunters, and of other economic interests whose private needs suggested that a particular policy be adopted toward a given country or a specific area. It is the sort of analysis that should make scholars far less glib than they have been in their talk about "national interests." There are many instances where intertwining economic interests reach beyond national borders and lead to policies impossible to reconcile with the demands of a purely theoretical "national interest." Here is a book that prepares the student as no other book does for the economic clauses of the Versailles peace treaty. Professor Hallgarten has much to say about conflicting economic and political interests, the kind of conflict that shows how Britain had to eliminate Germany as an excellent customer in order to get rid of Germany as a military rival. Here one sees some of the activities of the Nobel combine, activities not easily erased by prizes awarded to people for work on behalf of peace.

Even though the study ends with the coming of the war in 1914 and even though the author urges the need of a similar study for the period since then, it can be said that there is no better book than this one to help in the understanding of our current problems. Such is the obvious and natural result of a book that deals fundamentally with the basic economic forces at work in our industrial society. Unfortunately the study is written in a heavy and closely packed German style that will limit its use by American scholars.

Yale University

HARRY R. RUDIN



BARBAGALLO, C., *et. al.*, Introduction by G. Caló, *1848-1849 conferenze fiorentine* Vol. XVII of the *Biblioteca storica Sansoni*, new series. Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1950. Pp. 196, L. 1000.

BELGIOIOSO, CRISTINA, *La rivoluzioni lombarda del 1848*. Milan: Università economica, 1950. Pp. 88. L. 100.

There is a vast difference between the above two volumes. The second of the two works listed above is a new edition of a work originally published in the September 15 and October 1, 1948, issues of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. It was written by Princess Trivulzio-Belgioioso in a heat of political passion after she had left Milan for France just before the Austrian reoccupation of Lombardy in August 1848. The Princess violently attacks the Austrians as diabolical monsters, flays Charles Albert for his alleged treason to the Italian liberal cause, and showers criticisms on the Milanese provisional government of 1848 for its inefficiency, weakness, and lack of exclusive devotion to the Italian cause. The work, which has previously been brought out in various editions, is well worth reading for the insight it gives into the bitter, violent hatreds and suspicious attitude of some of the disillusioned liberals of 1848. It is a partisan polemic, but one which cannot be dispensed with by the serious student of 1848 in Italy.

Princess Trivulzio-Belgioioso's book is an, impassioned political tract, limited to a discussion of the political situation in Lombardy during the critical months of 1848. The other work reviewed here is much broader in scope and represents some of the best trends in Italian historical scholarship in the post-war years. It consists of papers read at the Florentine conference in celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the revolution of 1848 in Tuscany. The papers are by no means limited to a discussion of Tuscany in 1848. They concern themselves with the 1848-49 revolution in its broadest extent, as well as with the economic, social, and cultural milieu out of which the revolution sprang. They deal with various subjects which can not be organized in any definite pattern, but they give the reader an insight into the breadth of the revolutionary movement which he does not get in the usual well-organized treatise.

Barbagallo devotes his discussion to the economic basis of the revolution. He shows how the revolution, as well as the Risorgimento movement which preceded it, was a struggle between the old conservative feudal aristocracy and small and middle-sized property holders of bourgeois origin. The articles by Sereni and Russo are concerned with the great literary figures of the Risorgimento. Sereni demonstrates how Giusti's writings reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the lower middle classes in Tuscany. Russo deals with the contributions of "The divine poets of 1848"—Alfieri, Foscolo, Leopardi, and Manzoni—who helped inspire the spirit of 1848. Pizzetti discusses the work of the great Italian musicians of the Risorgimento, particularly Rossini, Bellini, Donizetti, and Verdi, in the same vein. Levi devotes his pages to the part which Mazzini and his followers took in the revolution, Jemolo discusses the role which religion played in the 1848-49 movement, and Bacchelli points out the dramatic significance of the "five days" in Milan for the whole Italian revolutionary movement. In his essay on "Historic Reality and Utopia in 1848 in Europe," Cantimori develops the theory that the moderate liberals of Europe, obsessed as they were with the specter of anarchy, were the defeated group of 1848, and points out that the extreme left was too divided and disorganized to play an important role in the revolution.

Probably the most interesting essay in the whole volume is the last one: Salvatorelli's article on "1848 in Italy and in Europe." Salvatorelli shows the importance of the Italian reform movement from 1846 to 1848 in helping to provoke the revolutionary movement elsewhere in Europe. He also develops the thesis that in many parts of Europe, particularly in Germany, the 1848 revolution was much more analogous to the one in Italy than to the one in France, as has too frequently been alleged. Furthermore, he points to the great similarity between all the European revolutions of 1848 and gives a hint that there might have been something to Mazzini's concept of an international brotherhood of peoples fighting an "international" of kings. This solidarity among the peoples of Europe was frustrated by the clashing national demands which came to the surface as the revolution developed. Salvatorelli's thesis is colored by an Italian point of view, but it is a provocative one well worthy of consideration.

University of Texas

R. JOHN RATH

MAY, ARTHUR J., *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. 532. \$6.00.

Owing perhaps to the abasement of the small states of Central Europe under the alternate Nazi and Bolshevik rule, a growing number of studies have appeared since World War II endeavoring to reappraise in a manner frequently tinged with nostalgia the history of their once glorious predecessor, the Hapsburg empire. Professor Arthur J. May's new book is an outstanding contribution to this trend.

Unlike A. J. P. Taylor's *Hapsburg Monarchy* or R. A. Kann's *Multinational Empire*, this is a descriptive rather than interpretive study. With great organizational skill it undertakes to describe the complex political, social, economical, and cultural developments not only of the empire as a whole but of each of its eleven ethnic groups as well as the Jews. Professor May has shown already in his *Age of Metternich* a rare talent for recreating the atmosphere of an age and of its society. The cultured and cosmopolitan atmosphere of imperial Vienna and the slow-paced life in the provinces are vividly depicted in a style both witty and graceful. There are also fine portraits of the Emperor Francis Joseph and of the dominant personalities of the empire of all nationalities.

Unfortunately the author has limited himself in the selection of sources to German materials only apart from English and French ones. No Magyar, Italian, Rumanian, or Slav sources are used. Surprising omissions are such standard works in English as *The History of the Roumanians* and *The History of the Czechs and Slovaks* by R. W. Seton-Watson, a recognized authority in the field. Such a limited selection of sources inevitably results in an unbalanced treatment. Generally speaking, the author identifies himself most closely with the views of the Austrian German liberals. Little sympathy is wasted on the Magyars, and the Slavs are treated somewhat condescendingly. A great effort is made to justify or explain weaknesses of the empire and extol its virtues. Such statements as "It must be said, and said again, that nowhere in continental Europe, except in Switzerland, were the peculiar interests of national minorities given more protection . . . than in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy" (p. 447) are at best misleading. Austria's structure was quite unique and its conditions can not be easily compared to the neighboring multinational empires of Russia and Turkey, created by single

conquering nations. The use of the term "minorities" in reference to the non-Germans and non-Magyars of the empire is inappropriate, both from the historical and strictly numerical points of view. The treatment of Austria's Balkan policy and her relations with Serbia and Russia shows particularly the inadequacy of a study of the Austrian empire based, to a large extent, on German sources. Terms like "Pan-Slavism" and "Pan-Serbism" are bandied about quite indiscriminately. Russia is pictured by Pan-Slav policies and uniformly eager for military adventures, and Serbia as an obstreperous "puny Balkan powerlet" ever menacing Europe's peace with her hysterics. The dynamism of ethnic nationalism is played down and the strength of dynastic patriotism emphasized. "Four terribly wasting years of war, crowned by catastrophic military defeat and . . . militant separatist propaganda were required to bring about actual dissolution of [Austria]" (p. 484). Yet such Austrian writers as Count von Czernin and Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau admit freely that Austria was held together during the war by German bayonets. Once this prop was removed the nationalities departed almost without protest from Vienna.

As for errors of fact or form, as distinguished from controversial points, the author states that the Slovaks used a Slovak literary language until the 1890's when the Czech language was adopted by a "new literary faction" (p. 375). The reverse is true. The Slovaks used the Czech literary language until the 1840's when Ludovít Štúr, a Protestant leader, introduced a separate Slovak literary language. Similarly erroneous is the statement that the Slovak Protestants "turned Czechofil and used the Czech language in their services" (p. 377). The Slovak Protestants had always used a sixteenth century form of Czech for liturgical purposes and continued to use it after the linguistic separation for the same reason that English-speaking Protestants prefer the seventeenth century King James version of the Bible to modern translations. The spelling of many names and terms, particularly Slav, is incorrect or inconsistent. Thus "Pasić" should have been "Pašić"; "Udrzal", "Udržal"; "Cas", "Čas"; "Matice Skolská", "Matice školská"; "Matice Slovenská", "Matica slovenská"; "Matiča Hrvatska", "Matica hrvatska"; etc. The ending *-ić* in Yugoslav names is consistently misspelled *-ič*.

In spite of such minor slips and the many controversial points resulting from its over-all *Hapsburgtrene* bias, this book deserves notice. It presents in an eminently readable form a wealth of information and is well-suited to serve as an introductory study of the declining years of the Hapsburg empire. It is to be followed by a volume of the World War I years and the dissolution of the empire.

Florida State University

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

RESHETAR, JOHN S. JR., *The Ukrainian Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. 360. \$5.00.

The author of this book correctly states in his preface that the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920 "was not without effect for it compelled Russia's Communist rulers to acknowledge the existence of the Ukrainian people." Equally correct is his other statement that English and American students who have described and analyzed with proper care the events which occurred since 1917 in Russia proper (i.e. Great Russia) have neglected to make comparable efforts to



study the situation and developments in the Ukraine and other parts of the former Russian Empire after the revolution of 1917.

This actual gap in the work of American and British students of contemporary Europe has been now considerably filled by Prof. Reshetar. His objective, unbiased presentation of facts preceding the Ukrainian Revolution, and his detailed description of all the following events display his thorough erudition and his acquaintance with the general works of outstanding historians, and of the documentary sources and literature on the subject of his book.

Professor Reshetar has devoted his main attention to the origin and activities of the Ukrainian Central Council ("Rada") which was convened immediately after the All-Russian March Revolution of 1917 to the demise of the Rada late in April of 1918, and to the establishment of the rule of Hetman Skoropadsky by the German military occupation powers in the Ukraine, to the overthrow of the Hetman régime and following revival of the republican régime under the Directory of Ukrainian Socialist parties and to the débâcle of this régime as an outcome of the uneven war simultaneously led by the Ukrainian army against Soviet armies and the armies of Russian "white" generals supported at that time by England and France. The readers of Mr. Reshetar's book will also find here a comprehensive description of Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1920.

Of special importance and significance is Mr. Reshetar's judgement that all the enlightened individuals and groups among the Ukrainians were adherents of the All-Russian March Revolution of 1917 and ardent supporters of the attempts to convert the Russian Empire of the Czars into a Federated Republic of free peoples with a broad autonomy for each of them on their ethnographic territories. The Bolshevik coup in November 1917 proved, however, the weakness and inability of the provisional democratic government to cope with the ruthless, demagogic and brutal seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. *This fact*, in the words of Mr. Reshetar, "compelled the Ukrainians to proclaim the independence of their nation."

This sound diagnosis of Mr. Reshetar is corroborated by the history of the Ukraine since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and especially since the appearance of the Ukrainian "Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood" whose aim was the establishment of a Federation of all Slavonic peoples. Mr. Reshetar shows in his book how the Ukrainian Central Rada originally continued to advocate the federation of a future form of statehood for all its peoples of Eastern Europe. He emphasizes the fact that the first three "Universals" (solemn declarations) of the Ukrainian Central Rada clearly stated the desire of Ukrainians to be autonomous "without separating themselves entirely from Russia." Even the Third Universal issued on November 20, 1917—3 weeks after the Bolshevik coup—contains the statement that the Ukrainians do not separate themselves "from the Russian Republic" but "maintain its unity." Only in the latter part of January 1918 when it became clear that the Soviet Government would never tolerate any autonomous régime in the Ukraine, the Central Rada issued its Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918 containing the declaration that "henceforth the Democratic Ukrainian Republic is a free and independent sovereign state, and is not subject to any other." This Universal reflected the disappointment of the Central Rada in the power of Russian democratic groups of the population to create a genuine democratic commonwealth of nations even after the downfall of the Soviet

Government. All the subsequent events only strengthened this pessimistic feeling of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R.

It is impossible to mention in a brief review many other opinions of Mr. Reshetar based on his analysis of the roots of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920, and of the following events and developments. One may agree or disagree with some of his judgements about the "underdevelopment of the Ukrainian national movement" at the time of the Ukrainian Revolution. In his chapter he points out, however, that "in the several decades since the national revolution Ukrainian nationalism has continued to develop even under Soviet rule . . . and has become a vital factor in any analysis of Eastern European politics . . ."

As a scholar, Professor Reshetar has refrained from exact predictions of the future events which may follow the end of the present régime of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. In concluding his book, he stated that "only the future will determine whether the Ukrainian quest for independent statehood will be fulfilled." *Washington D. C.*

ARNOLD D. MARGOLIN

PETROV, VLADIMIR, *Soviet Gold: My Life As a Slave Laborer in the Siberian Mines.*

Translated from the Russian by Mirra Ginsburg. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company. 1949. Pp. 426. \$4.00.

Vladimir Petrov's *Soviet Gold* is the memoirs of an engineer who, in 1935, at the age of nineteen, was arrested in Leningrad and, after spending a year in prison there, was sent for five years to the Kolyma gold mines. He served his full term. The book describes his life in prison and in camp and ends with his release, after which he voluntarily stayed on to work as a "free employee" for the Soviet mining authorities. As we learn from the dust-cover, he returned to Europe during the war, became a German prisoner, and after the war came to the United States. Sober, modest, and sympathetic, the story makes a gratifyingly few excursions into the realms of philosophical speculation and higher politics. Where events connected with high politics are touched, as in the instance of Marshall Tukhachevsky's arrest, it is clearly indicated that the information is based on hearsay. Thus, a coherent, exciting, terrifying account of a human tragedy emerges, which keeps the reader's interest to the very end, be he historian, philosopher, politician, student of contemporary affairs, or lay reader of biography. And as, absorbed and moved, he lays down the book, he will ask himself: Is it true? Is it even possible? What has led us into the present situation? What can be done?

Is it true? If we consider the account of the arrest and reason for arrest, the conditions of interrogation, prison life in Leningrad; the cattle trains carrying victims to Vladivostok; the voyage from there to Magadan in the hold of ships unfit for the passage; and the exhausting events in the Kolyma camps with the description of the various classes of prisoners, their wrecked lives, and their deaths; the brutality, idiocy, waste; the utter senselessness which impresses itself upon the reader—then the truthfulness of the account may, indeed, seem questionable to the scientific investigator. As a matter of fact, Petrov's account does not claim to be a scholarly history; he quotes verbatim interrogations and conversations which took place fifteen years or more ago and of which he, of course, has no record. Moreover, historical accuracy may well suffer from the preoccupations of a prisoner and his reduced mental vitality. But we do possess

enough other accounts that confirm the general picture drawn in Petrov's memoirs—oral accounts as well as published material such as that found in Herling's *Soviet Slave Empire*, in Beck and Godin's *Russian Purge*, in Weissberg's *The Accused*, or in Dallin's *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*. And we have enough general comparative material to judge Petrov's rather unique special account of one of the USSR's most important economic enterprises and secret regions—the Dalstroy Trust and the Kolyma gold fields.

Is it even possible? The question is difficult to answer, for all our traditions, education, rationality, humaneness rebel at the very thought that an existence and happenings, such as described, are possible. Yet, as historians we cannot escape the fact that all this is possible. It has happened in Spain in the times of the Inquisition, the Peninsular War and the Civil War; in France during the campaigns against the Knights Templar, the Night of St. Bartholomew, the Dragonnades, and since; in Germany in the Thirty Years' War and under Hitler; in England under Mary and Elizabeth, in the British navy of the eighteenth century, the coal mines of the nineteenth; in Russia under Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great; in most countries at certain times and under certain conditions. No conscientious historian can deny that it is, also for today, within the realm of the possible—rather, that evidence is such as to establish it as fact.

What has led us into the present situation? Perhaps Petrov implies that forces not understood have brought about a situation in which from the side of both the state and the individual mere survival has become the paramount consideration. Petrov makes his friend Vassily say: "There is no way out for us but to forget completely that we are human beings. Only so can we survive" (p. 107). No human beings, indeed, if, as described, we crawl around on all fours with nose and mouth in the garbage heaps, or, for that matter, watch, allow, or force others to do so; if through penal service all sense and human aspirations are dulled to an extent that suffering tortures or inflicting them becomes a routine no longer noticed by either party, a method of dealing with man sponsored for the "security of the whole" and expressed in statistics which are a part of a vast economic project! It may be that mighty achievements to benefit future generations of a "collective" age are accomplished in such a manner (not unlike Peter the Great's and Münnich's building projects in the eighteenth century); but the human being has lost his place. The rational mind may argue that despite the waste and senselessness connected with much of the enterprises reported by Petrov they constitute the inescapable, logical, possibly dialectical, consequence of a centralized dictatorial state structure in the age of youth of collectivism. But ordinary rationality still remains incapable of explaining the facts, and all humanity is, incapable of comprehending them.

What can be done? In an age in which any "incident" involving a symbol like a flag, an insult, breaking of an unjust treaty, a legal title to an oil field or a challenge to the property of a foreigner can precipitate the most sorrowful disaster for the world, the denial to thousands and millions, of their right to be human beings can not shake the existing order. Perhaps the situation will continue, and impotently we shall watch it, until its own time and usefulness have passed. Or perhaps a "diplomatic" incident will occur sooner and interrupt the present development. In the meantime, a book like Petrov's though perhaps moving the emotions of all who read it, will be a voice that calls



not to action but to meditation—to a rethinking of history and thereby to a sounder understanding of the forces behind human actions and a clearer evaluation of mankind's possible future. And beyond this, Petrov's memoirs will remain a historical monument of our own age, a record of its frustrated hopes and most disgraceful undertakings.

*University of Delaware*

WALTHER KIRCHNER

LEMBERG, EUGEN, *Osteuropa und die Sowjetunion*. Stuttgart: Curt E. Schwab, 1950. Pp. 256. DM 5.80.

Dr. Eugen Lemberg was introduced to American scholars by Professor Hans Kohn who recently reviewed his book *Geschichte des Nationalismus in Europa* (see *American Historical Review*, LVII, 153-5). The book on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been written in a lighter vein than the scholarly analysis of European nationalism. It owes its origin to lectures held in the Pedagogical Institute at Kassel and appeals to a wider audience. Footnotes and bibliographical data have been reduced to a minimum and the text has been evidently only here and there retouched after oral delivery.

The title of the book indicates that the author is fully aware of the line that divides the Soviet Union from the captive countries in Central Europe and in the Balkans. The lecture course was so organized that the audience would be able to keep apart passages devoted to the Russian orbit from the sketch of historical developments in Eastern Central Europe. The author has made a successful start in that direction. He presents first early Russian history and has compiled as a counterpart a survey of Eastern Central Europe in the Middle Ages. Chapters on modern history are less symmetric and consequently less satisfactory. After a discussion of Russia's endeavor to make up for her belated appearance among the leading European Powers there follows quite organically an outline of the linguistic and cultural revival of the peoples in Eastern Central Europe, the Germans, Czechs, Poles, Magyars and the Balkan peoples, with emphasis upon the earlier phase, before 1848. But the three chapters in which the story culminates and then passes into the labyrinth of current events, deal mostly with Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union.

The author's departure from the original scheme may have been unintentional and caused by the necessity to keep the survey within the limits laid down by the directors of the Institute. Instructors in charge of the survey courses often have to adopt Procrustean methods to meet the requirements. But in this case the disparity of the relevant passages has done serious harm to the story and has considerably reduced the usefulness of Dr. Lemberg's book.

Little can be found there concerning intellectual activities and religious life among the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Magyars during the renaissance and reformation period. The lack of such a passage is to be regretted as it was precisely at that time that the respective national languages were widely used, although in Hungary the Latin yielded to the vernacular in a much lesser degree than either in Bohemia or Poland. The exuberance of national life in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is a more important factor than the political developments by which the extension of foreign rule over the formerly independent nations was facilitated.

More serious objections can be raised to the author's presentation of the

collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and of the resurgence of national states in the eastern central zone. From a historian who has made modern nationalism his field of specialization more could be expected than mechanical repetition of such platitudes as the statement (p. 240) that the main source of troubles in Danubian Europe is to be sought in the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by the peace treaties of 1919. It is sufficiently known that the Dual Monarchy had fallen apart before the armistice was signed on the battlefields and the peace conference called to session. There was nothing left for the peace-makers to break up. More plausible conclusions can be made if the eyes are turned not to Paris in 1919 but to Vienna and Budapest since 1867!

A grave omission is easily noticed in the final section of Dr. Lemberg's book. He only vaguely alludes to the aggressive policy of the Third Reich in relation to its eastern and southeastern neighbors. In the introductory chapter he refers (pp. 11-12) to the task to build up in Central Eastern Europe a supernatural order with which the Germans were entrusted. But we look in vain for a more precise statement, who had destined the German people for such a role, which, in fact, destroyed the political structure of Eastern Central Europe and created a vacuum into which the Soviets moved without any serious challenge or opposition. Did the *Auftrag* come from Wotan or from whom? Without description of the predatory campaigns of 1938-1945, and their fearful accessories there is in the book no background against which the fate of the *Volksgerossen* bewailed by the author could be effectively projected.

There is much in Dr. Lemberg's book that can be read with interest and profit. In treating the early history of the middle sized and small neighbors of Germany, he has done his best to be fair and realistic. Such exceptions from this line as the theories concerning the supposedly Germanic origin of the Premyslids in Bohemia and the Piasts of Poland could be dismissed as a hangover of the author's earlier reading. But the passages on the recent developments since 1914 have been seriously distorted. They lack candor and a sense of causation and detract from the value of Dr. Lemberg's outline.

Columbia University

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

BLUCHER, WIPERT v., *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951. Pp. 416. DM 15.50.

Wipert von Blücher takes pride, warranted in the main, in reporting that relations between Germany and Finland during his tenure as German Minister at Helsinki from 1935 to 1944 were uniformly friendly. They offered practical proof; he insists, that a small democratic state could live on close and friendly terms with the totalitarian Reich.

The Minister's story is somewhat limited in scope. He is not telling the story of Finnish-German relations as such but rather the story of his share in them. His narrative is often selective and at times even peripheral in its bearing (for example, the passages dealing with the growth of German influence on Finnish soil after September 1940 give only a fraction of the story).

Only in part does he treat the military and economic aspects or the extra-diplomatic efforts of Party-supported agencies seeking to extend their intrigues—such as the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*, the *Aussenpolitisches Amt*, the *SD*, or the *Auslandsorganisation*.

On the other hand his volume contains more than one expects of resumé of conversations that Finnish officials had with American and English officials. For these he must have relied on other sources than his own aides-memoires. The absence of documentation makes it impossible to control his account satisfactorily. He seems to have been only secondarily concerned with the flow and ebb of Finnish opinion; what he has to say of the Finnish press and Finnish opinion suggests remoteness, at times even naïveté.

Serving the Hitlerian Reich in a democracy clearly had its difficulties, and it could only be done with any chance of success, as von Blücher avers, by "older" officials in the German foreign service. His volume gives a good portrayal of how this "older" corps bore the snubs and discourtesies of Hitler and Ribbentrop as well as of many a lesser Party functionary.

Their hope was to temporize and ride out the Nazi storm. Huddled together in spirit they clung to their positions as best they could to keep them out of the hands of too many Party zealots. They strove to maintain some of the decencies and amenities of the diplomatic tradition in which they had been schooled.

A von Neurath and later a von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office could give them some coverage. But only some. Ever present was the alert attention of the loyal Party minions, making it necessary for the "older" officials to keep in touch with one another, at times by code.

Their sympathies, as here portrayed, were no less than democratic (would they perhaps be pleased, in 1952, to serve the Bonn government and the Free World?). German policy would be best served, they held, by non-interference with Finnish domestic affairs and the preservation of Finland's democratic polity. The Minister would have no truck with the Finnish political extremes of either left or of right (particularly not with the fascist-inclined IKL). When Ribbentrop in 1944 seriously proposed to displace the Finnish government in order to establish a Finnish Quisling régime, seemingly it was von Blücher who warded off the blow. The "older" officials disapproved of the invasion of Denmark and Norway and they were quite out of sympathy with the Party's racial agitation.

Von Blücher has taken pains to characterize a goodly number of the public figures with whom he came in contact. These vignettes are useful and enlightening, for the range of figures included, in terms of political affiliation, is wide. Tanner is included from one wing and Ryti from another. Mannerheim, of course, is given considerable space. Uniformly the sketches are sympathetic in tone. Even the American Minister, Schoenfeld, comes off well—allowing for wartime alignments. Only one figure, apart from the German Nazi leaders, is portrayed unflatteringly, namely Holsti, and that not particularly because of his western and pro-League orientation.

In his preface von Blücher warns his readers that his work is to be regarded not as a history but a collection of historical "raw material". He is right. His volume will never be one of the important sources for the eventual account of Finnish-German relations during these tempestuous years, but it is one that will call for close control at every stage of the narrative. Some of his readers, it may be added, will be grateful to have this sizable body of "raw material" available in a uniformly readable German.

*New York University*

OSCAR J. FALNES



CZAPSKI, JOSEPH, *The Inhuman Land*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1951. Pp. 301. 16s.

This book, by a Polish artist, is most aptly titled. Soviet Russia, as seen and experienced by the author during the Second World War is an inhuman land, not solely because of the secret police and occasional atrocities, but also because the whole of its society is totally caught up into the machine of the political despotism. That society has been forced to conform to the rigor of an impersonal and intangible force. This terrible omnipresence, suggestive of the reign of Nicholas I, strikes through its dehumanized minions, and while it is every where, it only appears sporadically. Hence the presumption of this society is that all who are not its automatons must, potentially or actually, be its enemies. A Polish Lieutenant, stumbling half-starved and ill-treated out of that congealed society cries to his comrades: "You may give me bread, you may give me money, but those are not the things I came for. All I want is a little human compassion . . . All I want is not to have to die among jackals" (p. 80).

But the "inhuman land" is not the central focus of this book; it is the background and area for a Polish epic of vision and heroism, which is at once, both an Iliad and an Odyssey of woes and wanderings. When the Nazis attacked the Soviets in June of 1941, the Polish prisoners, who could still be reclaimed from irrevocable decisions, were suddenly converted, from the Soviet point of view, from objects to be extirpated into military comrades. So from scattered prisons in the Soviet Union these released Polish prisoners converged upon a camp near Tashkent called Yangi-Yul. In Uzbek the name was promising—it means The New Road. Here, forgetting the grievances of 1939, as well as of 1831, 1863, 1772, and others, the Poles, uplifted by their sense of nationality and stirred by happier prospects for the future, became a society and trained an army that later saw service at Monte Cassino.

The author was placed in charge of the Propaganda Service. A distinguished artist, readily conversant with Polish and Russian literature, Czapski broadened his Propaganda Service into a cultural center. And surely such was needed, not only to keep morale elevated, but also to educate the many young boys who arrived at the camp with pathetic letters from parents written to one theme: "We shall die, but see to it that the boy is saved". The description of a Chopin evening, the program continuing through the pouring rain, made this vital community a "Poland at her zenith—Fresh from the rainbow bridge of ecstasy." (These lines are quoted by the author from Norwid's poem: "Chopin's Piano").

Suddenly, in March 1942, the Soviet authorities decided to reduce the rations allotted to the Poles by 50%, thus condemning many to starvation. The steepe threatened to be another Katyn, a death camp. So once more, like a wandering tribe, the Poles had to flee. The only route led through Iran. There the population was friendly, and though the Poles had no money with which to buy and eat, they were welcomed hospitably. The author writes, "friendliness is a weak word to express the cordiality which they showed. The children, and many of the grown-ups as well, waved their hands as we passed" (p. 276). At Kushan "two young men brought us a gift of grapes." We hope with that grace and delicacy that flowers on centuries of culture.

But even in the "inhuman land" the author encountered, like seeds beneath the snow, some traces of humanity. During a long train journey his travelling

companions in a compartment, after the usual cold suspicions had passed, did incorporate themselves, and even this "foreigner" (who had Intourist rations) into an attenuated fellowship. A poor discharged soldier uttered some truths to a crowd in a railway carriage; the outraged travellers quoted the newspaper against him. He expressed a doubt about the newspapers, but the mental block of his companions was so impenetrable, that he curled up and said no more. And there is protest too. A child at the customs shakes his fist at the portraits of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, while a woman present says; "It's always the same with the children, what's Stalin given these poor kids?—hunger and poverty . . . There was no way of stopping them" (p. 274).

The protest of the child is feeble, but it may be full of portent for the future. So in that terrible land, all the energy of inhumanity cannot completely de-humanize, either its victims, the Poles; or all its subjects, for those whom Dostoyevsky called Honestfolk and children can resist its corrupting venom.

Carleton College

REGINALD D. LANG

TENENBAUM, JOSEPH, *Underground, The Story of a People*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 532. \$4.50.

The scope of the book is far broader than the title signifies. In addition to giving a vivid account of the amazing underground existence of Polish Jewry during the war years, Dr. Tenenbaum, whose earlier volume *In Search of a Lost People* (New York, 1948), served as the basis of the present work, also provides a succinct but adequate background of the 1000 year old history of the Jewish community in Poland with its specific way of life, language and literature. While concentrating mostly on the Warsaw ghetto, he devotes instructive chapters to other towns where ghettos were established: Łódź, Białystok, Częstochowa, Lublin,—even to little towns like Mir, Kleck, Nieśwież and others.

*Underground* does not pretend to be a truly "scholarly" work. It does not carry footnote documentation and its bibliography is far from exhaustive. But there can be no doubt that it is based on careful and intelligent study of the existing literature on the subject, both published and unpublished. Dr. Tenenbaum emphasizes in the preface that his intention was to write a "book more accessible to the general reader" and he has succeeded in making a good popular presentation of the greatest catastrophe in Jewish history since the destruction of the Second Commonwealth, both in its planning and implementation by the Third Reich and the reaction, of Polish Jewry.

The author carefully traces the successive stages of German policy toward the Jews. It started with the scheme to concentrate and segregate Europe's Jewish population in the Government General of Poland, mostly in the Lublin area. The next phase inaugurated by Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, on May 30, 1940, already involved mass liquidation on the spot, but put the main stress on the ultimate settlement of the survivors in Madagascar where a "Jewish State" was to be established. It was not before January 1942 that wholesale extermination instead of territorial concentration was finally decided at a conference presided over by the SS Lt. Gen. Reinhard Heydrich.

Enlightening and pathetic chapters are devoted to Jewish self-government in the ghettos. The *Judenrats* (Jewish Community Councils) set up by the German authorities to carry out their orders established an intricate school network and

model departments of social welfare, organized medical care as well as religious services, cultural centers, theaters and orchestras. Newspapers were published. The author relates a surprising series of dynamic political and economic developments, including intense party strife and strikes with picketing and window smashing "in protest against the low wage-scale and the neglect of provisions" by some Community Councils.

The climax of the book is the dramatic but realistic account of the ghetto revolts in Warsaw and some smaller Jewish centers. Jewish youth in the ghettos, willing and eager to fight and to die, was placed before a tragic dilemma: to stage an uprising which would endanger the lives of those who might somehow survive the Nazi genocide or to face the humiliating prospects of passive surrender to unavoidable mass extermination. Dr. Tenenbaum presents this dilemma with much understanding and restraint.

A Polish Jew himself, Dr. Tenenbaum stresses the almost complete loneliness of the Jews in the Polish community under German occupation. Anti-Semitism remained as strong as ever. Very little if any, sympathy and help were forthcoming from the Polish population, including Socialist and other leftist underground groups; arms, ammunition and food were sometimes promised, but promises were seldom kept. Moreover, small groups of Jews who escaped the Germans and joined the partisans in the woods, had to fear their Polish and Ukrainian "comrades-in-arms" not less than the German enemies. They were hunted by both sides. Very few survived. The pitiful remnants of Polish Jewry which before the war numbered three and one-half million are still encountering acute enmity on the part of the Polish population.

New York City

JOSEPH B. SCHECHMAN

SCHWENG, L. D., *Economic Planning in Hungary since 1938*. New York: Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 1951. Pp. 80.

KEMENY, GEORGE, *Economic Planning in Hungary, 1947-49*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952. Pp. 146.

WSZELAIN, JAN H., *Fuel and Power in Captive Middle-Europe*. New York: Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 1952. Pp. 63.

The economic life of Soviet-ruled Central Europe was until recently a scientific no-man's land for the West. Knowing, that in the first post-war years there were coalition-governments and relative freedom of the press; that the area was more accessible to foreigners than Russia, and that some of its economists escaped to the West since 1945, how is this lack of scientific information to be explained?

Western scientific interest was concentrated almost exclusively on the U.S.S.R., while very few economists of the "satellite" countries had opportunities for scientific work. Those active in the old régime either escaped or were excluded from public life, while non-communist experts of the new régime scarcely had time for scholarly work. Those who escaped later lacked documentary material and financial means; meanwhile their countries surrounded themselves by the iron curtain of news and information.

Now at last the West has begun to appreciate the economic importance of



this region and has provided for some of its experts the means of scientific work. And as Central Europe is now fully adapted to the Soviet system and has achieved a certain stability, the scanty information available can be better evaluated and controlled. Now, after the appearance of foreign publications based on second hand material, exile economists have begun again to publish their studies. Mr. Scheng, former research chief of the National Bank of Hungary, reviews Hungarian State plans since 1938. He reports shortly on the pre-communist ones: the billion-pengö (\$200 million) plan of 1938 to improve armaments, which was eliminated by the war and inflation, and the 1942 ten-year plan for agriculture, which was barely started. But the 1947-49 Marxist three-year plan, the chief subject of his study was, according to the Soviet model, "overfulfilled" in 29 months. As the other communist plans, it was intended to speed up industrialization and build the base for Communism, but it had some special characteristics. Hungary, alone among these countries, had still an elected non-communist majority; to make the plan acceptable to them, the planners emphasized its moderate character and limited goal. It was to be accomplished without further nationalizations, in the framework of a mixed economic system, to be financed partly by private savings and external loans. Two Hungarian-born aliens, Eugene Varga for the Communists and Th. Balogh, economist of British Labour for the Socialists were the advisers. The only difference between the two blueprints was that Socialists advocated a higher percentage of investment for consumers' industries. The total was to be relatively modest: 9-10% of the national income. But soon thereafter the Communists established their dictatorship and increased both the volume of the investments and the percentage apportioned for heavy industry.

The execution of the plan showed the futility of communist promises and of a coalition with them, but also the interdependence of full-scale planning and totalitarianism. To reach their goals, the planners enforced, disregarding the price-factor and rentability, the desired relation between investments and consumption and between investments for productive industries and for others. They liquidated parliamentarism, parties, economic democracy, independent trade unions, free movement of labor and private industry. Logically, they transformed Hungary into a totalitarian state. Where they could not control economic developments, the plan failed. Private savings remained insignificant, foreign loans unattainable; neither could foreign countries be forced to buy goods at prices prescribed by the Communists. Still less controllable was the weather: there were years of drought. Here at least there was a remedy, to force the people to consume less; with or without adequate food supplies the industrial potential had to be enlarged.

Why the other parties, controlling 83% of the seats, voted a law leading logically to such consequences, is not dealt with in the study. We may remark that the conservative-nationalist and violently anti-Communist régime which ruled the country until 1944 was saturated with anti-capitalist slogans. There was increasing state-interference, bureaucratism and protectionism: there remained no force in the political arena conscious of the value of individualism and private enterprise.

The Five-Year-Plan began in 1950 on a broader industrial basis, created by the former plan, and was extremely far-reaching. When Mr. Schweng wrote his study, 50 billion forints were to be invested, but soon after this figure was increased to 85 billion (\$7 billion), more than 25% of the national income, with

an overemphasis on heavy industry for which 98% of total industrial investments are scheduled. There are still other hidden items for military investments and war reserves. The overburdening of the economic strength of the country soon led to disastrous results, extreme scarcity, the failure of the rationing system, currency-devaluation and workers' unrest. The instructive facts and figures of Mr. Schweng already indicated this trend. It was inevitable since Hungary's productive capacity was to be used almost exclusively for the armament race between the world powers.

Mr. Kemény is an equally competent person to review and judge the Hungarian Three-Year-Plan. In the conservative régime he was an economic journalist. After the war he joined the Socialist party and became under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance; he remained in his post after his party was merged with the Workers' (Communist) party. At last he failed to return to Hungary from an official trip to England. In his study, one of the first detailed reports on Central European Socialist planning, he does not omit mentioning the Plan's achievements, but gives also an almost complete list of its defects and reveals the propagandistic and statistical distortions of the planners. We cannot agree with him that the nefarious effects of Communist policy in general and of planning and nationalizations in particular could not be predicted; his comrades, the old Socialists, foresaw them clearly and struggled against them, paying with their liberty or their life for their resistance. Neither do we agree with several details: for instance that before drafting of the Plan the Marshall-resources were already blocked for Hungary: she was invited to Paris, July 12, 1947, for the final agreement on Marshall-aid, twenty days before the inauguration of the Plan, which she refused, under pressure from Moscow and her own Communists. Of course, the demagogic agitations, instigations and threats of the Hungarian "left-bloc", to which the Socialist party, led by a pro-Communist minority, adhered, made a collaboration with the West quite improbable.

But apart from such political-psychological objections we think that hardly anybody else but Mr. Kemény could have given such a thorough account of the organization of the Plan (which was not yet a mere copy of the Soviet-Plans), of its successes and benefits from a Communist viewpoint: the iron consistency of Communist leadership, the party-discipline (in contrast to the inconsistencies and divergencies in other parties), the speed-up of the rhythm of investments in comparison with pre-communist times, the partial restoration of discipline in the plants and offices, the speedy surpassing of pre-war production, the reduction of unemployment and the insertion of new strata of the population in the industrial production. But still longer is Mr. Kemény's list of the evil consequences of all that. Especially interesting for expert readers are the statistical tricks and frauds for propaganda purposes to conceal the deficiencies; but still more shocking are the moral and political evils: e.g. the innumerable breaches of promise to stop further nationalizations, to pay indemnities for the owners, to abstain from the kolkhoz system and the persecution of scapegoats. There is also a long list of harmful economic effects: the deterioration of the quality of products, the resistance of the workers, the sabotage, the disregard of human needs, the anarchical loan system, the industrial miscalculations, unrentable investments, distortion of the price-structure, underpricing of exports to the USSR, imperfect synchronisation between production-phases, the shirking of responsibility, deterioration of

house-property and over-investments. This is all the more conspicuous in Kemény's study, as all these evils are evident in the first, relative modest Communist plan. Much more disastrous consequences result from the second greatly expanded and one-sided Five-Year Plan. It is to be regretted that the study does not provide sufficient bibliographical and other sources of information.

The third expert, the Polish economist J. H. Wszelaki follows another and more extensive aim. He treats "captive" Central Europe as a single economic unit, which at the price of immense sacrifices of the people is to become rapidly one of the chief industrial centers of the world with a planned output for 1954 of 250 million tons of coal—equivalent of energy production: 133 million tons of coal, 85 millions of lignite, 17.5 millions of petroleum, 6 millions of natural gas and 12 millions of hydroelectricity, all in coal equivalent. Not long ago another study of Mr. Wszelaki (in *Foreign Affairs*) reported on Central European industrial progress. With the present study he is to be regarded as an outstanding expert to rectify distorted, obsolete and incomplete views on Central Europe, revealed by zealous propagandists, who try to depict Central European economics only in a derogatory manner and often mislead public opinion of the free world as to the economic strength of the Communist world. The author has been criticized by exiled politicians because of his frankness, but he has defended himself as a conscientious scholar, whose duty is not to incite sentiments and to give the readers a sense of false security, but to tell the truth. It is a useful service rendered to the free world to warn it against a repetition of the dangerous underestimation of the strength of dictatorships.

New York City

ROBERT MAJOR

DALLIN, DAVID J., *The New Soviet Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Pp. 216. \$3.75.

The title of Mr. Dallin's newest book would lead the reader to expect an examination of how the "largest empire in history," embracing 800,000,000 as against a pre-World War II 150 000 000, operates. Such a book would be an important contribution for which the author would be well qualified. This volume is not that. It is not an essay on the "imperial structure" but rather a series of related essays, some previously published, on the homeland of that empire, prefaced by a brief sketch on "The Growth of the Soviet Empire," and including a historical digression on "How Cold Wars End."

The remainder of the book contains an able attack on the anthropological blunders of Gorer and Mead vis-a-vis the Russian problem, analyses of recent developments in Soviet policy toward Jews, the linguistics and genetics controversies, the privilege of the Soviet elite, the Soviet black market, and so forth, all of which have been the subject of recent books and articles (by Solomon Schwartz, Enrique Castro Delgado, Edmund Stevens, and others) either more thorough or first-hand than Dallin's. Material on the inner workings of the Politburo and the Soviet Communist party, interesting if true, is not documented. For much of his evidence the author has relied on the interrogation of refugees (Mr. Gorer's *modus operandi*, presumably more judiciously employed); we are left to guess whether the need to protect informants deprive us of an opportunity to gauge reliability. For example, Stalin's usual behavior in Politburo meetings is described, though there have been no known recent ex-Politburo escapees.



What exactly Mr. Dallin wishes to say about the "empire," either from the point of view of the homeland or the satellites, is unclear. He does wish to distinguish between Soviet and Tsarist expansionism, and concludes the "Communism in the Soviet Union has remained, as it was before the war, the applied form of Stalin's version of Marxism." This Communism, Dallin points out, can use internal popular movements or "fifth columns" and maintain the friction of the satellites' sovereignty, which Tsarism could not do; likewise the Soviets reap the benefits of their continuing and constant verbal denunciation of "imperialism" in backward countries. It comes as a surprise, therefore, to learn the author's opinion that Tsarism "was better adapted to large-scale great-power expansionism than is Communism . . . Stalin's Communism thus blocks the road to the stability of his own empire" (p.10). Yet Mr. Dallin himself shows that stability is no desideratum to Stalin, whose goal is "the encompassment of the entire globe," and whose progress in that direction has been far enough to alarm the entire free world.

Mr. Dallin once more obscures his own contribution by seeking to show that Soviet expansionism fits Lenin's definition of imperialism. Of course it does not fit, since it is not based on private ownership of the means of production in Russia. What needs to be done is to show the inadequacy of Lenin's analysis, not to contend that it is sufficient to cover Soviet phenomena. Facts on which many Western observers (including Mr. Dallin) agree are that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship of an elite with a hierarchical society, expanding toward world domination—that is, that it possesses traits which Lenin contended to be peculiar to capitalistic states in the modern era, *despite* its very different economic system. It seems certain that Leninism cannot explain these Soviet phenomena; and Mr. Dallin by pointing ironically to Lenin or by using unamplified terms like "power . . . naked power" appears not to have attempted to do so either.

The author's purpose evidently is to show that the "Russian" element of the Soviet pattern is separable from the "Communist" element and that the latter is the villain. This reviewer would agree, and would furthermore evaluate highly much of the material in the book, while regretting that haste in assembling it may have contributed to the unclarity of ideas which has been cited—and is not a peculiarity of the author's, nor a characteristic of him at his best.

*University of Washington*

DONALD W. TREADGOLD

PAGET, R. T., *Manstein, His Campaigns and his Trial*. Foreword by Lord Hankey. London: Collins, 1951. Pp. 239. 15s.

Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Lewinski, genannt von Manstein was the last one of the German general officers to undergo a war crimes trial. He was found guilty and condemned to 18 years of imprisonment (December, 1949). Mr. Paget, his defense counsel, has now given us his account of the legal proceedings supplemented by a fairly detailed description of the general's military career and an appraisal of the latter's personality.

Mr. Paget assumed his arduous legal task - declining all remuneration - because he felt that the defendant was denied proper counsel and also because he could thus express his fundamental disagreement as to the legality of the war crimes trials in general. His voice in this controversy is well worth hearing. However, within the allotted space it is impossible to give even a summary of his

reasoned statement. But whereas nobody will deny Mr. Paget the title to his legal point of view, one must take issue with him in his defense of Manstein on military and moral grounds. In the course of four months of close association, Mr. Paget developed an intense admiration for his client. He, therefore, not only rose to his legal defense but also to an *Ehrenrettung* in the course of which the presentation and interpretation of facts become one-sided and sometimes even contradictory.

In the opening chapter entitled "His Early Career" the reader is made to believe that Manstein could honestly lend his services to the Nazi régime because he was unaware of its abominations and persecutions. This fact (and many others) add up to an account of the political situation which is slanted in Manstein's favor. Later on (p. 75) we are parenthetically informed that these facts were furnished by the General's German friends who also took part in the defense. Their account of recent German history could not but be biased yet there is no indication that Mr. Paget (a lawyer!) recognized this fact.

One of the grave indictments was based on the atrocities committed by the *Einsatzkommandos* (task forces) of the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst - Himmler's security service) which "operated" in the rear areas. The nature and scope of their activities were such that Manstein commented: "Had I known of the abominations of the S.D., I could not have carried on, for I should have lost the support of God" (p. 11). However, Manstein was aware of the existence of the *Einsatzkommandos* in the areas under his command, though only "scarcely" (p. 30) so. The fact is emphasized that these units were not subordinated to his command but only attached to it for rations, quarters, and transportation. This peculiar arrangement should have aroused the curiosity of any commander. He was informed that their function was two-fold: (1) police and (2) intelligence. Intelligence is clearly a military function but so was police activity because the rear areas in Russia were infested with active partisans whom the S.D. units helped to combat. It is difficult to see why Manstein should show no interest in activities designated to gather intelligence and to secure rear areas (which often were only tenuously held). Perhaps he put little stock in the efficiency of (strictly speaking) non-military organizations. Or should one rather believe that Manstein was no different from the rest of the German army: "... reacting in a very normal German way to something of which it disapproved, that is to say, dissociating itself from evil rather than seeking to stop it" (p. 173).

Yet, there was no denying that inhuman acts had been committed in areas under Manstein's command. The defense pleaded that there were measures forced upon an army which was struggling for survival (scorched-earth policy, reckless exploitation of prisoners of war for military purposes, etc.) or else measures resulting from orders which Hitler had issued. Concerning the latter, Manstein and his counsel emphasized "the soldier's unavoidable duty to obey" (p. 201). The general had taken his military oath to Hitler and was inextricably bound by it. (Before that he had sworn to defend the Republic but, evidently, the change of allegiance had caused him no worry). Be that as it may, we are nonetheless shown that on several occasions Manstein either circumvented or disregarded orders from above. Here is a case in point. The German 6th Army, at the time of its encirclement at Stalingrad, was subordinate to Army Group Don. Mr. Paget now tells us that Hitler had forbidden the encircled army to break out but that

Manstein "decided to defy Hitler and send to von Paulus (Commanding General, 6th Army. Incidentally, just Paulus, no "von") orders to break out within 24 hours" (p. 48). But Paget, endeavoring to prove Manstein a man of rectitude who defies a senseless, indeed a criminal order, violates the facts. Hitler had forbidden a surrender but not a sortie. Moreover, Army Group Don had been ordered by him to relieve Paulus and his Army; as a matter of fact, it had been formed especially for this purpose.

It is nonetheless true that Manstein committed on occasion acts of defiance but he did not do so in genuinely crucial situations. One month after the débâcle of Stalingrad (March, 1943), he realized that the war was lost (p. 52). Yet he carried on until his dismissal in 1944, thus assuming, militarily and morally, the responsibility for one year of senseless bloodshed. Despite Mr. Paget's well-intentioned and quite honorable pleadings Manstein stands condemned - not just in the opinion of a civilian who might not understand the military mind but also in the opinion of his former Chief of Staff: "History will charge the leading officers of the *Wehrmacht* with wanton bloodshed if they fail to act in accordance with their professional and political knowledge and conscience. Their soldierly obedience ceases to be binding where their knowledge, conscience, and sense of responsibility forbid the carrying out of an order" (from a letter of Colonel General Beck to General von Brauchitsch. July 16, 1938).

*University of Colorado*

GERHARD LOOSE



## SHORTER NOTICES

RISTFELHUEBER, RENE, *Histoire des peuples balcaniques*. Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1950. Pp. 504.

This is a useful book. The author presents in outline the history of the Balkan peoples from their appearance on the stage to our day. Chapters on the Middle Ages are short: about one fifth of the text has been reserved for the early developments up to the Ottoman conquest of the peninsula. While this portion might be correct in works describing some of the Western countries, it does not do justice to the Balkan conditions. The modern struggles for independence cannot be properly grasped if the student of history is not sufficiently versed in medieval history of the Christian peoples in the Balkans whose march toward statehood was interrupted by the Turkish advance into the heart of the peninsula. Sections II and III deal with the national movements in the nineteenth century and with the policies of the Balkan states prior to 1908. The most valuable part of the book is undoubtedly section IV. It opens with a sketch of the Young Turkish Revolution in 1908 and covers the ensuing forty years of struggles and upheavals. The story is presented in the manner and method which are typical of French handbooks. There are in the author's narrative no cumbersome details, no digressions from the central theme, no applause, no condemnations. The book has been written for the general public but can be read with profit by students of history as an introduction to the intricacies of life in the Balkans.

Columbia University

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

KONOVALOV, S., Ed., *Oxford Slavonic Papers*. Vol. II. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. 144. 12s. 6d.

The second volume of the *Oxford Slavonic Papers* continues the strongly literary line of the previous collection of papers. Two of the papers, "Russia and Europe" (pp. 1-16), by the late B. H. Sumner and "Mayakovski" (pp. 72-81), by the late Nicholas Bachtin, are posthumous publications. The Warden of All Souls emphasized the points of similarity between Russia, largely derived from her Byzantine heritage, over the points of fundamental difference between Russia and the European tradition and stressed the tendency of Russia, since at least the sixteenth century, to draw nearer to the life and thought of the Germanic and Scandinavian peoples. He yet recognized, "The tragic duality of Russian life," thus acknowledging the dichotomy that so puzzles the West. I. Berlin, in his extensive treatment of, "Lev Tolstoy's Historical Scepticism" (pp. 17-54), contends that the oft repeated charges that Tolstoy was naïve, falsified history, or was absurdly ignorant of historical fact, are based on a misunderstanding of Tolstoy's whole purpose in employing history to adorn his story-telling, his general attitude of curiosity and doubt, or his deep frustration in trying to comprehend mankind.

The next two papers, Pierre Pascal on, "Esenine, poète de la campagne russe" (pp. 55-71), and Nicholas Bachtin on, "Mayakovski" (pp. 72-81), discuss two Russian poets who lived before and under the Bolshevik régime, and their struggles to adjust a full flowing art to the conditions in Russia after 1917. C. L. Wrenn's study of, "Boris Pasternak" (pp. 82-97), is mostly concerned with Pasternak's poetic technique and comments on his translations from English. The last three papers are descriptions of early printed Slavonic books now in English libraries and a transcription of a diary of a voyage to Russia in 1618 and a letter of Tsar Mikhail to James I in 1621. This letter is quite polite.

S. H. T.

SEYMOUR, CHARLES, *Geography, Justice, and Politics at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. New York: American Geographical Society, 1951. Pp.24. \$1.50.

This is the first of the Isaiah Bowman Memorial Lectures. President Seymour calls on his memories of the Paris Conference to illustrate the dire necessity for politicians to be better informed of historical and geographical realities than they were - and unfortunately still are. President Wilson's high idealistic theology and naïve judgments of actual issues are clearly expressed. Mr. Seymour's judgments, however, do not always indicate that he has himself gone much beyond textbook knowledge in Central European history. He speaks (p. 17) of "Danzig, an ancient and purely German port." The historic facts do not bear this interpretation. For, at least, 700 of a total recorded history of 1100 years Danzig (Gdańsk) was a port of the Polish realm. Of much more significance is the fact that Gdańsk was prosperous *only* when it was a Polish Port. But Mr. Seymour is eminently right in insisting that the territorial decisions of the Conference were more nearly just than those of any other peace conference in history. It will be long before another settlement as just will be made.

S. H. T.

SUPER, PAUL, *25 Years with the Poles*. New York: Paul Super Memorial Fund, 1951. Pp. 368. Portrait.

The late Paul Super - known and beloved of the Poles as "Superski" - had a most satisfying life. The twenty-five years he spent in Poland or with Poles as Director of the Polish YMCA were full of ambitious adventure, trials, flights and new and precarious hardships. As a Protestant, he yet built in Catholic Poland an institution which won the admiration and the grateful affection of the whole Polish nation.

These memoirs recount simply yet graphically the story of his work as it was lived. It is of great value from other points of view as well. The reader gets a vivid impression of Polish opinion and reaction to local and world crises in its most sensitive expression - of friend to friend. There is indeed too little of such chronicling in our historical annals. Mr. Super's inextinguishable devotion to the Poles, his resourcefulness and persistence in their needs, go far to explain their deep affection for him and their gratitude both to him and to the International YMCA whose convincing representative he was for so long.

No price, date or place of publication is to be found in the book. It may be assumed that the volume may be obtained from the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences, 145 E. 53rd Street, New York 22.

S. H. THOMSON

HILL, NORMAN, *International Organization*. New York: Harper Brothers. Pp. 627. \$5.00.

This text should serve very well as a vehicle for teaching international organization. Like nearly all texts, it is not the kind of volume which one would choose to read for pleasure and general information. It lacks, as does the whole textbook genus, the third dimension which only the reflective prose of leisurely writing can supply. As a manual of instruction, however, it can definitely be recommended; anyone teaching in the field would do well to examine it.

The approach is analytical, with historical aspects of the subject being treated within each of the logical categories. The organization is simple and effective, and the treatment, while of course far from exhaustive, is suggestive. Instead of forming a solid and indigestible mass at the end of the book, the

text of relevant documents are appended at the end of chapters. The author has chosen these carefully with the result that they contribute to the usefulness and not merely to the bulk of the book.

Professor Hill treats international organizations as being in the main a further elaboration of the diplomatic pattern, but, nonetheless, as a definitely new and second stage in the evolution of organizational forms in the Western State System. Deeply impressed with the magnitude of the challenges with which we are today confronted, he does not believe that international organization is a successful response. But he does not fly to the panacea of world federation. For he is also impressed with the vast differences in political experience, wealth, and values which characterize the peoples of the world. Above all, he is alive to the chasm between East and West. The result of all this is not merely to debilitate the United Nations but to render a more ambitious organization of the world quite fantastic. The most Professor Hill will permit himself to hope for is a closer association of the Western European states, which, by virtue of the menace of Russia, he seems to believe may be within the realm of the practicable.

Washington, D. C.

EDWARD BUEHRIG

KHADDURI, MAJID, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1932*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. Pp. 291. \$5.00.

In this compact volume, Dr. Majid Khadduri, Professor of Middle East Studies in the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, presents a clear objective and well-balanced study of the trials, the tribulations and the political development of the independent state of Iraq. The author moves swiftly through the mandate period to the achievement of independence in 1932 and then carries the reader through the tangled maze of Iraqi politics, especially to the outbreak of World War II, with the various *coups d'état* between 1937 and 1941 and the emergence of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in 1941. Of particular interest is the story of the revolt of Rashid against the British in the spring of 1941, in view of the importance of the British action at the time, when German armies were moving south through the Balkans to the conquest of Greece, the outflanking of Turkey and the possible conquest of the Near East. The role of the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Regent and of those who followed, is well told, although his relationship with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, and their activities in Germany during the war years, yet remain to be characterized.

Professor Khadduri has concentrated the story of Iraqi constitutional development into a single chapter (Ch. X), and, similarly he delineated the development of Iraqi foreign policy into a single, convenient chapter (Ch. XI). In the latter the basic attitudes of Iraq toward the United Kingdom, the United States, the West generally, the Palestine issue, and the states of the Arab League are well analyzed. In his conclusion, the author notes the necessity of adjusting to popular demands in Iraq, if political stability, as well as social and economic progress, is to be achieved. Indeed, he notes that "if the Iraqi Government fails to introduce reforms or to achieve certain national objectives, popular discontent and unrest may be difficult to control." The appendix contains a table of the Hashimi royal family, a list of the Iraqi cabinets since 1920, and a copy of General Nuri Pasha's memorandum of December 15, 1940 with regard to Iraq's position in the world of struggle of the time.

In a day when it is so necessary to have fundamental understanding of the peoples of the Near and Middle East, grounded on basic knowledge, Mr. Khadduri's volume on Independent Iraq makes a very definite contribution.

Arlington, Virginia

HARRY N. HOWARD



ANDERSCH, ALFRED, Ed., *Europäische Avantgarde*. Frankfurt a/M: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1951. Pp. 167. D.M. 14.80.

This anthology, comprised of essays by twelve authors, was edited by a forty-year-old Bavarian, under the auspices of one of the most progressive German periodicals, the *Frankfurter Hefte* (this magazine, edited by a Catholic, is as non-denominational in its outlook as it is non-partisan). Mr. Andersch has assembled these pieces in the hope that, read as a unit, they may help those Germans who still cling to humanist ideals, or have recently discovered them for themselves, to realize that they are not alone. Judging by these twelve vanguard writers from six different nations, Europe, as a spiritual idea, need not be abandoned as a phantom of yesterday. The Europeans do not have to become the "graculi" of the American Century, nor the children of Great Mother Asia; Europe's cathedrals have not yet been turned into frigidaire factories.

The editor defines the European as "the human being who upholds the ideal of freedom." To back up his definition, Andersch has availed himself of the writings of twelve Europeans who - with the exceptions of the philosopher, Erich von Kahler - were born in this century, twelve who testify to the revolt of man against non-thinkers, the robots, the jailers and prisoners. Arthur Koestler begs Europe not to despair and, whatever the political situation, to build "oases" where the free spirit can flourish, though surrounded by anti-spiritual powers. Denis de Rougemont and Ignazio Silone attack the treason and hypocrisy of certain intellectuals who have given up the realm of thought; Vercors admonishes his readers to be aware of the possibility of a new world conflagration; Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, and his wife, Simone de Beauvoir, express the attitude of Existentialism.

Stephen Spender insists that, though Europe may not play a great role in the new century as a geographical unity, the European spirit will, nevertheless continue to spread victoriously over the globe. Emanuel Monier is vehemently opposed to the new wave of defeatism and apocalyptic despair. "Man has art." André Malraux exclaims; "Man can use technique for his benefit!" is Kahler's slogan. The concluding word is by Eugen Kogon, a former inmate of the Buchenwald concentration camp, who is represented here by the text of a speech delivered before a joint meeting of German and French writers four years ago; in it Kogon outlines a European federation that would hold out against all enemies; if it should include a German army, he warns, it must not be led by Nazi generals à la Bruchitsch and Manstein!

New York City

ALFRED WERNER

LAZIC, BRANKO, *Titov Pokret i Režim u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1946*. Munich: 1946. Pp. 29. 7 D.M.

It is an ungrateful and exceedingly difficult task to write the history of a civil war which ended in totalitarian dictatorship making it impossible for the writer to study all the necessary documents. The dictator puts up his own version of civil war and that is the end of the story, till a new, democratic régime may make the archives accessible.

Mr. Branko Lazić tried his best and has given us, on the basis of scattered and necessarily incomplete evidence, the heroically tragic saga of the war in Yugoslavia. His presentation is colored by his Serbian allegiance as he sees the civil war through Serbian eyes. That is understandable though not of much assistance for students of history. However, it helps to balance the fabrics of distortion spread by Communist propaganda (V. Dedijer's *Dnevnik*) and by the Croat Ustaše.

In the introduction, Lazić contributes to the still inadequate knowledge of the history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. He gives the facts of the Serbian national upheaval of March 27, 1941, which the Yugoslav Communists now would like to present as a patriotic deed of their own. He presents some new aspects of the struggle between Mihailović Četniks and Tito's Partizans and describes in some detail the civil war as intermingled with the fighting against the German and other armies of occupation. Little attention is devoted to the international aspect of the happenings on the Yugoslav battlefield but even so the reference to some Communist sources concerning British and American policy towards Tito is of importance to remind us of its fatal shortsightedness.

The second part of Lazić's book describes the policy of Tito's government in the first year after the war.

The book, written in Croatian, will be of only limited use to the American student. The more one has to appreciate the author's efforts; deprived of the possibility to publish it in his own country, he was limited by circumstances to a modest undertaking, omitting mention of the publisher, place and date of publication.

*University of Denver*

JOSEF KORBEL

SCHUELLER, GEORGE K., *The Politburo*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1951. Pp. 79. \$1.25.

This monograph is issued under the auspices of the Hoover Institute and Library as one of several "élite studies" which form part of the Institute's ambitious research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations.

The main emphasis of Mr. Schueller's study is not on the functions and the working methods of the Politburo, but on the origins, the personal, occupational and political history of the twenty-seven men that have been or are members of the Russian "directorate". Undoubtedly there never has been such a careful collection of facts and data utilizing all available source materials and taking advantage as it were, of every possible detail to fill in blank spots in the picture.

For obvious reasons the investigation does not unearth any novel information nor does it add significantly to our knowledge of existing trends. It was well-known before this study that the Politburo personnel under Stalin has undergone significant changes when compared with Lenin's time: the middle-class urban-born intellectual has been replaced completely by the rural born organizer, the propagandist of revolutionary days by the practitioner of police and technological power.

To say that the monograph only systematizes and emphasizes what is already known, does not detract from its usefulness. For instance, the "career lines" of Politburo members, past and present, traced in one of several interesting appendices, will prove invaluable, as will the entire volume, for future sociopolitical investigations in the broad field of élite studies.

The only criticism which may be leveled not so much against the author as against studies of this kind in general, is that Mr. Schueller does not always stick to his self-imposed limitations. The work is presented clearly as "basic research" refraining from interpretations and clinging, it is true, in somewhat "basic English", to a strict interpretative and quantitative analysis. But then there are interspersed some comparative remarks (between Czarist and Bolshevik Russia, between Soviet Russia and the Western World) which are outright naïve and hence make for somewhat painful reading in such a serious study as this.

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HENRY W. EHRLMAN

BRODRICK, ALAN HOUGHTON, *Danger Spot of Europe*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 192. \$3.75.

*Danger Spot of Europe*, the spot being Germany, was written in anticipation of a possible crisis in Europe in 1951. Brodrick's method of presentation is untraditional. He does not marshal an array of evidence pointing toward an inevitable conclusion, or lack thereof. Instead, he gathers together fragments from German history, contemporary observations, and much bric-a-brac. The net result is a specific impression or mood which probably reveals Brodrick's frame of mind as much as it gives a concrete picture of the German problem. While most of the text unquestionably deals with the subject indicated in the title, the chief value of the work is found in the light it throws on the reactions of the British author, confronted with the unpleasant and uncontrollable realities which haunt Europe.

It is plain that the rearming of Germany is distasteful to the author. He gags ever so slightly at the idea of going ". . . through all sorts of antics in order to persuade the West Germans that they were our natural Allies, even if we had a little dissembled our love." (p. 89). Even the German forests appear more sinister, ". . . suggests lairs of beasts more fierce than any lurking farther west." (p. 9). Yet Brodrick raises the question of whether it had been ". . . wise to force issue with him (Hitler) over a country we could neither defend nor even reach (Poland in 1939)?" (p. 41). Most Germans, moreover, had been neither "Nazi nor anti-Nazi." Few had paid any respect to the idea of a "*Herrenvolk*." (p. 105).

Broderick is also appalled by the brutality of contemporary warfare, though resigned to its necessity. "The U.S.A.F. dropped enough bombs in one night to annihilate Dresden and kill, perhaps 100,000 persons, but the raid had no direct effect on the course of the war at all. Still, it is certainly fortunate that the Americans did build up a strategic bombing-force after the war because without this force we might be losing, or have already lost, the Third World War." (p. 148) This quotation epitomizes the author's state of mind. Despite misgivings, he categorically speaks out against any idea of a "neutralized" Germany and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Germany has to be rearmed and integrated with the West. An alliance, tempered with such realistic appraisals, may be more durable than coalitions which look only to the stars.

Montanna State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

KRISTIAN, A. A., *The Right to Self-Determination and the Soviet Union*. London: Boreas Publ. Co., 1952. (*East and West*, No. 6). Pp. 77. 5s.6d.

The author starts from the assumption that the west in general is not sufficiently cognizant of the disparity between Soviet claims and actuality in regard to nationality policy. On a background of the history of Czarist Russian practice in matters of minority nationalities, he highlights the beliefs and actions of Lenin, both before the war and during and after the Revolution. Lenin's belief that the nationalities should be free, even to secede from the Union, is taken almost at its face value. By contrast however, Lenin's successors are shown to have repressed, wherever evident, in the Union any desire for separate national existence. He shows that even the language provisions in the Constitution are invalidated in practice by the imposition of the Russian language in the schools and military and civil service. The author is particularly candid in his treatment of the violations of specific promises by Molotov made to the Baltic states in 1940 that their national entities would be respected, but buttresses his presentation by reference to Soviet attacks on other national cultures within the Union.



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